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PREFACE :
Social Interpretation of Technics courses 
at the IUC/Dubrovnik
The objective of the Inter-University Centre of Post-Graduate 
Studies in Dubrovnik founded in 1971 is to encourage and pro­
mote cooperation among universities through teaching and re­
search. This objective will be realized primarily by organizing 
postgraduate courses and research projects, as it is stated in 
the Constitution of the IUC. The Social Interpretation of Tech­
nics course was first given in 1983, on the request of the di­
rector general. Its title was Science, Technology and Everyday 
Life and it was organized by Tom Kitwood of Bradford 
and Imre Hronszky of Budapest Technological University whom 
the original idea came from. The general aim of the annual 
courses has been to provide a manysided and integrated under­
standing of technological change as a complex social phenomenon. 
The analysis have been based on disciplines ranging from phi­
losophy through history, economics, and sociology to political 
theory. Special attention has been paid to the causes of tech­
nological transformation in different social systems and in 
both developed and developing societies. Various aspects of 
domination, in relation to class, culture, gender, and environ­
ment have formed an integral part of the annual courses.
As it has already been mentioned, the first course was en­
titled Science, Technology and Everyday Life. It had eight par­
ticipants and ten resource persons, as they are called. After 
this rather modest beginning, the course got its final general 
name in the next year. The board of course directors was wid­
ened to include Günter Ropohl (Frankfurt), Srdjan Lelas (Zag­
reb), Boel Berner (Lund), Alois Huning (Düsseldorf). The course 
was devoted to philosophical, political, economic and sociolog­
ical dimensions of technical practice in the modern world. It
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dealt with the ethical dimensions too. Fifteen students could 
enjoy the lectures of such outstanding scholars as Gernot Böhme 
(Darmstadt), Brian Eslea (Sussex), Peter Janich (Marburg), Bern­
ward Joerges (Berlin), Wolfgang König (Berlin-West), Hans Lenk 
(Karlsruhe), Howard Rosenbrock (Manchester), Friedrich Rapp 
(then from Berli-West), and Walter Zimmerli (Braunschweig), who 
also lectured several times in the following years.
Technical and Social Development was the special title in 
1986, the next year. The late Sally Hacker (Oregon), Jaap ‘Jelsma 
(Twente), Eugeniusz Olszewski (Warsaw), and Harry Rothman (As­
ton) were "resource persons" among other outstanding scholars. 
The year 1986 has brought a deep change in the organizational 
work of the course. One of the originators, Tom Kitwood left 
the board. The reason was that he got a new type of research 
work with his university. Boel Berner gave up her directorship 
too. Imre Hronszky was chosen as the coordinating director and 
the board, smaller as it has become, worked just as enthusias­
tically as before. The main theme of the year was Explaining 
Technological Change. Gerd Fleischmann (Frankfurt), Johann 
Götschl (Graz), Jonathan Liebenau (London), Trevor Pynch (York), 
Zoltán Tar (New York) presented important papers among others.
In 1987 the course was focusing on Normative Issues of Technol­
ogy Development. Just to mention a few names, Hjalmar Krupp 
(Karlsruhe), Erika Hickel (Braunschweig), Rolf Homann (Zürich), 
Dieter Birnbacher (Essen), liana Löwy (Paris) read papers on 
the topic. Wolf Schäfer (then Frankfurt) gave a lecture in a 
joint session with the Philosophy of Science course.
The course was partly held as a conference on Conflicting Values 
in Recent Technology Development.
Computers and Society was the topic for 1988. Tibor Vámos 
(Budapest) gave two important lectures. The one about computer­
ization and democracy was organized together with the Philosophy 
and Social Science course. Besides him Hans Götschl, Thomas 
Bernold, Vital!j Gorokhov (Moscow), Ladislaw Tondl, Manfred 
Schmutzer (Vienna), Josef Hochgerner (Vienna), Edward G. Edwards 
(Bradford), Galina Belkina (Moscow) had a major role in main­
taining a high scholarly level.
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This year there were two problems to discuss. Perspectives 
of Automation: Labour and Leisure was the topic for the post­
graduate course. Peter Scharf's (Siegen) and Alfons Schmidt's 
(Frankfurt) lectures balanced the overhelmingly philosophical 
presentations. Prof. Vlcek (Prague) a computer specialist gave 
an especially important talk. The course had a joint session 
with the Future Studies course where Penti Malaska (Helsinki) 
presented a paper. The second topic was discussed within the 
framework of a small "conference", or rather a workshop, enti­
tled Cognitive Science as Basis for New Technologies (Possible 
Social Consequencies). Unfortunately, its organisation was not 
completely successful because of the large number of late can­
cellations. Once again Prof. Vámos helped to secure the scien­
tific quality with a talk about those new developments in dif­
ferent fields that might become important in the further devel­
opment of cognitive science.
The role of the Hungarian resource persons was especially sig­
nificant throughout the series of the Social Interpretation of 
Technics courses. It is enough to mention Pál Tamás and János 
Farkas from Budapest who read remarkable papers nearly every 
year on the sociological side of the problems under discussion. 
In the beginning there was a fairly strong feministic partici­
pation in the annual courses, which , rather unfortunately, has 
diminished later. I have to mention Joan Greenbaum (New York), 
who gave two lectures on the sociology of computerisation, and 
also Siiv Friis (Lund), and Carolyn Merchant (New York) among 
others.
Most of the course directors felt their duty to give a 
lecture each year. The courses generally had about 20-22 par­
ticipants in addition to the 25-28 resource persons every year 
from the second year on. Participants and resource persons came 
from 12-13 countries each year. In 1987 the Soros Foundation 
Committee of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences provided oppor­
tunity for publishing a selection from the materials of the 
course. It genereously supported a special volume of Doxa, the 
Foreign language periodical of the Institute of Philosophy of 
the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. A year later the editors of
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Scientia Juaoslavia generously offered to publish selected 
materials from the 1988 course. They will be printed in a spe­
cial issue by the end of 1989.
(Copies to be requested: Sei. Yuq. 41001 Zaqreb,
Trg. marsala Tita 3, РОВ 327)
Imre Hronszky
TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENT AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 
György Licskó
The participants of the Section for the Social Interpreta­
tion of Technics listen to and discuss some 30-40 lectures an­
nually concerning the consequences and related social problems 
of the development of technics and other issues. We can present 
these problems in a very interesting manner and with a large 
degree of self-assurance. However, very little attention is 
paid to the essence of technics. It is generally the case that 
we are most certainly familiar with a number of definitions but 
none can be considered as being good beyond doubt. The large 
number of available definitions creates uncertainty rather than 
bringing about a firm approach to the interpretation of tech­
nics. In this brief paper I am not going to add another defini­
tion' of technics to the list that is already quite long <there 
are more than two hundred of these in fact. I wish to confine 
myself to making an attempt to underline the essence of tech­
nics .
The definitions which consider one or another of the com­
ponents of technics (means of production, science, invention 
and its application, human activity and so on) as essential are 
seen as deficient and one-sided, while those which list too 
many of the composite elements cannot be used because there are 
no set parameters beyond which one cannot go. Certainly, the 
fact that at times and places one or another of the composite 
elements of technics came into the picture, and, in turn, dis­
tracted attention from the others, also had part to play in the 
formulation of one-factor definitions. Development which occurs 
at an ever faster pace has led to increased individual special­
ization in terms of objectivization, information, knowledge and 
methods. Simultaneously, specialization has had an impact on
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man's whole way of thinking. Under such conditions this think­
ing tends to adopt a one-sided approach to complex phenomena.
We know, however, that increasing specialization has brought 
about the demand for integration. The majority of studies writ­
ten in recent years on the concept and essence of technics ap­
pear to show that the demand for integration is gaining the 
upper hand.
The present tendency of thinking focused on the essence of 
technique indicates that researchers are attempting to estab­
lish a complex concept capable of including as many composite 
elements as possible. It is true that efforts of this kind are 
designed to satisfy a realistic demand, but it is also quite 
clear that the more they endeavour to meet this requirement, 
the more awkward and more complicated the definition formulated 
in this spirit will be. In my view, the problem of giving a 
definition presently arises from the fact that the rapid de­
velopment of, and changes in technics render the concept so 
dynamic that it can no longer be treated according to the con­
ventional rules which govern the formulation of definitions. 
Thus a new and different method must be sought for clarifying 
the essence of technique.
The евзепое of technique
On the basis of facts made available by archeology and 
cultural history it is the generally accepted view today that 
technics is as old as man himself. Accordingly, like work, 
technique can be regarded as a category of social ontology.
Both work and technique are the most obvious proofs of man's 
carrying on goal-oriented, and non-instinctive activity. Work 
is a purposeful activity performed in the interests of meeting 
specific human and social needs, and the only thing by which 
man can perform this purposeful activity with increasing ef­
ficiency is technique. Man needs tools, methods, knowledge, 
ability, skills, organization and many other things to be able 
to increase the efficiency of his activity. In relation to one 
another all these elements taken together make up technology
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and it is common to each of them that they contribute to the en 
hancement of the efficiency of human work.
While animals adjust themselves to the environment, man can 
change it. Performing work is the precondition for changing the 
environment and, as a result of work, a constant relationship 
is brought about between man and his environment. Since in this 
reciprocal relationship man is the active party, new possibil­
ities are constantly being created for the performance of con­
scious activity. However, these can only be taken full advan­
tage of if they are first recognized and if this is followed 
by the establishment of the appropriate means, tools, methods 
and organizational forms, along with the development of the 
required individual abilities. In other words, the need for the 
use and subsequent implementation of new possibilities calls 
for the development of technique. It follows from increasing 
efficiency that we can always include new things in the sphere 
of our activities and that we can develop ever more intensively 
the things to which our activity has already been extended.
This is why we can regard technique as a category of social 
ontology of primary importance. Without it, that is, without 
increasing the efficiency of goal-oriented activity, the human 
abilities providing for the dynamism of modulating the en­
vironment would not be able to develop. Man is forced to bring 
these abilities into play by the endeavour to make his work 
more efficient - in other words, to help the technical pos­
sibilities of his relationship with his environment develop.
Increasing efficiency can be taken into account equally 
with each factor that is included in the definition of technics 
but is not exclusively attached to any of them. Similarly, we 
can speak of the effectiveness of the application of means, 
tools, methods or systems in the same manner as we can speak 
of the efficiency of knowledge, skills, organization or solu­
tions. Thus we can denote two areas of technique that belong 
to one another: the area of objective factors and that of sub­
jective ones. As for the objective factors, which take the 
form of means, tools and machine equipment, these have now 
grown to be immensely powerful and can give the impression that
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they have a predominant role to play within the whole complexity 
of technique. However, the technical development taking place 
today reveals that automation puts the role played by the human 
factor very much into the focus of attention. But this statement 
is also true the other way around. By this I mean that scienti­
fic knowledge and methods, or sophisticated individual skills, 
can only prove to be technical factors in the operation of 
complicated assemblies of objects that have assumed enormous 
dimensions if they correspond to the above-mentioned list. Thus 
technique whose objective and subjective sides are interpreted 
in the above manner can only make goal-oriented human activity 
efficient or can only increase its efficiency if they are com­
bined and are in mutual relationship with one another.
In this context mention can also be made of the problem of 
what is termed technological determinism. In this field deter­
minism can only mean that the mutual adequacy of the objective 
and subjective sides of technology is a necessary requirement. 
Individual know-how which ensures smooth and undisturbed opera­
tion, as well as the social needs and organizational framework 
that accept the technical equipment and can provide for all the 
conditions demanded by use, is required for the optimum opera­
tion of any technical equipment or device.
Efficiency which has been increased by way of the acquisi­
tion of particular technical complexities can, however, be uti­
lized in different ways. The method and objectives of use can 
be determined by factors other than those mentioned only too 
emphatically by technical determinism. As a rule, each increase 
in technical efficiency can lead to an increase in the effici­
ency of the culture in which it was developed or by which it 
was adopted. The opportunities for utilization can be judged 
on the basis of the kind of activity being carried on by the 
people of a certain culture, or the way the different activities 
are classified according to their order of values.
For example, feudal European culture in the Middle Ages a- 
dopted harness-making technology from equestrian normadic peoples 
who had a migratory and predatory way of life, but feudal Euro­
pean culture used this technology first and foremost to increase
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the efficiency of land cultivation and land transport. In other 
words, the peoples of feudal Europe did not become migratory 
equestrian nomads after their adoption of this technology. As 
far as our age is concerned, a period which enjoys a developed 
air transportation network, those people who helped develop this 
did not even think that passanger aircraft could enhance the ef­
ficiency of the activities of terrorists at a later stage. Re­
cognition of the opportunities and translating into practice - 
what lies in them - a process that is embodied in the activity's 
becoming more effective - is to a very large extent the function 
of the system of activities which is acquired and practised by 
the individuals of a specific culture.
The moral responsibility of technical development
Let us carry on the socio-ontological examination of tech­
nique which is formulated on a most general plane and relate it 
to a narrower field. I wish to discuss briefly the divergence 
between technial progress and moral demands, which may well have 
existed as early as Antiquity, but which has become an acute and 
problematic issue in our world of advanced technology. The pos­
sibility of this divergence was forcefully mentioned in a most 
dramatic fashion by Sophocles, one of the greatest artictic 
figures of Ancient Greece. This is what the chorus praising man 
says, among other things, in his play, Antigone'.
"Clever beyond all dreams
the inventive craft that he has
which may drive him one time or another to well or ill."
The idea formulated by Sophocles so admirably, and with classic 
conciseness and artistic power raises two very serious ques­
tions: Firstly, on what does it depend that man uses the prod­
ucts of his creative powers for good or bad ends? Secondly, can 
an example of human creative work be automatically bad or harm­
ful by itself?
The first question has implications for both the individual 
and for society. Individually a person can be evil, or a mad­
man running amok, and as such he can utilize anything against 
another person or other people. This possibility also arises
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from the ontological essence of man. A human being acting con­
sciously is capable of recognizing that the means at this dis­
posal can be used in different ways and for different purposes. 
Man has been familiar with this problem ever since the pre­
historic age. However, it emerged as a very serious issue when 
science and technique began to develop by leaps and bounds and, 
as a result, increasing potential came to be concentrated in 
the objects created by man. It is profoundly horrific to imag­
ine what would happen if a terrorist managed to hijack an air­
craft with nuclear weapons on board - hopefully such an even­
tuality is quite impossible. The rapidly growing efficiency of 
science and technics contributes to the increased efficiency 
of the people who can take advantage of the achievements of 
their joint development in their day-to-day activity. In this 
respect we can accept the view put forward by Carlo M. Cipolla 
that: "There is nothing more dangerous than technical knowledge 
when unaccompanied by respect for human life and human values 
... Instructing a savage in advanced techniques does not change
him into a civilized person; it just makes him an efficient 
2savage."
However, the problem becomes much more complicated if we 
take society as our point of departure, and not the individual. 
There is much depressing historical evidence to testify to the 
effect that there exists not only primitive savagery; there is 
also "civilized savagery", however paradoxical the term may 
sound. The technics of large-scale homicide was first applied 
in Europe. Knowledge or what is termed culture based upon the 
humanities cannot therefore be a guarantee by itself against 
civilized barbarism. It cannot ensure that the achievements of 
science and technics are not used for inhuman purposes. Guar­
antees of this can only be provided by completely open politi­
cal conditions under which no totalitarian power can silence 
or eliminate moral responsibility. Where it is impossible to 
speak openly and make democratic decisions concerning the use 
of means and methods, there will always be a danger of abusing 
the increasing efficiency of science and technics.
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Let us examine another issue. What is the extent to which 
any new achievement of the development of science and technique 
can be detrimental? Obviously, to this category belong weapons, 
the means designed to be used for destruction. These are not 
worth discussing. Instead, let us focus our attention on those 
means which are not intended for war purposes, yet their ef­
ficiency is far higher than that of those in which the achieve­
ments of science have not as yet been objectivized. In general, 
the supporters of technical determinism emphasize that man has 
to adapt himself to the technical milieu he has himself brought 
about. The view which holds that technique as such is neutral 
and only its use can be valued in a positive or negative way 
runs counter to the above concept. I believe that we must 
challenge both concepts. In my opinion, on the one hand man is 
not necessarily put at the mercy of technical alienation and, 
on the other hand, each level of technical development has an 
impact on man's activity as a whole. For man is an integral 
part of a technique that is operating efficiently. It is he 
who operates, regulates and applies it, therefore he is struc­
turally incorporated in it as a subjective factor. "A boy", 
writes Cipolla, "playing with a mechanical toy and a scientist 
using a computer will both be deeply affected in the workings 
of their minds, their inclinations and their curiosities by 
the gadgetry they are using. The technologies nurtured by a 
culture may easily have a cumulative effect on it."^
The ideas I have quoted appear to be arguments in favour 
of technological determinism. In fact they do not completely 
support this principle. For if the means, methods and know­
ledge used or possessed, respectively, by man have an influ­
ence to exert on him, then they will invariably induce a cer­
tain active reaction in him. Let me repeat that the objective 
and subjective components of technique jointly embody the 
structure operating efficiently. Man is a part of this system 
who can, or even, as a result of his ontological characteris­
tics, is obliged to, change the whole system constantly. And 
if the possibility or compulsion for change prevails, then 
the only issue that remains problematic is the factor that 
determines the change.
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One of the most outstanding and versatile historians of our 
century, Arnold J. Toynbee, was very intensively concerned in 
the 1960s with the influence exerted by science and technique 
on society. This was quite natural. The renowned scholar was 
close to his 80th birthday, and had experienced the impact of 
scientific and technical development, the pace of which had ab­
ruptly accelerated as though it was some sort of shock. In his 
studies dating from this period (Change and Habit; The Challenge 
of Our Times Experiences ) he examined the reasons lying behind 
the divergence between the heart and the mind - to use figura­
tive terms. In Toynbee's view, the heart which, in other words, 
is man's biological and emotional state, is of a static nature 
in contrast to the mind, which is equal to science and tech­
nique, and which is of a dynamic character. In previous ages, 
the dynamism of the mind and the static nature of the heart 
were in harmony. However, this harmony came to be disrupted in 
the wake of the industrial revolution and, by the second half 
of the twentieth century, the divergence had grown too great.
The development of science and technics leads to changes of 
such a fast pace that man is incapable of catching up biological­
ly, emotionally and morally. Man's nature cannot change at so 
fast a pace compared to that at which our artificial environment, 
the scene of our day-to-day life, changes or at which we change 
it.
Cipolla singles out the same problem with reference to 
ethics. He writes: "The fact is that technology develops cu­
mulatively, while ethics does not; technology is easy to impart 
while ethical wisdom is difficult to disseminate. The develop­
ment of technology over past centuries has been dramatic. But 
has it been proportionate to our ethical standards and our 
philosophical and social maturity?"4 Both authors I have quoted 
are free from nostalgic illusions. They are fully aware that 
the development of science and technique is an irreversible 
process. Toynbee describes the divergence or conflict between 
the mind and the heart as the third world war of mankind and 
adds that its outcome is totally unpredictable. Cipolla, how­
ever, emphasizes that - as I quoted earlier - the increasing 
efficiency of science and technology must be accompanied by
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moral demands corresponding to it.
Now, I believe, we have taken at least one stride forward 
towards a solution. Today we are richer in terms of experience 
and lessons gained and learned than we were before the 1970s. 
Today we know that the goal we must try to achieve is not to 
dominate Nature but to avoid conflict with our natural environ­
ment, or at least not to create conflict. This recognition 
gears the development of science and technique in a direction 
which truly corresponds to man's interests instead of going 
against them. This is the only way, namely by recognizing our 
real opportunities, in which we can avert the incalculable con­
sequences of boomerang effects. In any case, the past one and 
half decades have had a sobering influence on societies that 
have become intoxicated by the belief that science and tech­
nique can be omnipotent. The exclamation marks accompanying the 
proud statements prompted by the above belief have been trans­
formed into question marks at several points. Therefore we can 
now formulate a more realistic judgement of the value of the 
role being played by science and technique, without aiming to 
reduce their real value.
Scientific and technical development can also have a posi­
tive effect on the further development of certain moral norms. 
However, the divergence which was mentioned earlier undoubtedly 
exists. But it is not so sure that its existence is a major 
problem. True enough, it may well be the source of numerous 
dangers. It may degrade certain values and emotions, and could 
cause both thinking and action to get carried away or pushed 
into extremes and excesses. However, we are firmly of the opin­
ion that it would be a greater danger if divergence between the 
heart and mind, between technical rationalism and moral demands, 
failed to develop. In logical terms this would be possible in 
two cases: either if dynamic development were prevented by 
force or if we completely adapted ourselves to alienated tech­
nical rationalism and translated Aldous Huxley's "Brave New 
World" into practice. Neither of the two is the path to take.
Man rejects both the return to some sort of earlier and poorer 
state as well as complete adaptation to alienated technical 
rationalism of any kind.
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Settlement of the problem calls for the development of 
human abilities which are demanded by the rapidly growing ef­
ficiency of science and technique at a very high level. This is 
the field in which the normative issues of technical progress 
can be identified. In an ontological sense, man can be defined 
as a being consciously changing the conditions of his subsist­
ence. This is the very activity for which he uses increasingly 
efficient technique. In the final resort it is labour and tech­
nique that bring about the development of man's needs and 
demands which can lead him to success. These demands are partly 
individual abilities and partly the ability to cooperate with 
others. The use of even the simplest tools can develop in man 
the individual and cooperative abilities which are essential 
for the performance of successful labour. The more complicated 
and efficient the means and methods of labour, the greater the 
role of human abilities necessary for applying them.
The accelerated pace of the development of science and 
technique in fact renders dubious the mutual adequacy of the 
objective and subjective factors of activity. But the sheer 
recognition of the problem and its expression constitute re­
sults. It prompts us to seek the ways and means of ensuring 
adequacy. I believe that in this field the most important thing 
of all is to establish and become fully aware of a "multidimen- • 
sional responsibility". There is an excellent basis of princi­
ple and methodology paving the way to the understanding of the 
above problem.
This is provided in a study written by János Neumann over 
thirty years ago. Neumann poses the question as follows: "Can 
we survive technique?". What he meant is whether or not we can 
survive the consequences of the rapidly growing efficiency of 
the means and methods at our disposal. Neumann considered sur­
vival to be possible and formulated a highly important funda­
mental principle as the precondition for it. His point of de­
parture was the assumption that the application of science and 
technics has reached the level making it possible artifically 
to disturb or reproduce processes in Nature. In terms of time 
and space, however, Nature is of a scale very different from 
that of human life. Nature - as Neumann wrote - operates ther-
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mo-nuclear processes everywhere and it operates them well, but 
their minimum space demand is equivalent to the distance be­
tween the stars above us. However, man, operating a nuclear 
reactor (or an atomic bomb), has an incomparably smaller space 
at his disposal. It can be added that the same applies to the 
time available to man. What follows from this comparison? It 
follows that if in our own micro-world (on our globe) we repro­
duce thermo-nuclear reaction which is adequate for the macro­
cosmos, we must perform the job more accurately, more consid­
erately and in a controllable fashion. Otherwise chain reaction, 
due to its inherent nature, will assume macro-cosmic dimensions 
and wil destroy man.
It is true that Neumann's example is a pointed one, but it 
is highly instructive and can be generalized. It can be regard­
ed as an analogue for each efficient intervention having an 
impact on man's conditions of subsistence. Let us try to imag­
ine the unforeseeable consequences of a genetical intervention 
that turns out to be detrimental in retrospect. The application 
of efficient means, methods and knowledge calls for a different 
type of discipline, responsibility, prudence and reliability to 
be displayed or borne by man compared to the type needed in the 
less developed periods of science and technique. Earlier the 
errors in activity could be recognized and eliminated while it 
was being carried on, or else its harmful consequences were not 
so devastating. Today, however, we can, as a rule, recognise 
that error or negligence can lead to consequences which are 
often impossible to set right.
Therefore, the rapid progress made by science and tech­
nique prompts man to elaborate and acquire norms which can 
render safe the use of "super efficient" methods and means. We 
know only too well that there has always been a need for dis­
cipline, responsibility and reliability. Let us take a look at 
transport in general and mass transport in particular. A couple 
of centuries ago the principal means was the coach. Naturally, 
there had to be a person then to be in charge of the service 
and its organization. But it would be impossible to compare 
the responsibility borne hundreds of years ago by the man 
directing the coaches and that borne by people controlling air
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traffic at any major airport. As long as the anthropomorphic
tendency dominated human activity, there was no danger of ir­
reversibility looming on the horizon. Modern science and the 
technique of machines, however, deprive our activity and our 
thinking of their anthropomorphic character. The latter tend­
ency concentrates the powers of the human brain and Nature in 
the world of objects fashioned by man. The new dimensions of 
responsibility, discipline, reliability and so forth must be 
developed in order to "keep things under control".
The most important of the dimensions of the kind mentioned 
above are irreversibility and the irredeemable. The more ef­
ficient we can make our own activity, the more we have to make 
plans and think in the two categories listed above. This is a 
demand that is brought about by the development at an acceler­
ated pace of science and technique. This is why we can assert 
with good reason that this development has also a positive 
influence to exert even on the progress of socio-ethical norms. 
It makes man assess the expected consequences of his activity 
in longer perspectives in terms of both space and time.
The development of science and technique is not a venture 
without inherent danger. The anxiety voiced by Cipolla in this 
context is quite justified. Efficient technology is only too 
easy to spread, but the norms needed for safe application can 
only be established and made into general demands to be met in 
a period extending to several decades. Toynbee's anxiety is 
also warranted. It is not certain that man's biorhythm is 
capable of following the increasing pace of technical develop­
ment without suffering damage. Obviously, the optimum pace has 
to be found.
In our age we have to adjust ourselves to the changing en­
vironment several times even during the relatively short period 
of one generation. As regards problems of the above kind today, 
there are many issues left to be settled. At the very least we 
cannot as yet supply answers to all questions with appropriate 
certainly.
One thing, however, we know for sure: we cannot turn back. 
Man is not prepared to abandon the results he has achieved 
today in terms of his self-assertion. The people engaged in 
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scientific and technical activities will not conceal their 
future discoveries from now on. We have to reckon with diver­
gence between the heart and the mind, between technical devel­
opment and socio-ethical demands. But the fact that we have 
recognized this divergence offers us the opportunity to keep 
it within optimum limits and to develop the tendencies designed 
to counter-balance its detrimental influences the new dimen­
sions of responsibility, disciplined operation and reliability 
in cooperation. In technical facilities a large amount of sci­
entific knowledge and many human abilities come to be objec- 
tivized. To operate them effectively increasingly involves a 
new type of responsibility and new moral demands.
Technical University, Budapest
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ETHICAL ASPECTS OF LONG-TERM ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL IMPACTS
OF TECHNICAL DEVELOPMENT
Dieter Birnbacher
1. f«w temporal dimeneione of technological impact
The subject I am going to deal with is future ethics. Fu­
ture ethics is a rather recent offshoot of applied ethics, a- 
rising out of the necessity to consider ethical problems con­
nected with the long term effects of present actions - actions 
both by commission and by omission. I say "necessity" of con­
sidering the ethical side of long effects because future ethics 
is, once again, coming onto the scene rather late. The facts 
are already there, long before ethics has come round to ask 
whether they should be allowed to happen. Again, the owl of 
Minerva spreads its wings, after the real world's problems have 
had time enough to accumulate. Instead of preventing these 
problems from being there in the first place, all that philos­
ophy can do is to contribute to their practical solution in 
an Hegelian act of "Aufhebung", transforming them into theo­
retical problems in a purely intellectual realm, and deliber­
ately forgetting, for a while at least, that they are at the 
same time out there in the real world.
One source of the problems from which future ethics derives 
its raieon d ’etre is the fact that modern technology has pro­
vided the means to control man's future history on a hitherto 
unprecedented scale. The physical dimensions and the time span 
of the side-effects of man's technical control of his environ­
ment continue to expand. The potential physical impact of the 
carbon dioxide emissions produced by the combustion of fossil 
fuels equals those of major changes in the earth's climatic 
history. The physical impact of an all-out nuclear exchange 
between the superpowers equals or even exceeds that of an
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astrophyeical cataclysm such as that which probably led to the 
extinction of dinosaurs in geological time. On the other hand, 
the delay time of the effects produced by present technical 
procedures may amount to several generations. Insofar as the 
changes introduced into the environment by modem technology 
are irreversible, the effects may even be felt by all future 
generations ever to live - a rather uncanny idea. The nuclear 
bomb, for one thing, cannot be "disinvented" Even if all the 
nations possessing the bomb at the present moment should agree 
to scrap their nuclear arsenals within a year's time, knowledge 
about the bomb's construction and potential use would not so 
easily become lost. The bomb would go on to constitute a threat 
- indeed a threat to all future generations - even if it only 
existed in blueprint.
A second source of the problems future ethics is dealing 
with is the expansion of what we know about technology's long­
term risks. Scanty though this knowledge is in many respects, 
it is sufficient to confront us with moral dilemmas unknown to 
our sore comfortably ignorant ancestors. The growth of prog­
nostic knowledge - itself dependent on advances in prognostic 
technology - makes it increasingly difficult to absolve oneself 
from «X post reproaches by pleading ex ante ignorance. As know­
ledge about the probable or potential long-term effects of 
present technology advances, moral pressure to take respon­
sibility for them increases. Knowledge, control and respon­
sibility are linked to each other, and since lost innocence is 
lost forever, the pressure of responsibility can only grow and 
never diminish.
In the following, I shall discuss three topics in the 
ethics of long-term technological impacts, in an admittedly 
fragmentary and tentative way: 1. the question of the right and 
wrong of the common practice of dieeounting future values and 
disvalues and the associated tendency to restrict responsibil­
ity to the near future by weighting short-term good and harm 
more heavily than long-term good and harm;
2. the question of how to deal, in theory, with irravereible 
changes directly and indirectly produced by modern technology; 
and 
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3. the problem of the criteria to follow in judging the accep­
tability of long term technological riaka.
Though central to any satisfactory future ethics, these 
three questions, and especially questions 2 and 3, are still 
largely an agenda for the future. There has been a certain 
amount of discussion, but it is fair to say that the issues are 
as widely open today as they were in the early 1970s.
2. Diecounting future valuea and diavaluea
One of the obstacles standing in the way of an ethically 
acceptable assessment of potential long term harms and benefits 
of present actions and omission is the practice of diaoounting 
future values and disvalues common in economics. In discounting, 
future values are calculated as less valuable, and disvalues as 
being less of a disvalue, today than at the time they will ac­
tually come about. The later the date of incidence of the fu­
ture event, and the higher the rate of discount chosen, the 
greater the difference between what the future value is worth 
then and what it is worth now.
A majority of economists take discounting of future values 
for granted, mostly because it seems to fit in a natural way 
the phenomenon of time preference, of valuing the more remote 
in time less than the near-at-hand, common both in private and 
collective planning. It largely remains for the philosopher to 
raise the question as to the juatifioation of this piece of 
deliberate myopia. The question to ask is: how can discounting 
future values and disvalues possibly be justified? After all, 
position in time is not a feature that alters somehow the inner 
nature of a value. Whether the value is of a subjective kind 
like pleasure or knowledge, or of an objective kind like beauty 
or truth, position in time cannot make a difference to the 
amount of value these states of affairs carry with them, How 
can a time-bomb that will with certainty kill 100 people in a 
hundred years time be any less of an evil than a time bomb 
killing the same number of people in 10 years hence, or right 
now?
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There are quite a number of jobs economists want dis­
counting to do, and each application of the device has to be 
examined on its own merits and demerits.
First, discounting is applied to future monetary values in 
order to account for the phenomenon of interest. Future monetary 
values are calculated to be less worth now than they will be in 
several years time because in an economy with a positive real 
rate of interest a smaller sum of money is needed now to yield 
the same sum then. This is fair enough. Future money is not 
the same as money now, because money now means that I can pos­
sibly profit from interest by making an investment that yields 
me more money in the future. Likewise, in an economy with a 
positive real rate of interest, a future harm that can be fully 
compensated by money, is less of a harm now than it is then.
The amount of money I have to save now in order to compensate 
the deunage then, will be less than the cost of the damage at 
the time when it actually occurs.
There can be thus no objection in principle to the dis­
counting of future values whenever this is applied to monetary 
values or to future benefits and future harms that can be 
adequately compensated in monetary terms. It should however be 
clear that the legitimacy of discounting in such cases depends 
on a presupposition, namely that the assumed real rate of in­
terest will obtain during the whole time from the present to 
the incidence of the future value. Discounting future monetary 
values thus involves a heavy piece of economic forecasting. As 
is well known, however, economic forecasting is riddled with 
all kinds of uncertainties. Planning models that assume in an a 
priori manner that economic growth is going on at the present 
rate indefinitely, must be viewed with some suspicion. Even if 
discounting future monetary values in justified in principle, 
it is not in effect justified whenever the underlying assump­
tions about the continuity and stability of economic growth 
seem to be highly idealized.
Second, discounting of future values is directly applied 
to future utilities and disutilities in order to account for 
the common phenomenon of time preference. Time preference as a
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psychological phenomenon is a complex of various different ten­
dencies. Most prominent among them are the tendencies of pure 
time preference and of limited altruiem. Pure time preference 
is the tendency to prefer a value in the near future to an 
otherwise equal value in the far future, and to prefer a dis- 
value in the far future to an otherwise equal disvalue in the 
near future. Limited altruism is the even more familiar phenom­
enon of preference for own benefits to the benefits of others. 
For the psychological discounting of harms and benefits very 
far in the future, limited altruism is the crucial explanation. 
Even if we do not care sufficiently for harms and benefits 
falling into our own probable lifespan, we care even less for 
harms and benefits beyond our individual deaths.
It should be obvious that discounting future utility and 
disutility is imprudent if it concerns our own individual fu­
ture, and immoral if it concerns future generations. As con­
cerns imprudence, whoever bases his personal life plan on dis­
counting future benefits will inevitably come to regret this 
in due time. To the 50 years old, the 60th year of his life 
will be no further away as the 30th year to the 20 years old, 
but with a policy of discounting future utility he will not 
have saved enough to provide adequately for his old age. As 
' concerns immorality, whoever bases his lifestyle, as modern 
technological society does, on a generous disregard for the 
losses to be suffered and the benefits foregone by future gen­
erations, will not be able to stand up to the elementary moral 
, test of putting himself in the other's shoes. He certainly
would not wish that his ancestors had discounted his own utility 
and disutility in the way he is discounting the utility and 
disutility of his grandchildren.
Thirdly, discounting is applied to future utility for 
reasons of intergenerational equality. In this application, the 
underlying motivation for discounting is not economic or psy­
chological, but moral: given that economic growth and techno­
logical progress will make later generations vastly more wealthy 
(and their lives vastly more comfortable) than earlier ones, it 
is only fair that earlier generations do not feel called upon
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to save more for later generations than the minimum required 
to keep progress going. Discounting the utility that future 
generations will reap from their ancestors' investments is one 
way to achieve this equalization, because the rate of saving 
assuring the optimal growth of the economy will be far less 
with discounting future benefits than it would be without it.
For many ethicists intergenerational equalization will be 
a value important enough to justify temporal redistributions 
in one's own favour, provided a) that economic growth can be 
expected to go on and b) that economic growth really does make 
people happier. But apart from the question how realistic these 
latter assumptions are, I have to confess that I do not at all 
sympathize with this kind of egalitarian intergenerational 
thinking. My reason is that from a truly impartial intergen- 
erational point of view (such as a temporal interpretation of 
John Rawls's original position) a growth path with the more 
overall utility for all generations would seem to be clearly 
preferable to a growth path with less overall utility but a 
more equalized intergenerational distribution. Even if earlier 
generations have to make heavier sacrifices for later genera­
tions in the utility maximizing scenario than in the equalizing 
scenario, a rational decisionmaker behind the "veil of ignoran­
ce" could do nothing better, in my view, than to choose the 
former.
But however one may think about this rather fundamental 
distributive question, it can safely be said that discounting 
future utility and disutility seems rather unsuited for the 
distributive job it is made to do in this application. Instead 
of making explicit the principles of distributive justice un­
derlying the intergenerational redistribution, discounting 
clouds the issue by giving a distorted view of the facts. The 
problem of intergenerational distribution should be solved by 
explicitly giving criteria of intertemporal justice, not by 
representing the facts in such a way that problems of justice 
do not arise.
The conclusion of this brief discussion is that even if 
the discounting of future utilities for psychological reasons
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is excluded, difficult problems remain. One problem is to 
estimate the extent to which future utilities and disutilities 
will be capable of compensation by money. Even if it is ir­
responsible to discount future disutilities as such in present 
calculations, they will be legitimate candidates for dis­
counting to the extent that they can be compensated by monetary 
values. To give an example: if gigantic dams will have to be 
built in a hundred years time to protect the North Sea coast 
from flooding due to the melting of parts of the Antarctic ice 
cap, the construction costs of these dams will doubtless be 
legitimate candidates for discounting (provided economic growth 
does not come to a halt and the real interest rate does not 
become negative). But what shall we say of the aesthetic losses 
suffered by the construction of these dams, of the interfer­
ence with the subjective identity of the people living in those 
parts, or of the fear generated by such man-made natural disas­
ters? The Lebenagefahl of whole generations, their basic atti­
tude of trust and distrust in man's ability to control his en­
vironment by rational principles and technological means might 
conceivably change, and not for the better. I doubt whether 
such basic changes in attitude are in principle candidates for 
monetary compensation, i.e. that the disutility incorporated 
in such changes can be adequately measured by monetary gains.
3. The problem of аааеаагпд irreveraibilitiea
I shall now briefly touch on another problem arising in 
the context of the evaluation of the long-term consequences of 
technological advance, the problem of irreversibilities. Know­
ing, or having good reasons to believe, that a technologically 
induced change in the world is irreversible, is generally held 
to constitute a good reason for preventing its happening. At 
the very least, it is held to constitute a good reason to give 
more than normal thought to the question whether introducing 
the change is really called for. In any case, irreversibility 
is taken to be a factor that tells against the introduction of 
the change, over and above the harm or risk implied in its con­
sequences. What is rather obscure, however, is how this -
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largely intuitive - reaction to irreversibility can be justified.
In particular, the question arises if the factor of irreversi­
bility can somehow be made commensurable with other risk fac­
tors, thereby opening a way to a rational assessment of its 
relative weight.
Irreversibility can be understood in a stronger and a 
weaker sense. Changes or states are irreversible in a weak 
sense if they cannot be reversed by human means, but might dis­
solve spontaneously without human intervention. Irreversible 
changes in this weak sense are most anthropogenic changes of 
climate. Changes or states are irreversible in a strong sense, 
on the other hand, if there is no chance of spontaneous dis­
solution. In some way or other we have to cope with them. Ir­
reversible changes in this strong sense are the extinction of 
innumerate plant and animal species due to the expansion of 
civilisatory activities in the 19th and 20th centuries.
In the f o l l o w i n g  I shall c o n c e n t r a t e  on s t r o n g l y  irreversi­
ble changes, a n d  especially on those directly or indirectly 
caused by man. They have come about either by being deliberate­
ly sought (like the exploitation of minerals, the hunting of 
rare species, or the eradication of infectious diseases), or by 
being admitted to happen as side effects (like the extinction 
of numerous species of bats and butterflies). Differently from 
the biologist, the ethicist is mainly interested in anthropo­
genic irreversibilities because only these can be prevented 
with a certain effort. The question is: should this effort be 
made? What are the dimensions of negative value inherent in an 
irreversibility?
To begin with, a distinction should be made between two 
dimensions of value inherent in an irreversibility: the posi­
tive or negative value attached to an irreversible change 
because it is in fact not reversed, and the additional positive 
or negative value attached to it for the reason that it cannot 
be reversed. The first dimension of value is unspecific. It 
attaches likewise to changes which are in principle reversible 
but which are never in fact reversed, perhaps from ignorance 
or thoughtlessness. The second dimension of value, on the other 
hand, depends on the specific modality of irreversibility.
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The essential negative component of the value attached 
to irreversibilities in the first dimension is the utility 
foregone by later generations. That a thing is irretrievably 
lost means that it cannot be a source of benefit to future 
people. The extinction of a biological species means that all 
future generations are prevented from benefiting from the 
species in economic, scientific or aesthetic respects. Of 
course, irreversible changes are not always changes for the 
worse. Securing the ultimate eradication of a disease does not 
only mean that all later generations are saved from suffering 
from it but also that they are saved the necessity to eradicate 
it by their own efforts. Often, however, primarily positive ir­
reversibilities have negative side effects, and primarily neg­
ative irreversibilities positive ones. An irreversibility of a 
primarily positive nature is, I presume, the intergenerational 
process of increasing scientific knowledge and increasing 
technical know-how. This process is not without its ambiva­
lences. One striking exemplification of the "dialectics of en­
lightenment" is the fact that the expansion of knowledge and 
rationality leaves people very little chance to adhere to tradi­
tional forms of religious belief with the unreservedness of 
their forefathers. Though western culture is still officially 
Christian in basic outlook, people who actually believe in the 
Creed, in a traditional, not yet watered down, sense, tend to 
be culturally isolated. Energy production by nuclear fission, 
on the other hand, a technology with irreversible consequences 
of a primarily negative nature, also involves positive ones. 
While the longevity of nuclear waste restricts the freedom of 
later generations to choose their own life forms, availability 
of this technology for energy production also enlarges their 
range of choices.
With irreversibilities of a primarily negative kind, eval­
uation of future costs and opportunity costs will mainly de­
pend on two factors, future demand and substitutability. These 
two factors are not independent. With a highly specific demand, 
the thing irreversibly lost will be less substitutable than 
with a less specific one. To take the extremes: any ton of
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phosphorus lost In the Atlantic Ocean Is as irretrievably lost 
as a loved one killed in an accident. Every object has in­
exhaustibly many properties and aspects of which only a few 
correspond to an interest on our part. The greater the number 
of properties interesting us, the less will the thing be re­
placeable. The extinction of a biological species is no real 
loss (in value terms) if all its economic, scientific and 
aesthetic functions are taken over by other species. Even if 
butterfly В is no adequate substitute for butterfly A as far 
as its individual configuration of properties is concerned, it 
may be a sufficient substitute as far as its humanly significant 
properties are concerned. The aesthetic satisfaction provided 
by В may be no less than that provided by A. The situation is 
different, however, if A produces a certain chemical substance 
for which there will be an urgent need 2000 years hence. The 
trouble is that we do not know either the future demand nor 
all the potentially interesting properties of biological spe­
cies.
All this concerns the first, unspecific dimension of 
value. The second dimension comes into play when we take into 
consideration that later generations will not only be objec­
tively prevented from making use of a resource, but may also 
subjectively react to this fact, both by knowing about the ir­
reversibility of the loss or change and by regretting it. Know 
ledge and regret have to be taken separately, for there may be 
knowledge without regret: If there were a method of irreversib 
ly making a deposit of nuclear waste inaccessible and prevent­
ing it from interacting causally with the environment, know­
ledge of irreversibility would hardly be regretted. On the 
contrary, this knowledge would rather be a source of comfort, 
since there would then be no risk that the dangerous inheritan 
ce might be put to negligent or criminal use.
These two aspects are not exhaustive, however. There is a 
further aspect of irreversibility to be taken account of in 
valuation: the involuntariness of the restriction of freedom 
imposed by the irreversibility. Slavery or addiction - two 
forms of unfreedom - are bad enough, but they are easier to
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bear if incurred voluntarily than involuntarily. The fact that 
later generations are not free to revoke irreversible changes 
is not an act of self-imposed asceticism, but it is forced 
upon them as a fait accompli. It is true that earlier genera­
tions always impose quite a lot on later generations in leaving 
them a mixed heritage of goods and bads, chances and risks. But 
with irreversible bads and irreversible risks the case is worse 
because later generations are left no choice either to tolerate 
or to eliminate them.
Once these three dimensions of positive or negative value 
of irreversibilities are recognized, they can be seen to be in 
principle commensurable with the positive and negative value 
attaching to the various aspects of reversible changes. Each 
dimension points to a certain positive or negative value compo­
nent the aggregate of which can be compared with the corres­
ponding values of alternatives г
1. the positive or negative value of the state brought 
about by the irreversible change,
2. the positive or negative value of the subjective feel­
ing of being unfree to revoke the change once it has been in­
troduced,
3. the negative value of having this unfreedom imposed on 
one by earlier generations.
How significant are the two latter kinds of negative 
value in the case of primarily negative irreversible losses?
Are they in any way comparable to the first, unspecific, kind 
of negative value?
A plausible assumption is that the regret not to be able 
to do away with a state of affairs caused by earlier genera­
tions depends on two parameters:
1. the difference between the utility level attainable 
within the limits set by the irreversibility and the utility 
level that would otherwise be attainable,
2. the absolute level of utility to which a later gener­
ation is reduced by the irreversibility.
The greater the relative lose (the opportunity costs) suffered 
by the later generation in consequence of the irreversibility,
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the more not being free to change it will be regretted. Again, 
this feeling of regret will be more intense on a low absolute 
level of welfare than on a high one. A  reduction of ut i l i t y  on 
a high level of u t i l i t y  w i l l  o n l y  be felt as r e l a t i v e  d e p r i v a ­
tion, whereas on a low level, i.e. subsistence level, it will 
be felt as an actual harm. For example, the average West Euro­
pean will have great difficulties in finding in his natural en­
vironment many or even most of the song birds he finds referred 
to in the folk songs or in the literature of his cultural her­
itage. Mostly, their habitats have been irreversibly destroyed 
by the spreading of residential areas, by the expansion of 
industry, and by the methods of modern agriculture. This ina­
bility will, however, be much less of an existential threat 
than the inability of the inhabitant of the Sahel zone to make 
a living in consequence of the irreversible deterioration of 
his natural environment by desertification. It is easier to 
cope with not being able to recover a foregone benefit than 
with not being able to defend oneself against harm. There are 
many things human beings can get accustomed to, especially when 
there is no hope that things will get better in the foreseeable 
future. But adaptation has its limits, and they show up in 
situations of real hardship.
Moreover, valuation of irreversibilities clearly depends 
on cognitive factors. The calculation of consequences will 
yield a different result, for example, if those living in the 
future will know nothing about the alternatives that were open 
to earlier generations. The thought that the deterioration in 
their living conditions may be due not to any purely natural 
processes but to actual choices made by their forefathers may 
be completely alien to them. (How many people around the Medi­
terranean know that deforestation of their landscape is the 
direct result of - however uninformed - human choice?) In this 
case a feeling of being restricted in one's options by others 
will not arise. Though the restrictions are objectively in­
distinguishable, they tend not to be viewed as such, and the 
whole range of emotions attached to them will be different. 
Freedom and unfreedom, in the relevant sense, can be taken to
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be positive or negative values, however, only if these are 
actually felt. A dictatorship such as Orwell's Oceania, in 
which not only the entire documented heritage of music and 
literature is destroyed in a cultural revolution, but in which 
threats of draconic punishment successfully prevent the re­
construction of any of it from memory, would produce regret 
only in the first generation. The feeling of having lost some­
thing of importance, acutely felt in the first generation, 
might well have completely disappeared in the third. The second 
dimension of negative value has no further role to play. There 
would, however, remain the essential contribution of the first, 
unspecific dimension of negative value. Without adequate sub­
stitutes, human life would be objectively very much poorer.
Something analogous to this fictional case seems to hold 
good for the very real process of biological extinction. The 
disappearance of a species of butterfly from the earth due to 
the unchecked expansion of human technological civilisation is 
nothing that seriously afflicts many people. It is rather im­
probable that, apart from temporary sentimentalities, our grand 
grandchildren will seriously miss that particular species. It 
is by no means idiosyncratic, though, to wish that the oppor­
tunity to make acquaintance with living specimens of the 
species does not become irretrievably lost. The lost opportu­
nity amounts to a very real loss of possible experience even 
if it is not felt to be such - at least if there are no other 
possibilités of experience to make good the loss.
There are a number of good reasons, then, to prevent ir­
reversibilities, though these reasons will not always be good 
enough to warrant a categorical prohibition, irrespective of 
considerations of costs and benefits. There is no one single 
principle on which one can rely in deciding whether introducing 
or not preventing, irreversible changes in the natural or cul­
tural environment is justified. Each case has to be judged on 
its own merits. However, since our knowledge about the future 
is severely restricted (including our knowledge that a change 
believed to be irreversible is in fact irreversible) and 
since it is better to err on the safe side, we should at least
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hold up a presumption against Introducing or letting happen ir­
reversible changes which with some probability will either harm 
later generations or impoverish their lives. (Analogously, there 
should be a presumption in favour of irreversibly eliminating 
a source of harm or risks for later generations.) In each case, 
the presumption can be refuted by good reasons to the contrary, 
such as prohibitively high costs for people today. It cannot be 
right that people living now are made to suffer serious hardship 
for the prevention of some abstract and as yet indeterminate 
dangers for later generations.
4. Aaseaeing long-term technological riaka
The last problem in the moral evaluation of potential long 
term technological impact I shall discuss is the thorny problem 
of the standards of risk assessment, the problem of what weight 
to give to the potentiality of disastrous long-term consequences 
of modern technology in relation to their short-term benefits.
In practical decision making about the introduction or non­
introduction of modern technology elements of risk and of un­
certainty are usually irresolvably intertwined. In theory, how­
ever, there are advantages in holding risk and uncertainty 
apart, because they call for very different treatment. A pure 
risk situation can be characterized by three conditions:
1. All possible consequences ("outcomes") of the decision 
are known ;
2. to any one of these a positive or negative value can be 
assigned;
3. to any one of them a probability can be assigned.
The "can" in the second and third conditions of this characteri­
zation is here understood in a broad sense, that is, there is 
no requirement that the estimates of value and of probability 
are in some way based on "objective" data. I think, in other 
words, that the availability of "subjective" estimates of value 
and "subjective" probabilities is perfectly sufficient for a 
decision situation to constitute a risk situation, so that de­
cisions involving such subjective estimates should be subsumed 
under the general decision rules for risks and not under those
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for uncertainty. Subjective probability estimates should not be 
overvalued, but they should not be undervalued either. As 
Howard Raiffa has pointed out, they represent the estimates of 
an instrument of prognosis, the human brain, the capacity of 
which for processing information is unrivalled by any explicit 
analytic procedure. The only alternative, moreover, is singular­
ly unattractive, namely viewing the future as completely un­
certain wherever objective probabilities are not available. In­
tuitively, there is clearly a difference between merely abstract 
possibilities with probability zero on the one hand, and real 
possibilities with a positive, but perhaps hazy probability on 
the other. For use in decision making, subjective probability 
estimates should meet some criteria of validity, however. They 
should be sufficiently stable over time, they should be given 
on careful consideration of all relevant information, and they 
should react to unforeseen changes in the relevant information.
Let us assume that there are a number of long-term conse­
quences among the consequences the decision maker has to take 
into account (such as leakage of nuclear waste into the environ­
ment or extensive migration of millions of people consequent 
upon the destruction of vegetation by climatic changes) and that 
the decision maker is the ideal intergenerational universalist,
i.e. is perfectly impartial between his own lifetime and the 
lifetimes of succeeding generations. While for a decision-maker 
with a preference for his own life-time (and that of his nearest 
associates) Keynes's saying holds: "In the long run we are all 
. aead", the intergenerationally impartial decision maker will 
give adequate attention to the fact that later generations will 
have essentially the same needs and vulnerabilities as the 
members of the species living at present and will be similarly 
affected by environmental and cultural catastrophes.
What is the rational risk strategy for such an intergen­
erationally impartial decision maker? My suggestion is that in 
a pure risk situation, i.e. with an exhaustive overview of all 
possible consequences, such a decision maker will have to be 
much less risk-averse than a decision maker confronting a less 
extended time-horizon. With similar risk situations arising 
again and again in time, the law of great numbers comes into
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play. Even for technologies with a potential for wreaking very 
heavy damage, it could be argued that their frequent benefits 
compensate the infrequent damages done by them. Even if the one 
particular generation affected by a disastrous accident such as 
a nuclear failure involving extensive contamination cannot ex­
pect full compensation for the harm done to it, the series of 
generations taken as a whole can, because the accident probabil­
ity may be so low as to leave most generations unscathed. They 
reap the benefits for which one generation has to pay the price. 
Adopting a decision rule expressing neutrality to risk, such as 
maximizing expected utility, would be fully in line with the 
decision makers' intention to secure the greatest net benefit 
for the aggregate of generations, even if he would have to 
"sacrifice" the welfare of one generation for the welfare of 
the others.
This result seems paradoxical. For it is contrary to a well- 
entrenched moral rule for decisions under risk, namely that it 
is unobjectionable to follow a risk-neutral or even risk-prone 
strategy whenever the decision affects only oneself, but that a 
more conservative strategy is called for whenever the decision 
affects others as well. We do not generally object to someone 
jeopardizing his own life in pursuit of a highly risky kind of 
sport or pastime. We do object, however, to someone jeopardizing 
the life of others in the same pursuit. Nicholas Rescher, for 
one, has recently endorsed the postulate that decisions the 
potential negative outcomes of which have to be borne by others 
ought not follow a risk-neutral rule (such as maximizing the 
over-all expected value), but a more risk-averse one. According 
to Rescher, the question the decision-maker has to put to him­
self is not, how to maximize the value the others can expect 
from his decision, but the question (in his words): "What is 
the cautious thing to do - the thing which would least lay me 
open to reproach and recrimination should matters go wrong?" 
(Rescher, p. 161)
The contradiction between Rescher's conservative principle 
for decisions affecting others and the rule of expected value 
maximization may seem irresolvable, but I do not think that it 
ultimately is. The solution lies, I think, in taking a broader 
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view of the dimensions of costs and benefits relevant to the 
issue. Differently from what one may be tempted to think, there 
are conditions on which a certain amount of risk aversion in 
decisions affecting others is perfectly compatible with the 
rule of expected value maximization.
First, let us be clear about the fact that adopting a risk 
neutral rule of expected value maximization on a theoretical 
level does not imply that it is the best thing to follow this 
rule in practice. Under certain conditions, what the expected 
value maximization may require one to do is just not to apply 
this rule directly. There is a useful parallel to this seeming­
ly "paradox" state of affairs in utilitarianism: adopting util­
itarianism as a general theory of ethics may not require, but 
even may forbid, the direct application of utilitarian ways of 
thinking to the solution of practical dilemmas. (Think of Harems 
two-level theory of moral discourse). One factor that makes a 
more conservative rule seem more appropriate in practice is the 
presence of insecurity. The insecurity generated by following a 
risk neutral decision rule in practice can be a disvalue to 
such an extent that it is not offset by any of the other ad­
vantages of this particular decision rule. A decision rule that 
is optimal with regard to the possible outcomes of the decisions 
made, can be far less than optimal if not only the costs of the 
outcomes, but also the costs of the choice of the decision rule 
are taken into account.
This is evident from the case of insurance. The overall 
utility of insurance is not the same as the sum of the utilities 
of the potential payments made by the insurance in compensation 
for deunages multiplied with their respective probabilities. An 
essential part of its overall utility is the security that com­
pensation is paid in case of loss. For someone for whom this 
safety has a high personal priority it can be rational to buy 
insurance even if others with a much lower preference for se­
curity may hold it to be far too expensive, given the probabil­
ities of the losses to be covered. The utility of subjective 
security is as much a real utility as the utility of potential 
outcomes (payments), and in judging the rationality or ir-
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rationality of a decision under risk they cannot but be taken 
seriously.
Empirical data on the prices paid for insurance suggest a 
rather high preference for security. An intergenerationally 
impartial decision-maker will have to take this preference into 
account in deciding on the rùles he will follow in practice. If, 
on the theoretical level, he applies the rule of expected value 
maximization, he may well find that this rule is followed best 
by following a more risk-averse rule in practice, whereas a 
potential direct application of expected value maximization 
would imply heavy insecurity costs.
Another consideration tends in the same direction. The pos­
itive or negative value we assign to the outcomes of risky de­
cisions is not independent of whether these decisions were made 
by ourselves or by others. Harm flowing from an involuntary 
risk is usually assigned a far higher disvalue than harm flowing 
from a voluntary one. Insofar as harms or risks are imposed on 
later generations by the activities of earlier ones, they are 
rightly held to be worse than harms or risks flowing from ac­
tivities of the later generations themselves. Whereas involun­
tariness usually does not detract from the utility content of a 
pleasure, involuntariness of an evil makes it far worse than it 
would otherwise be. Involuntariness is thus a further reason 
not to expose others to risks one would rationally accept for 
oneself, though the disvalue associated with it may vary from 
case to case. An intergenerational decision maker following a 
theoretical rule of expected value maximization would have to 
take into account this additional factor, and it would certain­
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After decades of progressive optimism, technical develop­
ment, particularly in western countries, has come into a kind 
of legitimation crisis. Also, there has reemerged the well- 
known conservative cultural criticism (analyzed e.g. in Woll- 
gast/Banse 1979; Hronszky/Rathmann 1984), it is true, but the 
hard core of the actual debate on technology has to be seen in 
the accurate observation of real problems in recent technical 
development. With a certain justification conscious observers 
start doubting whether the expected benefits of technization 
still outbalance the increasing disadvantage. At least, tech­
nical change, no longer naively called "progress", has proven 
to be ambivalent: Although the amazing possibilities of recent 
innovations still can be seen, a growing number of neoative 
consequences and dangerous side-effects affecting the natural 
environment and the social conditions of life cannot be neg- 
. lected any longer. Everybody knows the prominent examples: the 
case of nuclear power, including the Chernobyl affair; the im­
pacts of microelectronics and new communication media or the 
dubious perspectives of genetic engineering.
So, the question is posed, who has to answer for those 
problems and who carries the responsibility for the deficien-
*The present paper originally had been prepared for the course 
"Social Interpretation of Technics: Normative Issues of Tech­
nical Development" at the Inter-University Centre Dubrovnik 
(Yugoslavia) in April 1987; an extended German version has 
been published in "Technik und Ethik", ed. by H. Lenk and G. 
Ropohl, Stuttgart: Reclam 1987, pp. 149-179. The author thanks 




cies of the so-called technical progress. In analyzing any 
given case, the careful investigator will find the following 
statements to be true:
- Not every innovation means social progress as well.
- Innovations are introduced without anybody regarding the eco­
logical and sociopsychological side-effects possible.
- Certain unacceptable side-effects are recognized only when 
the innovation is already being diffused.
- Afterwards it is difficult to blame an individual person for 
the negative outcome, because too many people had been in­
volved .
In brief: Technical innovations are being diffused, but nobody 
takes the responsibility.
The present paper firstly will analyze the concept of re­
sponsibility in general. Then, for technical practice two 
models of responsibility will be outlined and discussed. In­
dividual responsibility, in terms of dialectics, being regarded 
as the thesis and institutional responsibility being conceived 
as the antithesis, the last part of this paper will argue for 
the synthesis of "concerted" technology assessment.
2. The concept of responsibility
The original meaning of the word "responsibility" comes 
from the sphere of law and is known since the times of ancient 
Romans. To be responsible means to have to respond to the ques­
tion of the court for what one has done and why one did so. 
Today, an extended meaning plays an important role in modern 
ethics, since the concept of duty has been replaced by the con­
cept of responsibility. For instance, the famous German social 
scientist Max Weber (1919) has introduced the distinction be­
tween ethics of conviction and ethics of responsibility. While 
ethics of conviction is bound exclusively to the inherent 
value of the good and right action, no matter what it could 
bring about, ethics of responsibility stresses "that we have 
to pay for the (expectable) consequences of our actions". So, 
the appeal to responsibility postulates that the actor, in
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making conscious decisions, is prepared to take the expected 
consequences of the action upon himself or herself.
On closer examination, the notion of responsibility turns 
out to be a concept of multiple relations. These relations can 
be defined on a set of - at least - six elements, which are 
given in the fiqure below. Depending on the respective mani­
festation of the elements and on the kind of relations between 
those elements, various types of responsibility may be iden­
tified. It is not the aim of this paper to develop a general 
theory of responsibility; but in order to prepare the following 
considerations, some relevant manifestations of the elements 
have to be discussed.
E L E M E N T S  O F  R E S P O N S I B I L I T Y
Figure 1
Obviously, the first question has to be, WHO is responsible. 
In traditional ethics the individual person only is considered 
as the subject of responsibility. But, on principle, there is 
nothing to be said against the suggestion that a collective or 
institutional actor, such as a group or an organization, may be
43
regarded as a subject of responsibility as well. This view be­
comes inevitable when a certain action cannot be ascribed to a 
single individual any more, but turns out to result from the 
cooperation of several persons, each of them performing nothing 
but a marginal contribution to the overall action. Next it has 
to be asked, FOR WHAT the actor is to be responsible. Obvious­
ly, he or she is responsible for a certain action, but the con­
cept of an action must be stated more precisely. An action, in 
the broadest sense, can be defined as a goal-oriented transfor­
mation of an initial situation into a final situation; this 
definition does not apply only to the individual person, but 
also to an organization and to any other social system, which, thus, 
may be reaarded as an acting system in a non-metaphorical sense 
(Ropohl 1979, 105ff). Speaking, writing and even refraining 
from action may be considered as borderline cases of action.
Now, responsibility does not concern the action itself, 
but certain of its consequences. It is just the ooint of ethics 
of responsibility to ask, CONCERNING WHAT a certain action is 
to be assessed. Usually, any action implies quite a lot of con­
sequences, both intended and non-intended, either acceptable 
or neutral or unacceptable. If the action causes concrete 
damage, which could have been avoided by acting more carefully, 
responsibility turns to liability: then, the actor has to com­
pensate for the damage, for instance by reimbursing the ex­
penses incurred. Recently, it is discussed whether responsi­
bility is covering only the immediate consequences of the ac­
tion, or secondary and further remote effects as well; whether, 
for instance, the scope of responsibility is limited to the 
neighbour, or has to be extended to all mankind or even to fu­
ture generations (Birnbacher 1988).
Anyway, responsibility can be taken over only if the ac­
tor knows, IN FAVOUR OF WHAT he or she is expected to be respon 
sible, to bring about certain consequences and to avoid others. 
This, however, can only be justified in terms of values. Values 
may be understood as ideas of normative orientation which mark 
certain types of actions and consequences as being worth 
striving for, approving or preferring (VDI 1987, 3). So re-
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sponsibility, in the end, is not only a formal concept, but it 
is loaded with content; it would not make any sense without 
being engaged in moral principles like utility, benevolence and 
justice (Frankena 1963).
The original meaning of "responsibility" already implies 
the question, TO WHOM the actor is expected to answer. In the 
sphere of law, this used to be a legal authority like the court. 
Other formal authorities might be the employer, the superior or 
a professional association. An extended concept of responsi­
bility may consider additional, informal authorities, like pub­
lic opinion, the judgement of colleagues, relatives and friends, 
or even the actoi^ s own conscience. Certainly, it is disputed, 
whether the personal conscience can be accepted as a kind of 
ultimate authority, or has to be understood as only the inter­
nal mirror of external expectations. Anyway, as far as external 
authorities are not yet concerned, or cannot be concerned at 
all, the personal conscience is an important part of individual 
responsibility.
Finally, the time has to be considered, WHEN somebody is 
consciously responsible: after having taken the action only or 
already before going to act. The traditional concept of respon­
sibility usually applied to the consequences of an action al­
ready carried out; hence it may be called retrospective respon­
sibility. On the other hand, responsibility is of a prospective 
nature when it is taken over before the respective action is 
carried out. In this case the responsible actor will anticipate 
and calculate the prospective benefits and disadvantages of the 
action planned, and he or she will refrain from acting if the 
expected disadvatanges seem to prevail. Recently Hans Jonas 
(1979) has drawn new attention to this point of view by estab­
lishing his "ethics of future-related responsibility". Now, the 
conceptual framework, outlined before, is to be used in analyz­
ing the related issues in technical practice.
3. Individual responsibility
As mentioned above, traditional ethics prefer the idea that 
only the individual person can take responsibility; and usually
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they do not take into account any formal, external authority, 
only the individual conscience of the acting person. This idea 
of individual responsibility governs the debate on professional 
ethics in engineering, too. An impressive example may be seen 
in the so-called codes of ethics, having been established by 
engineering associations and addressed mainly to the individual 
engineer (see Lenk/Ropohl 1987, appendix). These codes of ethics, 
being understood as a counterpart to the Hippocratic oath in 
medical practice, are expected to determine the engineer to 
produce on his own nothing but beneficial technology.
A lot of engineers, however, deny this kind of responsibil­
ity. They have been brought up with a very narrow understanding 
of technology being focussed on technical products exclusively 
and neglecting both the context of development and the context 
of usage of those products. Obviously, within this understanding 
there is no place for reflection upon the process of human ac­
tion and the respective issues of responsibility. An adequate 
understanding of technics - the word "technics" stressing the 
aspect of practice, distinguished from "technology" denoting 
the respective systematic knowledge - may be given by the fol­
lowing extensional definition: Technics consist of (i) the set 
of useful, concrete, artificial things (artifacts, object system);
(ii) the set of human actions and institutions through which 
artifacts are produced; and (iii) the set of human actions in 
which artifacts are employed.
Actually, engineers tend to separate those different domains 
of technics from each other. Even if they admit to be respon­
sible of their producing actions, they pretend the resulting 
products to be value-free. Regarding the technical means as 
neutral, producers are not supposed to take any responsibility, 
because it is up to the user what to do with the technical 
means. This idea shall be called the user-related understanding 
of responsibility. A producer-related understanding of respon­
sibility, on the other hand, holds that improper usage is due 
to the badly designed product, blaming the engineer for any harm 
which might result from its utilization.
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The public debate on technology tends to play these contro­
versial ideas off against each other, engineers shifting the 
responsibility to the users and the public opinion passing the 
buck to the engineers again. If these points are made thus 
generally, the debate does not seem very fruitful. For, in 
reality, everything is depending on the number of functions 
incorporated within the technical system. Certainly, there do 
exist multi-purpose artifacts like the proverbial knife which 
may be used for cutting bread as well as for killing someone.
In modern technology the computer is another example, proving 
as a multi-purpose system which may be used for better or worse. 
In cases like that the producer cannot be made responsible for 
any misuse. But, anyway, even then he or she should be concerned 
about avoiding any misuse to be expected. This, actually, ap­
plies to the knife as well: Christopher Columbus is said to 
have blunted the points of his crew's knives when, during the 
crossing of the Atlantic, he was afraid of a rebellion; their 
shape having been changed, the knives could not be misused as 
stabbing weapons any longer. On the other hand, there exist 
specialized artifacts which are good for one purpose only.
Then, the producer has determined the way of usage by design, 
and he or she really is responsible for that kind of usage.
For instance, the time-fixed assembly line, which forces the 
worker to do his or her job with a determined speed, does not 
allow anything but misuse and thus turns out to be a kind of 
prefabricated inhumanity.
The distribution of responsibility between producers and 
users is not the only problem implied by the idea of indivi­
dual responsibility. Even if the producer-related understand­
ing of responsibility is accepted as far as it really applies, 
there are certain other difficulties arising. One of these is 
the limited influence of the single engineer in large orga­
nizations. Innovation being rather a social process than an 
individual performance, the single person takes part in a sy­
stem of cooperation, based on the division of labour. So, most 
of the time, the individual is not even able to overview the 
whole process and all its consequences, to say nothing of
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Controlling it on his or her own. The individual inventor loses 
control of his or her Idea, as soon as it has been published; 
there is no chance to find a solution when, after having been 
revised, it turns out to be dangerous, because somebody will 
exploit the idea anyway. Moreover, in teamwork the contribution 
of the single collaborator can hardly be demarcated or even 
identified; frequently, the actor himself or herself is not 
aware of the actual impact of his or her job. So, the complex­
ity of technical practice makes it nearly impossible to group 
certain consequences with an individual actor.
Even if an awareness of consequences is possible, indivi­
dual control and responsibility is restricted by economic and 
legal dependency. In particular, employed engineers - most 
engineers being employees, indeed - are bound to the regula­
tions of industrial law; concerning their professional work 
they are subject to directives and bound to secrecy so that 
they are not entitled to refuse a tricky job nor even to blow 
the whistle in public. In the United States of America (Flo- 
res/Baum 1980) and in Western Germany (Aktiirk et al. 1988) 
several cases have become known when conscientious engineers 
and other professionals lost their jobs, and the courts of 
industrial law which they appealed to decided against them. And 
certainly there could be found hundreds of less spectacular 
cases when responsible engineers having the courage to object 
to the employer did not just lose their job, but had to take 
serious disadvantages for their career and more. So, the en­
gineer is not very likely to play the moral hero (Alpern 1983), 
and even if he or she would, that would not change very much, 
because he or she would be replaced by more submissive collea­
gues. It would need more detailed investigations to decide, 
whether, nevertheless, there exist certain leeways for the 
responsible engineer. Anyway, these considerations exclude in­
dividual responsibility as the general antidote against the 
harm done by technology.
It has to be recognized, however, that ethical conflicts 
between engineers and their corporations seem to be rather the 
exception than the rule, and this is due not so much to the mo-
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ral corruption of engineers, but to their total ignorance re­
garding the broader context of technology. In their education 
they never learnt of that, and so they lack any sensibility 
about the non-technical consequences of technical systems. It 
is true, the engineer's expertise concerning interdisciplinary 
impact analysis will necessarily be limited; on principle, a 
particular engineer cannot be an expert in all the fields which 
are affected by his work. But if engineers were educated with 
a careful understanding of their work really affecting natural 
environment and human life, they would have learnt when to ask 
the experts of the other fields for advice. Anyway, this is 
another objection against the idea of individual responsibility 
that the individual engineer is not at all able to anticipate 
all the consequences of his or her actions because of the 
limits of personal cognitive resources.
Moreover, a particular engineer is not entitled to make 
value decisions on behalf of society unless they have been ap­
proved by democratic majorities. Otherwise he or she would run 
the risk of technocratic presumption, pretending his or her ex­
pert values to be valid for everybody. To determine the "real" 
needs of people is difficult enough within the discourse of 
social policies (see Moser/Ropohl/Zimmerli 1978); by no means 
is the engineer legitimated to decide on his or her own, what 
people really need. If the engineer were to evaluate the con­
sequences of technology exclusively according to personal values, 
he or she would be likely to behave irresDonsibly in a broader 
sense just doing so.
To conclude this section it can be summarized that there 
are several difficulties with the idea of individual respon­
sibility in technical practice. Apart from certain small areas 
of anticipating and controlling opportunity, individual engi­
neers would be overtaxed when being expected to take preventive 
responsibility for the consequences of technical change; and 
even in those small areas - which, of course, have to be analyz­




The consequences of technical practice, actually, cannot 
be classed clearly with individual persons. Technical develop­
ments are increasingly being detached from individual origi­
nators; they are, rather, the outcome of a systemic interplay 
between a multitude of actions than that of individual action. 
Technical development has to be understood in terms of a social 
system, and therefore it will now be argued that the normative 
issues have to be settled on the social level as well. If there 
is little chance for purely individual responsibility, one has 
to conceive of institutional responsibility. As this idea is 
nothing than the other borderline case within the field of pos­
sible solutions, an outline of a very extreme model will fol­
low.
Society, being assumed as the actor in technical develop­
ment, has to take the respective responsibility as well. So, 
society has to establish a specific institution for this task 
(Picht 1969, 113). This institution would be something like a 
National Office of Technology Assessment. It would not perform 
technical practice, but it would specialize in preventive re­
sponsibility. The division of labour between action and respon­
sibility requires, of course, an effective control on technical 
practice.
It is easy to imagine how this idea would work. Engineers 
would invent new technical systems as usual. But then, every 
invention would have to be submitted to that office. In this 
organization a multidisciplinary team of experts would examine 
the project, would analyze all the impacts to be expected and 
would evaluate benefits and harms according to standina values 
legitimated politically. If some supposed consequences seem to 
be uncertain, the organization would initiate a pilot project 
to study the consequences in reality. Then, the National Office 
would, depending on the overall result, allow or forbid the 
innovation of the invented system. Only then would engineers 
take over the project again and would complete their work.
It has to be admitted that the idea of a centralized insti­
tution for controlling technical development is the most radic-
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al version of so-called technology assessment. Most of its sup­
porters, especially in western countries, prefer more modest 
versions, according to which the institution, or several of 
them, would be limited to advisory functions, without being 
authorized to give directions. Indeed, only then would the insti­
tution be able to take on real responsibility. It is to be noted 
that it was the famous German historian of capitalist economy, 
Werner Sombart (1934, 266), who consistently expressed this pre­
requisite very early, suggesting a "supreme council of culture" 
designed to ban "mistaken" inventions and to announce a list of 
desired inventions. The institution would take on preventive 
responsibility, because it would test any invention, before it 
is innovated. It could assume retrospective responsibility as 
well, even liability, because whatever would haopen would be 
due to the decisions of that central office. Technical develop­
ment would no longer result from a bewildering mess of partial 
decisions, but could be controlled by a central agency syste­
matically .
At first glance this idea promises to solve all the problems 
which burden the individualistic approach:
- Responsibility cannot be shifted any longer from production to 
usage. Production will be allowed only if the usage seems to 
be completely harmless.
- The division of labour in development and production will be 
compensated by an interdisciplinary impact analysis and a 
holistic assessment.
- If the central agency is as autonomous as a court of justice, 
there will not occur any dependence on orders and directives.
- The limited expertise of individuals will be compensated by 
an organized cooperation within an interdisciplinary team.
- Instead of the arbitrary preferences of individuals, the 
national office will be guided by prevailing values, legiti­
mated by democratic procedures.
That is to say, responsibility in technical practice is to 
be made effective by a kind of socialization of ethics. Although 
liberalist thinkers tend to refuse this idea, in some crucial 
fields of technology it has, indeed, been realized for a long
51
time, in several countries. In Germany, for instance, already 
in the late nineteenth century associations of technical super­
vision were established, which originally had been responsible 
for the safety of steam boilers only, but later they extended 
their activities to the supervision of elevators, automobiles 
and other risky systems. It is worth noting that these are as­
sociations according to civil law, but they have been given 
sovereign rights by government; for instance, when they deter­
mine a private car not to fulfil the valid standards of safety, 
they are entitled to forbid further usage. And, also in Germany 
and also since the end of the last century, there exist build­
ing offices in every community, which have to examine and to 
permit every building project, the small outhouse as well as 
the skyscraper. So, the suggested national office would be noth 
ing but a gradual extension in competence and scope.
Nevertheless, the idea of institutional responsibility, too 
shows certain shortcomings. Firstly, this idea would imply nota 
ble restrictions to entrepreneurial autonomy, particularly in 
capitalist countries. Technical development is a constitutive 
part of corporate strategy, and therefore, innovation projects 
usually will be kept secret in face of competitors. All this 
would be strongly modified by a centralized technology assess­
ment. Governmental and administrative directives would control 
technical development rather than market forces. So, particular 
ly the mixed economies of western countries would be given a 
much greater part of public intervention. This basic issue of 
organizing the economic system cannot be discussed in detail 
here, of course, but, at least, it had to be mentioned.
Furthermore, the idea of institutional responsibility 
could lead to bureaucratizing the technical development. Just 
the German examples, mentioned above, show the respective defi­
ciencies; slow and lazy decision making, establishing inno­
vation barriers and maintaining an authoritarian conservatism. So 
the usual presumption of offices could kill liberal spirits and 
the readiness for creativity.
A third difficulty of that centralized solution would be 
the necessity of doubling the expertise. The central office 
would have to develop the same quality of expertise, at least,
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as that existing in industrial practice. Again, the German case 
of building offices is an instructive example. Although every 
building project is calculated by a private structural engineer, 
the building offices employ their own examining engineers to 
check the structure calculations. Just that way, for every 
developing field in technology the central agency would have to 
employ its own specialists. It is rather doubtful if this would 
be feasible and if society could afford it.
A last argument against institutional responsibility, at 
least in the centralized way, is the expectation that the insti­
tution would rather prevent than promote technical development. 
Above all, the central office would be focussed on avoiding 
harmful impacts of technology. Whenever there would appear the 
smallest risk, the office would intervene, thus slowing down any 
change. So, what radical ethics would require in a very ques­
tionable situation, namely to do nothing in case of doubt (Jonas 
1979) might be reinforced by the internal laws of bureaucracy. 
If, on the other hand, the institution were supposed to foster 
desirable developments, it would, in the long run, have to in­
vent and to innovate on its own, and this, of course, would be 
much more than that office is destined to achieve.
In summarizing this section it can be concluded that the 
approach of institutional responsibility, indeed, would cope 
with those problems which could not be solved by the indivi­
dualistic approach, but it would create new problems of a 
principal nature. So, this idea, at least in its radical mani­
festation, cannot be recommended either.
5. Concerted. Technology Assessment
The two models of responsibility, having been presented in 
the last sections, ought to be regarded as ideal types, which 
are useful to understand the principles. But as the discussion 
of these ideal types has shown, neither is suitable to
improve technical practice radically when standing alone. This 
result has to be stressed firmly, because the philosophical and 
political debates on technology still tend to neglect that both 
approaches are dependent on each other. Professional ethics
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sticks to the individualistic approach without bothering about 
institutional support; technology assessment, on the other hand, 
at least in its "first generation", is focussed on formal insti­
tutions and procedures at the limits of science and politics 
without considering the relevance of individual engagement in 
shaping technical solutions. The point is that these two ideas 
should be brought together, thus forming a kind of synthesis.
This synthesis shall be called "Concerted Technology As­
sessment" (in terms of the baroque concerto grosso, of course, 
not of the solo concert of romanticism!). A synthesis of that 
kind is expected to give institutional support to the indivi­
duals and individual support to existing and new institutions. 
Obviously, this new idea is too complex to be elaborated on 
these few pages. So, for the present, the idea is to be il­
lustrated by some examples, two of them rather fictitious as 
yet and a third one which is already under way.
The first example in the beginning, however, is not ficti­
tious at all (Aktiirk et al. 19 88). A leading engineer, employ­
ed by a large corporation, feared that a well-known construc­
tion, realized some years ago, would break, unless the cor­
poration undertook certain renovating measures. In spite of his 
urgent recommendations the management did not do so, but caused 
the "troublemaker" to quit instead. Out of professional con­
siderations the engineer abstained from warning the public, 
but some time later, the expected damage really happened: One 
person was killed, some people got hurt and the material damage 
ran into millions of Marks. So far goes the real story. And the 
following is also real insofar as the engineer affected is 
thinking about it ever since that experience: If there had 
existed a committee of engineering ethics, he would have been 
able to appeal to that committee, confidentially, perhaps even 
anonymously, to discover the case and to protect people from 
the anticipated danger without risking his own career. So, a 
committee of engineering ethics turns out to be an indispensa­
ble institutional completion of personal engagement. And, of 
course, the rules of industrial law would have to be changed 
to enable those committees to work successfully - which ob­
viously means another institutional support.
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On the other hand, technology assessment, as carried out 
usually today, is starting only when a certain innovation is on 
the run already. And frequently this reactive technology assess­
ment fails to stop a risky innovation because too extensive ef­
forts, both intellectual and financial, have been invested 
beforehand to give up that development. An innovative techno­
logy assessment would do better, which would start with the very 
beginning of an invention, introducing social values at any mo­
ment when decisions have to be made and testing the chances and 
risks of the new development at all times. But an external of­
fice would be unable to do so unless scientists and engineers 
were ready and willing to give the required information to that 
institution. This does not apply to a centralized office of 
technology assessment only, but to a decentralized network of 
assessing agencies as well. So, the institutional approach, when 
expected to be successful, on its part relies on the ethical 
sensibility of the individuals.
In recognizing the indicated interrelationship between pro­
fessional ethics and technology assessment - this is the last 
example -, an interdisciplinary working group of the Association 
of German Engineers (VDI 1987) has worked out a first draft of 
a guideline to technology assessment. It has to be noted that 
VDI-guidelines serve as preliminary forms of the national 
standards (DIN) and are regarded as part of the technical rules 
generally accepted. Technical rules do not possess legal force 
as such, but they can obtain it when certain laws or decrees 
refer to them explicitly; moreover, engineers usually regard 
those standards and guidelines as a kind of professional autho­
rity. So, the proposed guideline to technology assessment will 
exhibit some institutional force in itself.
The guideline cannot replace a textbook on technology assess­
ment, of course. It rather aims at a general enlightenment of 
both the engineers and the public involved. So, it explains the 
basic notions of technology assessment, gives a brief outline 
of the interrelationship of technology and values, provides a 
critical review of methods to be applied and recommends a plu­
rality of institutions, including administrative authorities as 
well as non-governmental organizations such as professional as-
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sociations, citizens' initiatives and even special working 
groups in industry, all of them participating in a wide-spread 
technopolitical discourse. In a central section the guideline 
supplies a list of values to be recognized in every assessment 
activity. Figure 2 shows eight main values and some typical 
relations, both instrumental and conflicting ones, between those 
values; for each main value, the guideline lists several sub­
values to put the general concepts in concrete terms.
The dominant idea of this representation is to make clear 
that the technical value of performance and the economic value 
of efficiency basically are subordinate to the quality of life 
as being expressed by the other values. The guideline does not 
prescribe - and is not entitled to do so - a definite priority 
of one value over the other, admitting for instance that there 
do exist legitimate conflicts between such values as efficiency 
and the quality of environment - conflicts to be dealt with by 
political bargaining. There is, however, one prescriptive fea­
ture within the argumentation, which says that none of those 
values must be neglected. Insofar, the guideline contradicts
V A L U E S  I N  T E C H N I C A L  P R A C T I C E
------> -- Ж —
TYPICAL INSTRUMENTAL AND CONFLICTING RELATIONS
Figure 2
56
the usual practice of technical inventing and industrial inno­
vating, where technical performance and economic efficiency 
are absolutely prevailing. The guideline cannot define detailed 
limits to these technical and industrial values, but it makes 
the point that there do exist certain limits in favour of in­
dispensable requirements of the quality of life.
As a whole, the guideline, when having been ratified, will 
meet the demands of concerted technology assessment. It will 
give institutional support to the individuals and encourage in­
dividuals to support the appropriate institutions. To foster 
individual responsibility, the guideline will
- instruct the engineer about the relevance of values in tech­
nical practice and help him to overcome the wide-spread 
technological fix;
- discover that technical and economic values are of instru­
mental nature only;
- make the engineer sensitive about the relevance of non-tech- 
nical values;
- give the engineer a list of criteria, with the aid of which 
he or she can examine his or her technical actions and their 
consequences ;
- communicate to the engineer some basic knowledge on methods 
and procedures to keep his or her responsibility;
- inform the engineer about appropriate institutions which 
could help him or her in case of responsibility conflicts;
- represent a kind of safe-conduct for the engineer to refer 
to when getting in conflict with his or her employer.
To make progress with institutional responsibility, on the 
other hand, the guideline will
- encourage an improved education of both engineers and non­
engineers in favour of the interdisciplinary understanding 
of technical practice;
- suggest a diversity of analyzing and assessing institutions, 
including committees of engineering ethics, industrial de­
partments of technology assessment, scientific institutes of 
interdisciplinary research on technology and, last but not 
least, governmental authorities to establish the legal frame-
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work for controlling technical change and technology courts 
to watch over the human use of technical power;
- provide working standards for the activities of assessing 
institutions ;
- suggest a normative base to which acts of legislation and of 
administration may refer when deciding against, or in favour 
of, certain technical developments.
It remains to be seen whether all these expectations will 
be really met, but, nevertheless, that guideline seems to be an 
adequate step towards a novel comprehensive understanding of 
responsibility in technical practice, combining individual en­
gagement and institutional competence. At last, the ancient 
Aristotelian idea could come true again in reuniting ethics and 
politics.
University of Frankfurt 
Frankfurt am Main
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ON THE MORAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF ENGINEERS
Éva Gábor
"If a man wants his work to be of service to Mankind, he 
should not be satisfied with a good knowledge of applied sci­
ences... Care about people should constitute the main aim of 
all technical endeavour... Human work should be so organized 
that the result of scientific thinking be a blessing and not a 
curse for us."
Einstein's words, uttered more than half a century ago in 
front of students of California Polytechnic State University, 
are still topical. Professional and lay public opinion is grow­
ing more and more impatient and is asking whether the material 
and human sacrifices demanded by technical progress should nec­
essarily keep growing, or whether, in order to preserve the 
good name of the profession, the time has not come for the en­
gineers themselves to take energetic measures and bring effec­
tive pressure to bear on those engineers who violate ethical 
norms.
The key figures of our time are engineers whose specific 
scientific-technical knowledge, skills, vocation and moral at­
titude enable them to fulfil the requirements of their profes­
sion. Should any of these qualities be absent an engineer is 
hardly capable of fulfilling these requirements. Therefore it 
is not by chance that we often find engineer training institu­
tions and bodies for safeguarding engineers interests in the 
forefront of the movement whose main goal is to revise the 
norms of thinking, behaviour and action expected from the pro­
fession and shape them to the requirements of our time.
The richest sources of literature on ethics for engineers 
are at the disposal of the national and international organi­
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zations, associations and societies of engineers* that since 
the seventies have laid more and more emphasis on training and 
post-graduate training of engineers in social and human sci­
ences, and in ethics in particular.
After analyzing case studies collected from various coun­
tries and regions, FEANI research workers came to the conclu­
sion that in most cases the breakdown or malfunction of tech­
nology caused by engineers can be explained not by lack of ap­
propriate professional training but by lack of certain human 
qualities, capacities and by narrow thinking on the part of 
engineers, by their insufficient degree of vocation and moral 
consciousness.
Cases - case studies - case morals
The moral responsibilities of engineers provided the focus 
of the debates of the symposium** organized in 1983 by VDI, an 
association which examines the activities of engineers from 
several points of view and has accumulated considerable expe­
rience in this area. The opening lecture was delivered by H. 
Lenk, professor of the Department of Philosophy of Karlsruhe 
Technical University. In the light of various case studies he 
analyzed the situation of the 80s, which he found alarming 
owing to a gradual decline of ethical standards among engineers 
Here we recall some of the cases presented and analyzed by him.
The small car named "Pinto" started causing problems as 
soon as it appeared on the market. The American firm that pro­
duced this car had decided at the beginning of the design phase 
to undercut its competitors by a radical reduction of produc-
*FEANI - Federation Européenne d'Associations Nationales 
d'ingénieurs. - SEFI - Société Européenne pour la Formation 
des Ingénieurs. - VDI - Verein Deutscher Ingenieure. - CSEP 
- Center for the Study of Ethics in the Professions, USA. - 
ASEE - American Society of Engineering Education and others.
**Verantwortung der Ingenieure - J. Lenk - Vortrag in der
Sitzung der Bereichsvertung - Technikbewertung am 23. Februar 
1987. Mannheim. (Manuskript)
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tion costs. The planned cost of the bumper suggested by the 
constructors would have been 11 dollars, but it was replaced by 
a 5-dollar plastic version. Eleven and a half million cars left 
the factory with a bumper that was utterly inadequate for its 
purpose. The "result": an average death toll of 180-200 per 
year and tremendous material losses.
Public opinion cast the blame on engineers. "Why didn't 
they protest when they found out about this? Perhaps they were 
in on the deal..." - grumbled the customers. Later, when the 
press began to air the question, it turned out that some engi­
neers who at the very beginning had warned the managers about 
the serious consequences to be expected were dismissed while 
some others who made remarks shortly after the tragic accidents 
were demoted. The engineers felt that they had risked as much 
as could have been expected of them but the association of en­
gineers disagreed.
In no circumstances can engineers act in complicity with 
those who consciously violate technological norms - was the ver­
dict of the competent body of engineers. It would be better to 
avoid cases where engineers suffer in these or similar circum­
stances but if there is no other way to expose such manoeuvres 
and thus prevent serious tragedies there must be "engineer-vic­
tims" ("Helden-Ingenieure"). Naturally, engineers should not 
then have to defend themselves alone; the organizations which 
exist to safeguard their interests should definitely take up 
their cases. In practice especially in constitutional states 
engineers who enjoy the support of organizations safeguarding 
their interests win this sort of case.
During the above-mentioned conference of VDI H. Lenk cited 
another illuminating case. Once again, the scene is the United 
States. The chief engineer of the factory where DC-10 aircraft 
were produced noticed during the last checking phase that the 
safety door did not close perfectly and informed the responsible 
person that the plane could not be put on the market with such 
a serious technical fault. The financial managers of the firm 
decided to disregard his warning, referring to the fact that the 
terms of delivery had expired, but promised to correct the fault
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before the testflight. (Of course they did nothing of the sort). 
Then the chief engineer repeated his protest in written form.
The manager of the firm ignored this protest as well. The test 
flight took place 15 days later. The test pilot was killed over 
Canada. (This happened in 1972) The factory still left the memo­
randum of the chief engineer unmentioned. Shortly after this 
the most terrible air disaster so far took place: the safety 
door of a DC-10 plane opened at a height of four thousand metres 
346 people were killed in the crash.
The investigation proved that the crash was caused direct­
ly by a technical malfunction but that this malfunction was the 
result of human (engineer) negligence. In the indictment the 
engineers were asked if they had done everything to ensure that 
only safe planes left of the factory. If they noticed this de­
fect did they warn the management of the factory in time? If 
they did but their warning was neglected did they do everything 
to prevent the probable tragedy? The engineers asked in their 
turn what they could have done apart from definitely warn­
ing the management of the factory of the serious technical mal­
function?
The court did not accept the engineers' plea and ruled that 
they could have protested and intervened even at the last mi­
nute: they should have made the situation known through the me­
dia. No doubt this would have had existential consequences as 
well but the case would certainly have been won by the engi­
neers. ASEE, the organization safeguarding the interests of en­
gineers made a similar statement.
The following case-study is also worth mentioning. Three 
engineers of the Bay Area Rapid Transit (BART), a firm produc­
ing railway rolling stock noticed that the automatic control 
system of a null séria locomotive did not work properly. The 
warning was hushed up by the management of the firm. Then some­
one (not one of the engineers) published the facts in the press. 
The three engineers were dismissed at once. Shortly afterwards 
the first serious accident occured.
According to the ruling of the court the three engineers 
behaved properly; morally they were blameless and could not be
sentenced by law. The firm was obliged to pay damages to all 
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:hree. The engineering profession also took a stand In this 
:ase. Most engineers approved of the sentence and shared the 
ipinion that in cases like this engineers should take such a 
isk even if it involved - though only temporarily - disadvan­
tageous consequences. A small segment of professional opinion 
iowever maintained that an engineer should not be a "martyr"; 
•uch sacrifices should not be demanded of him. The association 
if engineers seconded the opinion of the majority, saying that 
n the interests of the good name of the profession, engineers 
;hould condone only legally, humanly and morally proper actione
The engineering profession - stressed H. Lenk during the 
.rDI symposium - has to take a firm stand in any case where an 
jittempt is made to persuade an engineer to assist in violating 
.echnological norms. Engineers who allow themselves to be cor­
rupted should receive even harsher treatment - reads the rele­
vant resolution of the VDI. In certain cases even exlusion from 
>rofessional practice should be seriously considered. Profes­
sional opinion should never remain indifferent when it has to 
Lake a stand in questions of engineer ethics.
Nowadays we often find cases where, because of the complex 
vay in which tasks are distributed and shared it is extremely 
lifficult to find out who is responsible personally, legally 
ind morally for an accident in a factory, a manufacturing firm 
;r a nuclear power station, where at some point in the indus­
trial process a serious omission took place. The most charac­
teristic examples of such cases are breakdowns in nuclear power 
plants, which have become all too numerous in the last two dec­
ades .
The ethical committees of engineering associations and so­
cieties unanimously maintain that though it is very difficult 
!and in some extreme and very rare cases impossible) to estab­
lish who is personally responsible, this can never mean exemp­
tion for the engineers. Every effort must be made to determine 
the responsibility of individual engineers and once this has 
■ceen done they must be personally called to account. VDI, FEANI 
and other organization of engineers have repeatedly laid down 
that collective responsibility is nonsense : each engineer is 
personally responsible for his actions. 65
The last of the case-studies is the tragedy of the Chal­
lenger space-shuttle, from which new lessons were drawn by CSEP.1
The Challenger tragedy was studied from the point of view 
of engineering ethics by the director and a leading expert of 
CSEP. * *In their conclusive study the authors state that the 
tragedy of the space shuttle is a typical syndrome of engineer 
behaviour and conflict-solving, the professional and moral les­
sons of which are worthy of attention.
The specific ethical concerns of the relationship between 
subordinate engineers and management are often neglected. In 
production, in business and in administration there is a tacit 
agreement, according to which engineers are generally "sub­
ordinate employees" who execute orders and instructions, wherea 
managers are "directing employees" who give orders and instruc­
tions .
The direct cause of the the Challenger tragedy was that 
the subordinate engineers and the (mostly military) leaders, 
the majority of whom were also engineers, were in conflict with 
one another. Shortly before the launch the leaders suggested 
postponing the countdown by 24 hours because in their opinion 
another ground check was necessary. However, they did not give 
any technical reason.
The subordinate engineers considered this excessively 
cautious, not to say officious and insisted on the original 
schedule as they saw no serious reasons for postponement. In th 
ensuing debate the leaders won and postponed the launch. Given 
this situation the subordinate engineers decided to use the 24 
hours at their disposal to check some parts of the vehicle, anc 
got to work. One group of engineers happened to find the bidder 
fault in what was known as the О-ring. But 24 hours was not
*CSEP was established in 1976 with the intention of working 
out the curriculum of ethic knowledge indispensable for 
engineers, researchers, managers and businessmen. Its activ­
ities will be discussed later in detail.
**Weil, Vivian - Davis, Michael: Professional Ethics at the 
Interface of Engineering and Management. In: Perspectives on 
the Professions. Ethical and Policy Issues, Vol. 7. No. 1. 
1987. p.l.
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enough to correct it. They reported this to the chief engineer 
and new they were the ones who suggested indefinite postponement 
so that they would have time to exchange the ring. The subor­
dinate engineers did not hide the reason for their proposal.
The leaders, however, insisted on carrying out the previous 
decision. They found the observation regarding the О-ring exag­
gerated and thought that the subordinated engineers wanted to 
"get their own back" because their opinion had not been taken 
into consideration previously. They give the order to start and 
only minutes later almost the whole world witnessed the tragedy.
The disaster - as was stated later by commitees of experts 
- was caused directly by a technical malfunction but in the fi­
nal analysis it was human frailty that led to the catastrophe.
It could have been avoided had human vanity and the fear of loss 
of prestige not been involved. But unfortunately both were deep­
ly involved. Neither subordinate engineers nor leaders could 
escape from their narrow professional roles; they lacked em­
pathy in the broad sense of the word.
These and similar case studies are of great importance in 
the training and post-graduate training of engineers, and ex­
plain why institutions of higher technical education, profes­
sional organizations and associations of engineers insist on 
creating a broader basis for human and social studies, intro­
ducing ethical studies for engineers, and compiling and apply­
ing a code of ethics for the profession.
Hopes attached to a code of ethics for engineers
In highly industrialized countries and regions new codes 
of ethics for engineers or similar collections of rules have 
appeared one after another. The majority of engineers accept 
and find obvious the fact that the requirements become stricter 
and stricter.
At the end of the 70s CSEP made an attempt to compile a 
new code of ethics for engineers which would take the situation 
as it was then into consideration. According to P. Torda, pro­
fessor of the Mechanical Engineering Faculty of IIT,# chairman 
•Illinois Institute of Technology (Chicago). 67
of the commission whose task was to compile the code, the pre­
vious codes lacked an unambiguous formulation of priorities. Tc 
whom is an engineer accountable in the first place? Prohibitior 
were not formulated clearly, no appropriate protection was pro­
vided for the engineer so that he could make decisions in crit­
ical situations with good conscience and the engineer seeking 
self-justification for improper actions was not condemned un­
ambiguously.
All these considerations have been taken into account in 
the new version of the code, in the following formulations:
- An engineer is accountable first of all to the community 
(consumers, users) and only in the second place to his em­
ployers. (If he can satisfy the public interest only by 
violating the interests of his firm he cannot be punished 
for so doing.)
- An engineer must not allow products which are dangerous, 
being detrimental to health or physical condition to be 
marketed.
- An engineer is to refuse in all cases when an attempt is 
made to persuade him to act against the moral requirements 
of his vocation.
- An engineer is not to exert pressure on anyone else to act 
immorally.
- Boards of ethics for engineers are not to accept excuses 
like: "If I do not do it, someone else will" or "I am an 
engineer and not a moralist" or "I am only a small cog in 
the mechanism, if I make a mistake, someone else will cor­
rect it."*
The draft of a new code of ethics for engineers compiled 
VDI at the end of the 70s consisted of three main parts. It 
contained prohibitions : things that an engineer should not do 
because they are incompatible with his profession, possibil­
ities: what he can do in a given situation, what sort of ac­
tion can be expected from him in certain situations and imper-
*Report of the Workshops on Ethical Issues in Engineering.
(Ed. V. Weil) 1979 p. 15.
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ativee which he is obliged to follow under any circumstances in 
a given situation.
An engineer is responsible not only for the safe operation 
of technical apparatus and the faultless quality of products 
manufactured in the process directed by him but for the health 
of the employees working under his supervision and the security 
of those who use these products. Engineers who act according to 
ethical principles, thus exposing themselves to attack must be 
protected by organizations of the engineering profession.
The personal responsibility of an engineer can not be 
shared. Neglect of duty should be followed by legal and moral 
calling to account. Even in the lowest position an engineer 
should behave morally; a higher post merely increases the re­
sponsibility. Shifting responsibility onto others is to be con­
sidered immoral. The draft takes the Kantian categorical imper­
ative as the basis for moral norms because according to its 
compilers no other great ethical system could present an ac­
ceptable equivalent.
The code of ethics for engineers - states the VDI - cannot 
give simple and concrete solutions to all the conflicts arising 
from moral responsibility. It can undertake only the task of 
keeping alive the sense of responsibility in engineers and of 
working out training programs for teaching engineering ethics 
to under- and post-graduate students. The introduction of this 
subject into engineer training has both supporters and critics.
The operations of the boards of ethics for engineers are 
considered indispensable because they have a double task: on 
the one hand they safeguard the interests of engineers in cases 
when attempts are made to force them to do something incompat­
ible with legal and moral norms or if they are in danger of 
dismissal because of their adherence to ethic norms. On the 
other hand they protect the public against engineers who are 
unworthy of their profession, try to reform those who violate 
the norms or suggest that those who are unworthy of the profes­
sion should leave it.
VDI fights consistently to prevent the boards of engineer­
ing ethics from making any concessions. Indeed, if necessary
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they propose even greater severity so as not to allow any more 
Bhopals, Chernobyls and Sandozes. An outstanding representative 
of ethics for engineers, H. Jonas,* also supports greater se­
verity. If today's negative tendencies continue to develop at 
the present rate there could be a strengthening of anti-tech- 
nological and anti-engineer atmosphere among the public, which 
could lead to unforeseen consequences. People would regard tech­
nology as a monster threatening their lives and not as a triumph 
of reason and creativity.
Leaders of VDI (mostly engineers) have repeatedly stated 
that the strict requirements accepted by the members of the 
organization are not directed against engineers, but actually 
serve their interests. VDI fights to preserve the good name or 
engineers, to make their professional competence unquestionable 
and to obtain the appreciation of society at large.**
Insight into the workshop of CSEP
The foundations establishing and sponsoring CSEP - National 
Science Foundation and National Endowment for the Humanities - 
stated in the foundation document that though the Centre oper­
ates through the ITT at a local level, its activities will be 
extended to the whole of the United States. Since its founda­
tion CSEP has systematically collected and studied literature 
on ethics for engineers.
From time to time the Centre organizes conferences during 
which the most topical issues of engineering ethics are discussed.
Philosophers, ethicists, engineers (teachers-engineers), 
gather round the editorial board of CSEP's periodical "Perspec­
tives on the Professions". There are problems which are dis­
cussed by all teams, such as "Responsibilities of engineers today".
*H. Jonas: Warum die Technik ein Gegenstand für die Ethik ist: 
Fünf Gründe. In Lank, Hans - Ropohl, Günter: Technik und 
Ethik, op. cit. pp. 81-92.
**It would be worth taking into consideration the rich ex­
perience of the VDI even in Hungary, the more so as the coming 
period of social and economic development will surely raise a 
number of problems that VDI has already solved or attempted 
to solve.
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CSEP has concentrated its activity on two major issues:
1. The increased moral responsibility of engineers, the task of 
engineer training institutions in creating a sense of responsi­
bility among the technical intelligentsia. 2. The complex pro­
gram of teaching ethics for engineers.
1. It is not difficult to understand why the question of 
moral responsibility of engineers is the centre of interest. All 
too often they have failed to observe proper technological dis­
cipline, thus bringing discredit upon engineers in general; the 
good name of the profession was at stake. There again we found 
that engineers themselves had started to expect greater severity 
from their associations, and to demand both the exclusion of 
engineers unworthy of the profession and assistance for those 
who were ready to satisfy the increased requirements.
CSEP then started a large-scale campaign. It initiated 
theoretical discussions, had the topical literature on engineer 
ethics collected and studied, had case studies made, made well- 
known experts speak on radio and television. A large special 
committee worked on subjects concerning the moral responsibil­
ities of engineers.
2. CSEP - as we have already mentioned - supported the 
view that besides general ethics engineering ethics as a legiti­
mate special discipline should take its place in engineer train­
ing and postgraduate training. After a short experimental period 
this discipline entered American engineer training for all. To­
day in most technical universities and colleges it constitutes 
an organic part of human/social sciences training and is con­
sidered as indispensable as any other subject in this field. 
Among its instructors may be found philosophers, ethicists and 
engineers as well.
It was not by chance that CSEP chose as its motto the eye­
catching title of the 1982 conference on ethics for engineers: 
"Beyond Whistleblowing". Several other associations and socie­
ties of engineers share with the experts of the Centre the slo­
gan that Hans Sachsse, a renowned West German philosopher of 
technology, formulated in the early 70's: "The future of mankind 
will be determined decisively not by technology but by ethics
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capable of formulating norms for the humane operation of tech­
nology. "*
*Hans Sachsse: Technik und Verantwortung. Probleme der Ethik 
im technischen Zeitalter. Freiburg, 1972.
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TECHNOCRACY AND HUMAN PURPOSE.
BEYOND TECHNOCRACY?
E.G. Edwards
The purpose of the present document is to contribute to forming 
a model (paradigm, imaginaire) of the technocratic nature of 
domination/oppression in the modern world in the interests of 
those struggling for liberation, and more generally for human 
and natural survival.^
Part 1. TEE RISE OF TECHNOCRACY
1.1 What is Technocracy?
Technology is historically the knowledge and praxis of 
harnessing the forces of nature for the the survival of man.
.In the modern world the creation, possession and/or control of 
technology has become the key to all other forms of domination 
first of non-human nature but then of human nature. Though the 
formal or constitutional or legal entitlement to decision 
making may be vested in the rulers of States, (Generals or 
Political leaders), or the possessors of Capital, (the formal 
ownere of the multinational conglomerates), none of these dare 
to act (or indeed even know how to) in the major matters which 
affect social or even individual human destiny, without the 
sanction of the technocrats. Though this form of social domina­
tion differs in many ways from its predecessors, it may be 
regarded as sufficiently pervasive to justify calling it Tech­
nocracy.
However, the preceding forms of political, economic, so­
cial, cultural, or military control are not so much replaced 
by the rule of the technologists, as regrouped in a new para-
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digm of social domination, in which the pervasive ethos of mod­
ern postivistic, amoral, specialised and fragmented scientistic 
technology has become hegemonic. They are not so much subject 
to an external technocracy as absorbed into it. Like its other 
branches, they maintain a great deal of autonomy over their 
specialised functions, precisely by recognizing the equally 
specialised autonomy, of their constantly proliferating, co­
existent technocratic groups of colleagues. Hence the specialis­
ed, but fragmented autonomous roles of the separate sectors of 
the Technocracy though closely interdependent, cannot entail a 
principle of general authority or responsibility. This funda­
mental dichotomy in the ethos of the modern technocratic manag­
ing and controlling classes lies at the heart of the apparent 
impotence of the innovators and creators of the vast powers of
modern technology to prevent its abuse or even to avert its2threat of total human destruction.
In this paper we will distinguish between this thesis and 
the positivistic view still prevalent among progressive tech­
nologists and scientists that technology and its even more pro- 
testingly virginal sister, science, are essentially neutral and 
that the menacing, oppressive by-products of their develop­
ment are solely due to their abuse by the controllers of States 
or the owners of megabillions of capital. Nor would we consider 
it sufficient to regard them any longer as merely the ideologi­
cal contribution of the organic intellectual servants of the 
oppressive classes. That excuse was worn out by Robert Oppen­
heimer; though his scientific successors still protest that the 
Atom Bomb was no more than a discovery of what was already 
there, in Nature, waiting for its inevitable development.
Of course they still have to pay a similar homage to the 
wealth, political power, legal entitlement or social status of 
their bourgeois (or even feudal) predecessors as the emerging 
capitalist classes of the 18th and 19th centuries did to their 
aristocratic landowning forbears, and similarly, many tech­
nocrats are recruited from these older sources. But just as ef-
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fective social decision making passed from the owners of land 
to the owners of industrial capital, which ultimately determined 
the uses to which the land could be put; so it passes in turn 
to the owners of technological knowledge which determines the 
uses to which capital can be put.
1.2 The View from the Moor^
On the ancient open moorland, just above my house, archae­
ologists have recently uncovered the site of the earliest 
■permanent" human settlements. These stone enclosures, probably 
of the late neolithic period, relatively much larger than the 
temporary shelters constructed by the previous wandering groups 
of food gatherers and hunters, and the characteristic pollen 
counts found in association with them, indicate the beginnings 
of the first technology, the systematic domestication of non­
human nature, but almost certainly also the concurrent inven­
tion of human bondage. The newly invented permanent "property" 
guarded within the larger stone enclosures comprised the pri­
vately owned domesticated plants and animals - and of course 
the first domesticated human animals, the women.
Turning from the contemplation of these ancient origins of 
human institutions and the first Biotechnologies which pre­
formed them, on the horizon beyond the opposite side of the 
river valley, one can just see the tops of the glistening metal 
spheres of one of the world's largest American Nuclear Missile 
early warning stations (which is also reputed to be capable of 
listening to all telecommunication in the surrounding British 
countryside). The inhabitants of the same countryside have, of 
course, no access to, and no control over this alien institu­
tion, though their very survival is subject to its undeciphera­
ble messages, to its network of equally unapproachable missile 
launching bases and to their power to unleash the holocaust, 
unfettered by any misgivings by the surrounding natives.
These mere natives, who in relation to the impenetrable 
networks of expert military and ancillary civil technologists
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who control their destinies, constitute the vast majority of 
the human population of the planet, may truly be regarded as 
the domesticated human animals of the present day.
Technology begins with the attempt of human beings to en­
sure their food supplies in the increasingly severe climates 
and relative shortages of resources in the millennia preceding 
the agricultural revolution. Today the extremely sophisticated 
military electronic technology which dominates the space age 
is powered and sustained by tensions arising from the failure 
or uncertainty of adequate food resources to the majority of 
the world's population.
In the intervening scores of centuries, although technology 
has diversified and specialised in the human attempt to con­
trol, to manipulate all aspects of the non-human environment 
(and indeed of the human environment external to the control­
lers) the dynamics of its separate constituents have always 
been closely interdependent. The separatist ideologies and 
methodologies of the increasingly isolated groups of special­
ists have been contradicted by the actual interpenetration of 
their praxes. To comprehend the element of self-^movement of 
technology we cannot avoid considering it as a totality.
1.3 Technology aa Liberation and Bondage
Technology poses two possibilities for hűméin development: 
Human Liberation and Human Bondage .
Prior to the Agricultural Revolution, although the growth 
of the technology of hunting and food gathering helped to 
liberate human groups from the "massive habits of physical 
nature - its iron laws which determine the scene for the suf­
ferings of men" (Whitehead), it did not necessarily constitute 
the basis for human bondage. Although different human groups 
doubtless came into conflict, it was as a consequence of com­
petition for survival. The possibility of domesticating the 
labour of other human groups could not in general exist until 
the possibility of labour producing resources over and above 
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those necessary for mere survival had been created. That pos­
sibility was created by the domestication on plaints and ani­
mals .
This exploitation on non-human nature developed unevenly 
amongst differing human groups. It required time, the protec­
tion of permanent enclosures to gather the harvests and tame 
and breed the herds. It required the invention of the institu­
tion of "property" and the new cultural consciousness which 
reflected it. Hence the birth of the associated concepts of 
natural superiority, of the right to domination which reflected 
the control of property. Hence also the possibility of subor­
dination of the unpropertied, from whose depredations property 
must be defended. From henceforward, Human Liberation was not 
merely the Promethean struggle for freedom from the constraints 
of non-human nature, especially physical nature, it was the 
struggle to escape from human bondage or to exploit it in the 
interests of the wider freedom of the dominant groups.
The intervening millennia until our own time have hardly 
changed the basic character of the domestication of the majority 
of the human race. The basis of human domination has remained 
the control of property. But the cultural institutions essential 
to the necessary concurrent taming of the human mind and spirit, 
though always reflecting the concepts of the natural superiority 
of the dominant owning groups, have assumed a constantly in­
creasing importance and degree of autonomous development. This 
results from their other major cultural roles: firstly in 
transmitting the technology which has both underpinned the 
power of the dominant owning human groups, but also transformed 
it and hence transformed the nature of the most dominant forms 
of property, secondly in cultivating that co-essential and co­
existent, general sense of human solidarity, without which 
stable human society itself could hardly exist.
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1.4 Industrial Technology - The Domestication
of Humanity by Capital
Modem Industrial Technology has advanced inexorably to 
its present status as the foundation of world power since its 
beginnings in the 17th and 18th centuries. But it was only made 
possible by the remarkable technological advances of the late 
mediaeval period mainly devoted to agricultural production 
which laid the bases both for the possibility of release of 
sufficient labour from the land and for the developments in 
mechanical techniques and skills necessary to construct the 
first industrial machines.
But a relatively large accumulation and concentration of 
money capital was necessary to exploit and accelerate the 
primitive possibilities of industrial technology and to under­
pin the power of rising bourgeois class, the future owners of 
the future dominant form of property - industrial capital.
It was not accidental that this primitive accumulation of 
industrial capital took place in England, by no means the 
wealthiest nation in the advanced world of that day. It was 
largely provided by the most vast and ruthless domestication 
of the human animal in history up to that time - the triangular 
slave trade, from Liverpool to Africa with commercial artifacts 
and guns, from Africa to the Americas with slaves for the plan­
tations (which were to supply the raw materials for the first 
industrial production of textiles ) and from the Americas back 
to Liverpool with the enormous profits from this trade in 
human draught animals. For over a century a principal impetus 
to astronomy, physics and fine instrument technology arose 
from the consequent demand for more exact navigational instru­
ments and chronometers. Newton's concept of absolute, infini­
tely extended space, which has been the principal theoretical 
basis for modem science up to today, was not found from the 
contemplation of Nature itself - to which it is indeed es­
sentially foreign - but to legitimate and order a new nature 
offering unlimited possibilities for universal power. And
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from the beginning of this period of transition to the modem 
industrial world, all culture began to adapt itself to the 
potentialities offered by the new technology and to condition 
the human mind and spirit to its acceptance, to fulfil the 
vision of Descartes and Bacon of the Arts as the key to the 
final human mastery of Nature.
Apart from science, their principal cultural invention, 
the rising capitalist class refashioned religion, and the Arts 
to emphasise the values, virtues and ethics of the individual 
freedom whose enjoyment the” were to monopolise, but which was 
also necessary to free European labour from its deep-rooted 
attachment to the network of feudal dependence and responsibil­
ity, for its rootless complete dependence on the chance of 
employment by industrial capital.
In the succeeding centuries as the new industrial technol­
ogy multiplied the productivity of labour it was increasingly 
able to supply its own source of renewal and multiplication 
of capital and the expansion of the internal markets to replace 
reliance on the colonial. The expansion of factory labour be­
came more profitable and flexible, less restrictive and freed 
from any responsibility for the lives, or health of the human 
cattle, than the ownership of slaves. Moreover the monopolistic 
practices necessary to sustain the mercantilism of the slave 
trade became a fetter on the expansion of the free markets 
demanded by industrial capitalism. Religiously devout leaders 
of banking and industry in England who had often built their 
family fortunes a generation or so earlier, on the slave trade, 
rediscovered their Puritain conscience. They were intellectually 
reinforced by the leading cultural innovators of the time - 
the inventors of the latest science: economics - the true high 
priests of the new prevailing object of worship - "The Wealth 
of Nations". The slaves had to be freed.
They were replaced in the so-called advanoed nations by 
that form of domestication of the human animal which has per­
sisted until this day and remains the basis of their world 
power - the industrial proletariat.
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l.S Maes Production Teohnology - the Completion
of Domestication of the Human Animal
The supremacy of industrial capital was based on the un­
precedentedly rapid advance of mechanical (and later the be­
ginnings of chemical) technology of the 18th and 19th centuries, 
but its power could only be sustained by harnessing the prod­
uction of the more primitive parts of the whole world to its 
needs. The new world empires of the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries while founded on the newest form of human domestica­
tion - the factory system of the metropolitan countries - re­
lied on their domination of simultaneously co-existing older 
and indeed some ancient, serf based and slave based, regions 
for their supplies of essential agricultural and mineral raw 
materials. In the century and a half of this new regime of 
domestication of virtually the whole human race, the effect on 
the survival capacity of the less developed regions of the 
human race has been potentially fatal. Far from advancing 
beyond it, their basic capacity to feed themselves has been 
disastrously undermined. The major unsolved world technological 
problem remains the earliest, the Biotechnology of securing 
sufficient food resources.
But in the last quarter of the 19th century, science began 
to display possibilities of application to technology and to 
industrial production on a vastly new scale. Particularly was 
this so of the newest technology, that of electrical power, 
which because of its ease of transmission over much larger 
distances and because of its potential transformation of the 
means of communication, laid the basis for enormously increased 
size of production units. The age of mass production of com­
modities was bom. This fundamentally new technology like those 
that had preceded it in previous turning points of technologi­
cal history, profoundly changed the way in which the control 
of property orders the institutions of human production and of 
the very nature of the culture which reflects this control.
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The mass production technology of the modem "advanced" 
world required for its exploitation much larger organisations, 
eventually multinational corporations, and correspondingly 
extensive complex infrastructures of public and privately 
owned services. It therefore also called into being a new form 
of control, that of the managerial, scientific and technologi­
cal intelligentsia - the technocracy.
Since the inception of this latest period (from about 
1870) the exponentially accelerating expansion of this class - 
up to 100 fold in the economically leading regions - has been 
the largest single factor trasforming their social and cultural 
character.
This unprecedented explosive expansion in numbers has been 
exactly paralleled by that of the major cultural instrument of 
the 20th century, the institutions of higher education and 
research, which have been both recruited almost exclusively 
from the children of this newly dominant class and ideological­
ly transformed for the main purpose of preparing them for fu­
ture management. Every previous ruling class has been charac­
terised by an ethos, a cluster of "spiritual" values, an image 
•of the goal of human liberation, with which it has both "jus­
tified" its domestication of the majority of the human race 
(as well as the whole of non-human nature) and normally pro­
vided even its serfs or slaves with some prospect, however 
. distant, of their own liberation. The main importance of the 
cultural (especially the religious) institutions and their 
leaders to the dominant group has, indeed, been their role of 
transmitting this image of human destiny and giving it a credi­
bility to that large majority who had, in fact, little prospect 
of ever realising it.
The characteristic supreme "value" of the new technocracy 
is that "values" in this older sense are irrelevant. Although 
they have become the actual operational controllers, particular­
ly in the boardrooms of the multinational corporations of the 
capitalist world but also in the vast collective enterprises
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of state controlled economies they have bought this commanding 
position at a certain price; that of their own moral and spir­
itual sterilisation. The new technological and managerial 
professions have surrendered any claim to individual ethical 
or cultural or spiritual autonomy which the older cultural 
professions claimed for their members and in some significant 
degree actually maintained, in spite of their orthodox col­
lective role of justifying the existing institutions of human 
domination. Their modern over-riding ethic is that it is un­
ethical to permit ethics to interfere with efficient manage­
ment. It is not accidental that this positivistic ethical 
nihilism became the hall mark of respectability first in the 
newly pre-eminent scientific and technological departments of 
20th century universities but eventually in the older "hu­
manistic" fields of high culture, and began to pervade the 
newest intelligentsia, the social or human scientists almost 
from their beginnings, and certainly in their most pervasive 
modern task: that of circumscribing the human mind in a lan­
guage in which the terms "Freedom and Dignity" have no signif­
icance . 4In its larger, but operationally indivisible modern sense 
of that systematic creation, fusion and ordering of knowledge 
of all kinds to harness the powers of nature and human nature 
to the domination of both by its possessors, Technology is 
poised for its final stage in the domestication of the human 
animal - the final taming of the human mind and spirit - or 
perhaps the penultimate stage to its ultimate destination - 
that act of complete domination of all living human and non­
human nature - the elimination of life from the planet.
1.6 Technology of Knowledge - Bondage
or Liberation of the Human Spirit?
Though each successive period of successful technology has 
bought its ever increasing control of non-human nature with 
ever more extensive domination of the majority of human beings,
each has been largely powered by the apparently opposite pur­
pose - the liberation of the innovators from their own previous 
relative bondage. And to accumulate the necessary social power 
to overcome the inevitable resistance to the overthrow of the 
old order they have been forced to represent, and even design, 
their own liberation to be (at least in some aspects) a proto­
type for that of much larger strata of the race - eventually 
even for the whole of humanity. Each successive phase of human 
culture has carried simultaneously twin messages: that of the 
vision of human liberation, and that of the inevitability of 
human bondage. And each stage of human bondage, though usually 
more extensive and penetrating than the previous, has usually 
registered some net gains in liberation, usually from massive 
constraints of physical nature, of disease, famine and pre­
mature death at any rate in the "more advanced" parts of the 
world - the home bases of the successful innovators. On the 
other hand the power of human destruction has advanced in 
practice and potentiality in parallel with that of survival 
and in the last decades has attained the possibility (perhaps 
probability) of ending in complete human annihilation.
The leading edge of economic production today passes from 
that of material commodities to that of Knowledge itself, based 
on the technology of micro-electronics and that of sub-nuclear 
particles which provides the vast new power sources at the ser­
vice of the new knowledge systems and their technocratic con­
trollers. In principle these make possible the supplanting of 
the human mind itself, as the ultimate director of the domes­
tication of Nature, by artificial intelligence. The increasing­
ly impenetrable closed worlds of the technical experts could 
close in on themselves. Their only remaining values of accuracy 
and efficiency in the collection and ordering of dispassionate 
scientific data could render them redundnat compared with the 
infinitely more accurate, extensive, reliable and rapidly self­
ordering data banks of the future generations of micro-com­
puters. The final generation of human domesticators would final­
ly be domesticated.
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But there is another possibility, hinted at throughout 
this paper, which cannot be the subject of analysis but remains 
the subject of human vision, as it always has been, and always 
of sufficient partial attainment, however temporary, to render 
it more than merely credible. All previous forms of newly 
prevailing technology have relied on their ownership or control 
by social groups which could never be more than a minority. But 
the creation, ownership and control of knowledge itself can 
now, potentially, be returned to the whole race, though it will 
need to metamorphose from its present narrow aridly dehumanised 
language - to reflect the totality and essential interdepend­
ence of human consciousness - to do so. So the final domestica­
tion - that of the human mind and spirit - could be finally 
reversed and in its reversal, terminate the age of domestica­
tion of the human animal. It is even conceivable that the re­
realisation of that essential human interrelationship will 
propel us to stand in the same relationship not only to all 
human beings but "to all beings and things which come to meet 
us in Nature" (Buber).
The termination of the domestication of humanity may end 
the rape of non-human nature, indeed may be impossible without 
that end. By contrast, the "nuclear winter" which looms as the 
inevitable consequence of the deployment of the latest military 
technology in world conflict must almost certainly complete 
the subordination of both human and non-human life to universal 
death. The elimination of this threat becomes the supreme pre­
sent task commanding all the resources of interdependence and 
invention which have always sustained the vision and struggle 
for human liberation.
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Part 2. TBE ROLE OF HIGHER EDUCATION
2.1 What ie Higher Education?
Universities have existed in Europe for over 900 years.
For nearly all that period they have dominated the process they 
largely took over from the monastic orders of the preceding 
centuries - the production of the intellectual leadership of 
their societies, the essential cultural aides to the dominant 
social classes, the legitimators and legislators of the ruling 
doctrines on the nature of man and civil society, and the re­
lation of both to God. (The first two universities were devoted 
to medicine and law respectively and the third asserted their 
claim to theology).
To these they added much later, indeed only in modem in­
dustrial times (and after a historic lag of nearly two cen­
turies when they declined and were partly superseded by the a- 
cademies and scientific societies), the regulation of the 
doctrines of the nature of nature - science and engineering; 
and finally the nature of social communication (and of all the 
arts which serve it). In general, throughout the modem world, 
Higher Education may be considered as the kind and level of 
education pursued in Universities. Their world hegemony of this 
cultural role has only been highlighted by its temporary, par­
tial usurpation by the English Dissenting Academies and Sci­
entific Societies of the 17th and 18th centuries or the French 
Grandes Ecoles and German Technischen Hochschulen of the 19th 
or the Polytechnics and the specialised Scientific and Technical 
Institutes of the 20th. These have not so much substituted a 
new kind of social cultural role, but, in particular regions 
and times, piloted new emphases or fields, later to be adopted 
if selected for their survival value, by the generality of 
universities.
But this remarkable capacity for survival is a testimony 
not to some uniquely stable gnoseology, some semi-permanent 
revelation of the nature of culture, to which they are privy,
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but rather to the opposite: to their adaptability - their ca­
pacity to absorb radical change in their objectives, methods, 
and even their concepts of the nature of the truth - to serve 
the changing needs of the dominant social classes of their 
times - for whom their proper function was to produce the es­
sential cultural mediators, legitimators and consolidators of 
their powers. This is hardly surprising, since they have always 
largely been funded and in recent centuries largely populated 
by the same social classes.
The modem concept of the academic autonomy of the secular 
university is largely a product of that political liberalism 
which recognized that in a competitive market economy, the 
universities could only carry out their general social cultural 
role of serving capitalist society as a whole, if they were to 
a large extent protected from the hurley burley struggle be­
tween the individual economic masters.
But their necessary degree of autonomy also derived from 
the (occasionally enlightened but ambivalent) perception by 
their masters, of their complementary function (there from the 
beginning but swollen to enormous power in the present century) 
of nurturing that dynamic of technology which is both the 
source of power of survival of a social system, but also the 
potential cause of its obsolescence and replacement.
For in its larger, but integral, sense, (Sect. 1.5. ref 4 
above), technology must continually develop that critical func­
tion which constantly re-appraises the limits of the existing 
control over natural and huniam potentialities, in seeking to 
extend it. But it can hardly perform this role without that 
degree of social, cultural and ideological enquiry which must 
make the existing order and its canons themselves the subject 
of speculation and the legitimacy (or even survival value) of 
its possessors the subject of critical examination. It is thus, 
this essential critical function of the dominant intelligentsia 
which provides the possibility of the nascence of cultural/ide­
ological rebellion within its own ranks.
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Higher education is that level appropriate to the dominant 
social classes of society, (and their essential cultural aides) 
those who make decisions, give orders, design systems (whether 
technical, economic, political, social or cultural). In modern 
society the possession of completed higher education is, broad­
ly speaking, the necessary entry ticket to the technocratic 
sectors of society. Until the very recent past, although this 
level of education was an essential resource to the rulers of 
societies, it was not necessary for them to possess it personal­
ly. The services of the highly educated: the clerks, priests, 
doctors, lawyers, artists, writers, even generals and more 
recently engineers and scientists and communication specialists 
could be purchased or patronised. The question of How Many? 
was settled by the demands of the masters of society which in 
turn were determined by the needs of the prevailing technology.
2.2 The 19608. The Decade of the Hew Intelligentsia
The decisive breakthrough of the new, technocratic in­
telligentsia to the centre of the stage of world power may be 
located in the decade of the 1960s. This may be most generally 
indicated by the sharp and sudden and remarkably uniform ac­
celeration of the exponential expansion in the numbers of 
university students throughout the advanced world during this 
decade.
The escalation of University expansion in the advanced 
world of the 1960s was not principally due to any marked ex­
tension of the franchise of Higher Education to the lower so­
cial classes which had not previously enjoyed it. It was mainly 
caused by a jump in the participation rate in Higher Education 
by the leading professional and managerial social class. The 
steady exponential growth in this class, since the closing dec­
ades of the 19th century had been triggered off by a technol­
ogical revolution giving rise to new, potentially massive 
changes in industrial productivity and in the size and complex­
ity of productive and social organisations. By I960 their more
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them tenfold exponential expansion in proportion of the working 
population mirrored the parallel exponential expansion of the 
universities laraely populated by their children.
In the 15 years from 1957, the proportion of their sons 
entering Higher Education soared from a previously stable level 
of about 25% to as much as 90% in all advanced countries. It 
marked a new transition in the nature of technology in the 
above larger sense - to a technology of knowledge itself. The 
knowledge revolution was already beginning to transform the 
levers of power and privilege. To stay at the top it was nec­
essary to climb on the Higher Educational bandwagon, and inev­
itably the most socially alert sections of the growing profes­
sional and management hierarchy had first seen the writing on 
the wall.
Paradoxically, the 60s are claimed (somewhat nostalgically) 
by the radical left intelligentsia as their decade, when the 
campus became the heart of social revolution, when every tenet 
of social cultural and political orthodoxy was challenged, when 
the student revolutionaries became for the time being the mas­
ters of the streets of first Paris and later Tokyo; when the 
mightiest military power in history was forced to retreat not 
merely by the resistance of the Viet Cong and the North Viet­
namese army, but, as much, by the rebellion on its own univer­
sity campuses.
Yet both the source of the demand and the destination of 
the large majority of the threefold expanded graduate numbers 
(including most of the rebele), resulting from the escalation 
from 1957 to 1972, was precisely the new managerial, scientific, 
technical and communication requirements of just those, Multi­
national and State conglomerates against whose world domination 
the student rebellion was directed. Indeed as Alain Touraine 
pointed out at the time, the primary cause of their anger was 
precisely the inevitable resistance of the old management to 
the new generation which was destined to take over its place at 
the controls.
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nevertheless, the student rebellion of the 60s dealt a ma­
jor ideological blow to that élitism of the universities which 
the concurrent explosive expansion of student numbers and the 
anderlying demand in the advanced countries for a continually 
expanding managerial, professional class, had demonstrated to 
oe without any pragmatic foundations.
The idea of éducation permanente was bom; the implicit 
.joal: Higher Education for Everyone.
(Could this be the clue to the ultimate harnessing of Tech­
nology to Human Liberation, to eliminating its historical par­
allel role of Human Domination, to the fulfilment of a world 
Beyond Technocracy?)
The virtual attainment of this goal in the top echelons of 
the managerial and professional classes (which was the main 
operative pressure behind the uniquely rapid escalation of the 
60s) was bound to lead to an immediate drop in the pressure for 
expansion in the early 70s. The economic recession of the sub­
sequent decades and the fact that the cost of Higher Education 
was now for the first time becoming comparable to and compe­
titive with other major sections of public expenditure, led to 
1 a general lag in the supply of Higher Education places below 
the real (and very much more below the potential) expansion of 
qualified applicants. But this lag was internationally uneven, 
most in countries least confident of taking a lead in the new 
•knowledge based economies, least in those determined to obtain 
a major share of these fields. Though the manufacture of Tech­
nocrats is not a simple recipe for national political and eco­
nomic power in the modem world, it is their efficient utilisa­
tion which is the most valid index of the redistribution of 
its possession and of control of the latest forms of neo-colo­
nialism.
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2.3 Universal Higher Education: The Concordance
of the Hew Intelligentsia
The modem objective of universal Higher Education was 
b o m  from the (forced?) marriage of apparently diametrically 
opposing interests: on the one hand the need for a greatly ex­
panded intellectual elite to sustain the drive to world eco­
nomic (and hence political social and cultural) domination by 
the multinational conglomerates (in which they conceive them­
selves to be in competition for the same objective with a cor­
responding expansionist, but less developed group of vast State 
collectives) - and on the other, the need by those equally 
rapidly expanding, but more diverse social movements, whose 
objectives share a common vision of liberation from one or the 
other or both versions of big brother.
For the latter group, universal higher education is an es­
sential goal to assist in the "conscientisation"of the large 
majority of the world's people to the possibility of their 
liberation from domination by the former and to arm them cul­
turally for its attainment.
The activists on both sides of this intentional divide 
meet in the modern university and indeed even interchange self 
images and roles. Moreover they are largely united in their 
rejection (though for opposing reasons) of the older cultural 
élitism and their search for applicability or, more generally, 
intentionality, in their intellectual objectives, rather than 
the positivistic, knowledge for its own sake self-image of 
their predecessors. Each tend to consider Higher Education as 
the essential tool to make social revolution (though with 
opposite connotations of its nature), rather than as the key 
to the discovery of absolute truth. Each tend to consider the 
intelligentsia as the new revolutionary class, the prime agent 
of social change. Each are concerned with the multiplication 
of their own kind as the key to survival of their corporations 
or their communities, their national economies or their inter­
national networks. But thereafter, their concordance appears
to break down.
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2.4 The Dichotomy of Objectives for Expansion
of Higher Education
The future managers of the multinationals must, for the 
letters' survival, seek to advance and protect just that amoral 
instrumentalist, business is business, view of intentionality 
in the pursuit of knowledge and the corresponding apotheosis of 
efficiency as the essence of their own role. And their ex­
pansionist tendency is bounded by the capacity of their com­
panies to expand and severally or in national or transnational 
blocs to dominate the external economy. But both the domination 
of economic giants and the domination within them of an intel­
lectual élite must be, and is actually balanced by an eoually 
expanding world of under-development, subject to their domina­
tion, and by the ever more rigorous exclusion of its under- 
educated peoples from the participation in the control of the 
giant enterprises which determine their own lives.
All other forms of social and international domination give 
pride of place to the domination by the corporate possessors of 
new knowledge over those societies which do not and the domina­
tion of those who have higher education over those who have not
On the other hand the intelligentsia of liberation are 
faced with a dilemma. Precisely the possession of that knowl—  
edge which is the key to domination, but whose critical role 
can reveal its illegitimacy and even obsolescence as an instru­
ment of human survival - can separate them from the oppressed. 
As Paulo Freire put it "But while to say the true word which is 
work... is to transform the world, saying that word is not the 
privilege of some few men, but the right of every man... Con­
sequently, no one can say a true word alone, nor can he say it 
for another, in a prescriptive act which robs others of their 
words.". The implicit goal of the radical élite: the destruc­
tion of their own élitism, lives uneasily with the modem uni­
versity curriculum. This is not because the latter is intellec­
tually inaccessible to the majority of the people. There can 
be no reason to believe that the African, South American or
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Chinese people are genetically less intellectually capable 
than the Japanese. It is because the forms of knowledge it pur­
sues and transmits have developed to serve purposes and systems 
( techno logi.ee ) of domination which can hardly be applicable to 
the liberation of the whole race and even less to the whole of 
the living planet.
That cultural revolution in the nature of learning, the 
Great Instauration of the 17th century, embodied the Baconian 
vision of the domination of man over nature but led inevitably 
to that determinism which legitimates the domination of man 
over man, the domestication of the human animal. The scien­
tistic optimists, the 20th century heirs of the Baconian vision 
may still dream that a mere change of management will suffice 
to reverse its prospective nihilistic final destination, will 
suffice to tame the thermonuclear bomb before it annihilates 
all life. Other leading scientists of our day challenge the 
axiomaticity of its models of nature and human nature: see its 
determinism as applicable only to those closed (thermodynamic) 
systems"’ which do not so much reflect nature as it really is 
but are artificial constructs designed (as it were, as cultural 
cattle enclosures ) for the purpose of the domestication of na­
ture (and human nature). The problem for the intelligentsia of 
liberation is whether their own culture (which is predominantly 
the existing university culture in the advanced world) can 
ultimately serve their purpose, or whether it must undergo a 
sea change at least as cataclysmic as that which gave it birth 
at the beginning of the modern world. And, if so, can they be 
the agents of its birth or how are they to give place to the 
right of every man to displace them, to devise the new true 
word for themselves?.
2.S The Social and International Apartheid
in the Possession of Higher Education
While the main pressure for more higher education in the 
advanced world has been the exponential expansion of the man-
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agerial and professional classes and in the 60s the dramatic 
escalation in their participation rate, the latter period 
marked a significant rise in the minority proportion of en­
trants from the remaining majority of the population. But 
whereas the former arose from the increased value set on edu­
cation by the higher social classes themselves, (transmitted 
through families which already contained highly educated mem­
bers or were on equal social terms with those who did) - the 
latter, in the main, did not. It was a secondary consequence 
of increased educational encouragement from outside the family, 
especially from schools and devoted teachers. It owed much more 
than the former to the universalisation of secondary education 
in the advanced countries and was an important first fruit of 
the beginnings of comprehensivisation. Such international stud­
ies, as were made at the time, concluded that selective sys­
tems of secondary education were neqative influences, generally 
inhibiting the social spread of Higher Education.
In the underdeveloped countries, such Higher Education as 
developed was virtually an exclusive possession of the narrow 
upper social strata, inevitably either directly obtained from' 
the universities of the advanced, world or dependent institu­
tions closely modelled on them. It was especially about this 
neocolonialist culture and its intelligentsia that Freire could 
issue the warning quoted above.
Education is tested and evolves by its contribution to so­
ciety to survive. The task of the intelligentsia as a whole, 
even though most of them serve immediately the survival of the 
existing social systems, involves, for that very reason, the 
criticism of the latter. It is largely through the exercise of 
this critical function that the total ethos of a social culture 
is changed. So it was at the beginning of the modem epoch in 
the 16th and 17th centuries, when after a period of faltering, 
the large majority of the intellectuals swung into the creation 
of the revolutionary new culture of modern western society 
which was to dominate that of the whole world up to this day.
93
So it may well be again if a new culture is to be fashioned 
to serve the imperative needs of a new universal purpose of lib­
eration and human equality both within and between all societies ; 
if the race itself is to survive.
Part 3 CONCLUSION : CAN THE OPPRESSED CREATE THEIR 
OWN TECHNOLOGY, THEIR OWN INTELLIGENTSIA?
The American sociologist Alvin W. Gouldner has observed:
"The Communist Manifesto had held that the history of all 
hitherto existing society was the history of class struggles: 
freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild- 
master and journeyman, and then bourgeois and proletariat. In 
this series however, there was one unspoken regularity: the 
slaves did not succeed the masters, the plebeian did not van­
quish the patricians, the serfs did not overthrow the lords, 
and the journeymen did not overcome the guildmasters. The low­
liest class never came to power. Nor does it seem likely now."
His inference is that that the actual controllers, the
exercisers of power in States where capital has been mainly 
expropriated from private hands are not in fact the people as 
a whole, in whose name it is now managed, but the new managers
themselves, or perhaps to be more precise the political and/or
military elite of the new managerial professional and intellec­
tual classes. This question is hardly to be answered merely by 
ideological protestations of the liberationist purposes for 
which the political and technocratic elite hold actual power 
and enjoy actual privileges of am order not dissimilar to many 
of their counterparts in the capitalist States.
Similar high-minded protestations are the regular stock in 
trade of the latter who employ their specialist colleagues in 
the mass media in a way not entirely without analogy in the 
propaganda departments of the former. And indeed, increasingly 
wide sections of the most technologically advanced multination­
al capitalist conglomerates may actually be formally owned in
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majority part by insurance companies, pension funds and even 
Trade Union welfare funds formally possessed in their entirety 
by millions of ordinary people. Indeed the tendency for the 
latter to become the large majority of funds available for new 
investment seems to be irreversible as the proportion of the 
national income devoted to these purposes steadily increases 
with increased longevity and lower ages of retirement in the 
so-called advanced, capitalist world.
Nevertheless, it is likely to be the case that the legal 
ownership of the main means of production and the major sec­
tions of social infrastructure by the people as a whole, is a 
vital instrument for the transformation of technology from its 
prevalent role of human domination to that of universal liber­
ation. It is not yet apparent, however, that it should inevi­
tably result in the achievement of this goal, particularly if 
it is secured through the critically conscious activity of a 
mere minority - particularly a minority still largely sharing 
the ontology and hence the ideological basis of the worldwide 
technocratic intelligentsia itself. Indeed the very concept 
of the inevitable victory of a social revolution can embody 
precisely that determinism which characterises all ideologies 
of domination
Marx assumed that all other classes in capitalist society 
would rapidly diminish in importance leaving the naked con­
frontation of the owners of capital and their proletarian wage 
slaves as the only dynamic of further social change. The contra­
dictions inherent in the capitalist mode were assumed to render 
it more and more unstable. It was assumed that this rendered 
the takeover of power by the proletariat inevitable (or pos­
sibly the only alternative to complete social breakdown).
He did not seem to anticipate that exponentially acceler­
ating multiplication of the managerial and modem technocratic 
professional classes which we have discussed above. Indeed, 
the latter only really took off after his death, and remained 
largely undetected as a major social transformation until its
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escalation in the 1960s. (In this it resembled the growth of a 
human cancer undetectable in its constant exponential growth 
over decades and only recognizable in the final months or weeks 
of its victim. )
It may be questioned whether this phenomenon really rep­
resented the emergence of a separate ruling class in the Marxist 
sense or whether, as we have suggested above, all leading sec­
tions of the existing ruling classes have become permeated and 
identified with the ideology of the Technocracy and their in­
terests subject to its criteria of survival value; so that the 
question becomes merely academic.
To take over power it would (on a Marxist model) be neces­
sary for the proletariat to be capable as a class (indeed the 
only capable social force) of innovating, fostering, and dif­
fusing the highest, i.e. the most productive, most dominant 
levels of technology. (Indeed Lenin set the seal on this con­
cept in conceiving communism as resulting from Soviet Power 
plus electrification.)
But as technological advance becomes more and more the prod­
uct of advances in more and more abstract sciences, its spe­
cialists distance themselves ever more completely from the com­
prehension and control not only of the proletariat but even of 
each other.
We have argued above that in previous societies it was 
sometimes possible for the dominant social classes to hire or 
patronise their cultural aides, their intelligentsia, to carry 
out the task of developing their necessary technology (in the 
enlarged sense given above). Even so, the creation of its own 
intelligentsia was more critically important for the emerging 
capitalist bourgeois class than ever before, since they them­
selves asserted their social and international economic and 
political supremacy in the 17th and 18th centuries essentially 
through their capacity to harness an unprecedentedly rapidly 
changing technology. For this purpose it was insufficient and 
indeed inapplicable to rely solely on the minority of the dis-
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iiffected intelligentsia who саше over to them for their feudal 
mling class predecessors. Nor was it sufficient merely to 
*;ake possession of the former technology and its parallel cul­
tural institutions.
The bourgeois were forced to create an entirely new intel­
ligentsia largely from their own ranks, an entirely new cul­
ture, with its own religion, philosophy, legal superstructure,
,above all, an entirely new science. For these purposes it was 
not sufficient to take over the control of the previous major 
cultural institutions, the churches, the political and legal 
îlites, the universities. They had to create their own reformed 
churches and their own dissenting academies and scientific and 
technological societies, their own forms of Government.
Underlying all these cultural (superstructural) forms they 
had to foster a new ontology, an entirely novel materialist and 
determinist model of the natural universe (and eventually of 
the world of human nature) legitimating and ordering their pur­
poses of the universal reification and domination of both.
Though the so-called euperetitioue elements (deistic, vital- 
istic, mystical) in institutional religious and many other so­
cial practices survived for centuries and indeed until this day, 
and indeed have been deliberately encouraged and exploited by 
the ruling capitalist classes as essential, though minor, cul­
tural instruments of social control, they have been gradually 
•but remorselessly excluded from the cultural models of ultimate 
control, from the rules of decision making by the Board rooms 
of the Multinationals or from the War Ministries of Thermo-nu­
clear Power.
Could a culture of universal liberation take over such a 
world view moulded for the purposes of universal domination?
To what extent could radical elements in the existing intelli­
gentsia - itself becoming the self-chosen social instrument of 
ever more pervasive domestication of the human spirit - become 
the initiators of such a new culture, the initiators of their 
own replacement by its multigenetic initiators: the oppressed
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peoples themselves; a culture not devised for the latter but by 
them and of them, expressing their multitudinous coexisting and 
co-essential creativity and interdependence; a culture which in 
all essential respects may incorporate an image of the nature 
of reality, of the validity of scientific knowledge, at least 
as contradictory to that of its bourgeois predecessors as was 
the latter to that of the mediaeval culture they rendered ob­
solete?
To ask these questions is to realise that there are no his­
torical precedents (unless the Maoist Cultural Revolution is 
regarded as a disastrous false start). At the same time it is 
impossible to avoid the suspicion that previous intellectual 
models of universal human liberation which assumed the con­
tinuing validity of the precedent bourgeois determinist materi­
alist world view, however elaborated by dialectical concepts of 
its mechanism, may have been the source of major mistakes in 
the design of new social systems and major traaedies in the 
sacrifice of human and natural life and potential.
The weakness of the revolutionary intelligentsia is that it 
has often not so much expressed the creative critical conscious­
ness of the oppressed (which indeed has still to find a coherent 
and integrated expression) but, rather, the dissatisfactions of 
some of those elements of the ruling bourgeois intelligentsia 
who have been excluded (or even exclude themselves) from par­
ticipation in its prerogatives of power. Their self-images, 
their ambitions for their own social and political leadership 
are usually written in the dominant technocratic language of 
the hegemonic culture against which they rebel. This is, perhaps 
inevitably, most likely to be the case when they seek to congeal 
these fragmented ambitions into a general political programme 
for taking over the management of precisely the means of social 
domination against which they rebel, to inherit the role of the 
preceding Technocracy.
On the other hand their potential value to the oppressed 
arises from that other traditional but contradictory role of
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:he intelligentsia of societies in which it seeks to give new 
expression to human solidarity and interdependence.
In this role they still have to play an essential and his- 
:orically unprecedented part: that of the destruction of their 
pwn intellectual elitism and its ideology and even ontology. Their 
;ask may be nothing less than the fostering of their own re­
placement by a total human group, the oppressed, which for the 
.first time in history does not, itself, have the economic, po­
litical, military or cultural power to destroy the old culture 
pf domination and to initiate the new one of its own liberation.
While this task is more credible for a revolutionary intel­
ligentsia, especially in States where the ownership and control 
pf all the levers of economic, political, and military power 
are formally held on behalf of the people as a whole, there are 
no precedents for taking it for granted. Moreover it may entail 
not merely the transformation of the essential cultural model 
of the preceding bourgeois centuries, but to roll back some 
basic human beliefs of all the millennia since the birth of the 
first Technology - and the concurrent founding of all subsequent 
culture as the intellectual modelling of the domination of all 
other nature and human nature in the interests of its possessors.
Such a prospect would be perhaps unthinkable if epochal his­
torical changes in technology and culture had proceeded linear­
ly through time.
■ But they have not. The time intervals between revolutionary 
changes in technology and its concurrent culture have at each 
stage become a fraction of the time consumed in bringing the 
previous stage to fruition. The conquest of the world by the 
technology of the agricultural revolution probably required 
millennia. Industrial technology exerted its supremacy over all 
previous systems in a few centuries. Mass production technology 
pioneered only in the 20th century had become economically 
supreme within decades. The microelectronic technology of the 
1960s established itself at the leading edge of advanced de­
velopment within a single decade and the revolutions in soft­
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ware development which mark the international economic battles 
of the knowledge industry are won and lost in single years.
And now the universal threat to human survival has become 
imminent. The shortening time span of confidence in continued 
human existence matches the shortening time span of revolution­
ary technological change, whose most advanced sectors are nur­
tured in the dominant industry of the means of human destruc­
tion .
But the need for a totally new social dynamic of liberation 
has also become infinitely more manifest than ever before. This 
paramount need, forcing itself into human social critical con­
sciousness in an unprecedented and ever wider variety of cul­
tural forms and social groupings begins to manifest itself in 
revolutionary movements transcending in social and internation­
al scope and in their multitudinous and multicultural concerns 
with peace, liberation and conservation of the total environ­
ment, any previous human expressions of solidarity and inter­
dependence .
Though they cannot yet provide a blueprint for a world 




Since the purpose of this paper is to suggest a model rather 
than prove a thesis, detailed supporting references are not 
oiven. However, much of the relevant substance of the first 
two parts is dealt with more extensively in the following 
publications of the author where detailed bibliographies are 
given:
Part 1, E.G. Edwards, "Interdisciplinarity, The Relation 
between Objective Knowledge, Moral Purpose and Social Prac­
tice". Bulletin of the Inter-University Centre of Post-Grad­
uate Studies, Dubrovnik; Published by University of Hamburg, 
Vol 1. 1983, Vol 2 1984.
Part 2, E.G. Edwards, Higher Education for Everyone. 
Spokesman Press, Nottingham 1982. ЕЛЗ. Çdwards and I. Roberts
"British Higher Education; long term trends etc.", Higher 
Education Review, London, Spring 1980. E.G. Edwards "An 
Analytical View of Trends of Student Enrolment in Western 
Europe", in; Higher Education in Europe, UNESCO, Bucharest, 
July/Sept 1981.
The term 'Technocracy, meaning a society ruled by technicians 
has been used by various authors since its invention by 
W.H. Smyth, a Californian engineer in 1919 (see e.g. W.H.G. 
Armytage, The Rise of the Technocrate, London 1965.) The 
author uses it in the wider sense given in this paragraph 
in which Technologists (in the older sense) do not necessarily 
constitute a separate dominant class but, rather, all sections 
of the ruling classes (including the politicians) tend to 
congeal into a new block in which the ethos and self image of 
the most advanced technology becomes hegemonic. C.f. also the 
wider definition of Technology developed in Part 2. e.g. ref.
4.
Sections 1.3-1.6. are adapted from a more extensive treatment 
in E.G. Edwards, "Domestication of the Human Animal", from 
Le triomphe dee biotechnologiee, I.U.C. of P.G. Studies, 
Dubrovnik, To be published by Presses Universitaires de Namur, 
1987.
The wider definition of Technology developed below implies 
that all other cultural (i.e. superstructural) social in­
stitutions become subject to the hegemony of the ethos and 
ontology first developed in modern advanced scientific tech­
nology. This thesis is developed more extensively in ref. 1. 
Part 1. E.G. Edwards, Interdisciplinarity etc.
C.f. especially the works of Ilya Prigogine, e.g. From Being 
to Becoming, pub. W.H. Freeman, San Francisco 1980.
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■
TOWARDS A NEW NOTION OF RATIONALITY FOR TECHNOLOGY
POLICY
Laszlo Molnár
It is widely known that in Hungary, the problem of tech­
nological innovation is unsolved. This can be regarded as a 
fundamental problem of technology policy.
In the 1960s and 1970s in Hungary there were conflicting 
views concerning a technology policy separated from economic 
policy. There were some who denied the necessity of such a 
technology policy. Others considered it as part of the economic 
policy of enterprises. But neither the economic policy of the 
state nor that of enterprises can provide us an appropriate 
technology policy, because this would be too great a task for 
them to carry out adequately. On the one hand it would be beyond 
the competence of enterprises and on the other hand, the eco­
nomic policy of the state is determined by short-term require- 
• ments and the need for equilibrium. Technology policy aims at 
creating a new, different environment in the long run. Accord­
ing to Tibor Vámos, this policy "... goes beyond the installa­
tion of new products, new technological methods... it compre­
hends the whole of producing - or at least helping the prod­
uction - of new conditions, the totality of assessment and of 
consideration of effects."^"
These conditions are: human and social factors, financial
means, general material conditions, and the action aiming at2technological development. For me the value-system deter­
mining technology policy also merits analysis, because this 
system plays an important part in shaping technology, too. In 
this case the notion "technology" is of great significance, and 
its meaning can clarify the formative factors of technology 
policy.
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I .  T h e  t e c h n o a r a t i a - m i n d e d  v i e w
Neglecting the social factors of technology and regarding 
it as socially neutral, means to accept the view known as 
"technological determinism". According to Jacques Ellul, a 
famous representative of this view, "Technical progress today 
is no longer conditioned by anything other than its own cal­
culus of efficiency."^ This technical determinisn is based on 
an unproved and false assumption, i.e. that it is always pos­
sible to find "the one best way" for technological decisions. 
The person who accepts this has no reason to reject its con­
sequences.
I. "'The one best way' so runs the formula to which our 
technique corresponds. When everything has been measured and 
calculated mathematically so that the method which has been 
decided upon is satisfactory from the rational point of view, 
from the practical point of view, the method is manifestly the 
most efficient of all those hitherto employed or those in com­
petition with it, then the technical movement becomes self­
directing. I call the process automatism." 4
II. "If a desired result is stipulated, there is no choice 
possible between technical means based on imagination, individ­
ual qualities, or tradition. Nothing can compete with technical 
means. The choice is made a priori. It is not in the power of 
the individual or of the groups to decide to follow some method 
other than the technical. The individual is in a dilemma: 
either he decides to safeguard his freedom of choice, chooses 
to use traditional, personal, moral, or empirical means, there­
by entering into competion with a power against which there is 
no efficacious defense and before which he must suffer defeat; 
or he decides to accept technical necessity, in which case he 
will himself be the victor, but only by submitting irreparably 
to technical slavery. In effect he has no freedom of choice."^
III. "... a new characteristic of economic technique: it is 
inevitably antidemocratic."6 "Technique is a boundary of de­
mocracy. What technique wins, democracy loses. If we had engi­
neers who were popular with the workers, they would be ignorant 
of machinery. In our time, technique is a court of last appeal.
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'he worker is master neither of his factory nor of his bosr 
ries. " 7
IV. "With the introduction of technical development into 
he life of the state, the situation becomes completely differ­
ent: doctrine is merely explicative and justifying. It no longer 
■epresents the end; the end is defined by the autonomous opera­
tion of techniques. It is no longer the criterion of action; 
the sole criterion of action consists in knowing whether or not 
technique has been correctly used, and no political theory can 
tell us that."®
The crucial point of this argumentation is the "one best 
-vay" formula concerning technological decisions. This formula 
Ls expressed in the slogan of the Chicago World Fair of 1933, 
that science discovers, genius invents, industry introduces the 
new things and we adapt ourselves to them and are formed by 
them.^
Technical determinism describes the technical development 
as a linear progression. But this description rests on an ar- 
oitrary handling of facts, and on the disregarding of the pos­
sibility of alternative outcomes at the turning points.
This view has a common assumption with the Taylorian "Scien- 
•tific Management" theory. Namely, both assume the possibility of 
finding "the one best way" of decisions by seeking the maxi­
mization of profit. But in reality economic organizations are 
often satisfied not by the best but by merely satisfactory 
solutions.10
János Kornai has pointed out that "the one best way of" of 
decisionmaking is not a fact, it is only an inexecutable pos­
tulate."1  ^Michel Crozier regards this sort of rationality as
12an "improverished one", which is "totalitarian" as well. In 
Crozier's opinion this ideology of industrialization was used 
for the following reason: the notion gave absolute power to 
the management defining and elaborating this rational solution 
and through this the management was able to break the habits, 
attitudes and privileges of other groups participating in 
production.1  ^ In my opinion this "absolute power" is not nec­
essary for the functioning of modern technology: there are non-
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Taylorian forms of organization of work in successful American
r  J v-rr» f- 141irms•
To sum up: the substantial common features of technological 
determinism and Taylorism are the following:
1. the false hypothesis of the "one best way" of technologi­
cal decision and development,
2. the neglect of the human problems (e.g. special inter­
ests, values and informal relations) of the workers participat­
ing in production,
3. the preference for authoritarian and totalitarian ways 
to solution of the problems of production,
4. the myth of the autonomy of technology,
5. the suppression of human autonomy and
6. the input-output analysis which takes into account only 
the internal costs of a product and neglects the social and ex­
ternal costs (environmental pollution, alienation etc.).
This "impoverished rationality" can represent a threat to 
society and to mankind at high levels of technology. According­
ly we must urgently enrich the content and the dimensions of 
"rationality" in order to be able to cope with the threat.
II. Toward a new type of rationality
To establish a new type of rationality it is necessary to 
use a more encompassing meaning of "technology". This wider 
meaning must have, in Pacey's view, three aspects: 1. the cul­
tural (goals, values and ethical codes, belief in progress, 
awareness and creativity;) 2. the organizational (f onomic and 
industrial activity, professional activity, users and consumers 
trade unions) and 3. the technical (knowledge, skill and 
technique, tools, machines, chemicals, livestock, resources, 
products and waste). The technical aspect of the wider meaning 
is equivalent to the "restricted meaning" of technology.15
From this it follows that we have to take into account not 
only the expert opinion but lay (user) views as well when as­
sessing technological developments. The main problem is "that 
experts see the goals of programmes in much more specific <ways
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16t;han the public, and ... <their> basic values differ." There­
fore we have to arrange an "innovative dialoguebetween pro­
moters and users.
Arnold Pacey has worked out a matrix for assessing dif­
ferent points of view concerning any new technological develop­
ment. This matrix gives us a possibility to compare the dif­
ferent views, those of the experts and those of the users, along
the following lines: 1. practical benefits and costs, 2. status
18'and political advantage, 3. basic values. Pacey says that this 
matrix "... is also useful in illustrating how dialogue is 
curtailed. When new highways, chemical works or power plants are 
proposed, many very detailed questions about benefits, costs, 
and risks are asked in technology assessment exercises and en­
vironmental impact assessments. These questions cover some of 
the same ground as the top half of the table but those who ask 
them tend to assume that objective answers can be given. There 
is little recognition of the way in which promoters must usually 
answer the question differently from the lay public. Yet even 
to present the lay public as a single entity may be over-simple, 
for consumers, employees of the projects and local residents 
whose amenity is disturbed will have quite different points of 
view. A more significant way in which discussion is curtailed,
however, is that questions in the bottom half of the table
19may never be asked at all."
If we complete the Taylorian concept of rationality with 
the above mentioned factors, then we can arrive at an enriched 
form of rationality. This also changes the character of tech­
nological development: the monologue of the promoters becomes 
a dialogue between promoters and users. We have to develop it 
into a democratic dialogue, because "we are to have a democrat­
ic control over technological development, we need public in­
quiry and technology assessment procedures that are able to 
strip off the various disguises which allow fundamental con­
flicts of basic values and political interests to hide behind 
utilitarian arguments about benefits and costs. But many tech­
nology assessments and most major British inquiries have served 
mainly to cloak issues with technical detail that is often
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Table from Arnold Pacey, The Culture of Technology, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1983. p.155
Matrix for assessing different points of view on any new technological development (e.g. a 
public health project). The columns representing expert and lay (or user) views are initially 
blank and are filled in by promoters of the project as a means of testing its appropriateness 
in the community concerned. The matrix is here shown partially completed; in practice, both 
questions and answers will usually need to be more detailed.
Queries Expert views User views
Practical benefits and costs
What benefits are sought? Very specific benefits (e.g. control
of a particular disease)
Better living standards in 
general, including health, 
amenity, housing, jobs
What costs, what risks, 
and what environmental 
impacts are perceived?
Cost of implementation; risks as 
a statistic to be weighed against 
benefits
Costs in time, cash, amenity, 
organization, risk, seen in 
personal and family terms
Who gains which benefits? 
Who loses?
Lowest income groups cannot 
afford the cash costs
Status and political advan 
What is the impact of the 
project in terms of status 
and prestige?
tage
Visible progress, good for national 
prestige. Professional advancement 
for the experts concerned
Status associated with pos­
session of new household a- 
menity
Whor gains or loses Some strengthening of central 
status, power or influence?government authority
Some loss of control over 
life-style, fear of bureau­
cratic power
Basic values
What is the cultural con­
text?




What are the dominant 
values?
Technical interest and virtuosity; 
economic values
Need or user values, family 
welfare
barely relevant. Commenting on one such inquiry, a writer in 
the science journal Nature observed that: 'Technical decisions 
as complex as these have a political content, and that content 
must be isolated and recognized for what it is'. (Robert Walgate, 
Mr. Justice Parker and technical fact, in: Nature (London), 
273/23 March 1978, pp. 300-301.) This had not been done."20
But, you may ask, what do you intend to say by way of ex­
planation of this problem? Everyone knows that there is no 
technology assessment in Hungary! My answer is that just be­
cause of this we should be careful before institutionalizing 
it and so, perhaps, we will have a chance to derive advantage 
from our disadvantage: to organize technology assessment in­
stitutions and to assess these as well.
According to the abovementioned we have to distinguish 
three levels of technological rationality:
I. The Taylorian and Ellulian level with the notion of the 
"impoverished rationality".
II. The level of technology assessment and that of the en­
vironmental impact.
III. The assessment of the second level.
On this level the critical assessment tends to establish a 
democratic control over technology development and lay (user) 
views would be taken into account by the promoters. But this 
process can be carried out only as democratic communication 
between experts and laymen. This rationality renders it meaning­
less to separate the Weberian type purposive rational [zweck- 
rational) and value-rational (wertrational) action: purposive 
rational development has to take into account the means correct­
ly chosen to obtain ends, but "correctly chosen means" have to 
be in accord with conscious value standards of laymen and ex­
perts as well.
If we take this version of rationality as a merely utopian 
one, then we have to pay the social and environmental price of 
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RECENT METHODOLOGICAL ORIENTATIONS IN SCIENTIFIC AND 
ENGINEERING DISCIPLINES
V.G. Gorokhov
The sphere of scientific-engineering disciplines, which 
today are developing intensively along with natural scientific, 
mathematical and socio-humanistic disciplines, includes diverse 
fields of research and many types of engineering and design. 
These disciplines have a well-shaped disciplinary organisation 
(a specific publication file and a distinctive research commu­
nity) and occupy a prominent place in modern science. Besides, 
by the second half of the 20th century most scientific-engi­
neering disciplines could shape their own theoretical research 
known as engineering theory (or technical theory), which ought 
to become a principal subject of methodological analysis.
The main feature of scientific-engineering disciplines is 
that they emerge at the junction of scientific and engineering 
activity and must function precisely in the conditions ensuring 
such interconnection. This determines the specific features of 
their structure and formation.
In the structure of a natural-science and engineering theory 
conceptual and mathematical apparatus and theoretical (ontologi­
cal) schemes are usually singled out. (See V.S. Stepin. 1976.1
Theoretical schemes represent a combination of abstract 
objects oriented, on the one hand, on the use of the correspond­
ing mathematical apparatus, and, on the other, on the "mental" 
experiment, i.e. the design of possible experimental situations. 
The mathematical apparatus is primarily used to calculate ex­
perimental situations. In a developed theory it performs the 
displaying function, i.e. the function of transformating ab­
stract objects by deductive inference. This enables one to ob­
tain new knowledge without needing to turn to experiment and
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Observation. For the mathématisation of a scientific discipline 
the parallel elaboration of adequate conceptual apparatus is 
needed.
In principle, engineering science has the same mathematized 
theory as natural science. An engineering theory also has ab­
stract objects assembled from a fixed set of elements according 
to definite rules of assembly. Capacities, inductances and 
resistances correspond to them in electrical engineering; gen­
erators, filters and amplifiers in theoretical radio engineer­
ing, and various types of kinematic pairs, links, circuits, 
etc. in the theory of mechanisms. These ideal elements corre­
spond adequately to standardized structural elements listed in 
engineering catalogues. In other words, abstract objects of 
engineering sciences should exactly correspond to the structure 
of engineering objects.
Three main levels in the theoretical (ontological) schemes 
of an engineering theory can be discerned (see Fig. 1) The
Basic natural- Methods and means




multiplying of structural schemes
of engineering objects
A V
sphere of functioning of 
engineering activity
Fig. 1. Structure and functioning 
of engineering theory
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’'unctional scheme is oriented on the mathematical description 
und fixes the general idea about the engineering object, ir­
respective of the method of its realization. The units of this 
scheme reflect only the functional properties of the elements 
)f the engineering object for the sake of which they are in-- 
:luded in it to attain the general objective and reflect certain 
nathematical relations. Flow schemes, or schemes of performance, 
iescribe natural, for instance, physical processes taking place 
'in the engineering object and connecting its elements into a 
single whole. The units of such schemes reflect various opera­
tions performed in the natural process by the elements of the 
sngineering object while it is functioning. These are based on 
natural-scientific concepts. Finally, structural schemes ref­
lect the structural arrangement of elements and linkages in the 
given engineering object and presuppose its possible realiza­
tion. The elements of the latter are regarded in them as having 
not only functional properties, but also properties of the se­
cond order, i.e. those undesirable properties which are added 
by a definitely realized element, for instance, non-linear 
distortions of the amplified signal in the amplifier. These 
schemes represent constructive-technical and technological 
parameters, i.e. they reflect specific problems cropping up in 
engineering practice.
The functioning of engineering theory is realized by the 
iteration method. At first a special engineering problem is for­
mulated. Then it is represented in the form of the structural 
scheme of the engineering object which is transformed into the 
idea about the natural process reflecting its performance. To 
calculate and mathematically model this process a functional 
scheme is constructed. Consequently, the engineering problem 
is reformulated into a scientific one and then into a mathe­
matical problem solved by the deductive method. This path from 
the bottom to the top represents the analysis of schemes.
The way in the opposite direction - the synthesis of schemes 
- makes it possible to synthesize the ideal model of a new engi­
neering object from idealized structural elements according to 
the appropriate rules of deductive transformation, to calculate
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the main parameters of the ideal model and to simulate the per­
formance. The solution obtained in the functional scheme is 
gradually transformed to the engineering activity level, where 
engineering parameters which are secondary from the point of 
view of the ideal model are taken into account, for instance, 
the size and weight of parts, their screening from electro­
magnetic side effects, the optimum structural layout, etc., and 
additional calculations (corrections of theoretical results) 
are carried out.
Functional, flow and structural theoretical (ontological) 
schemes reflect different methods of representing an engineer­
ing object and levels of the solution of a mathematical problem, 
a scientific problem and an engineering problem. Using the 
procedures of analysis and synthesis of schemes based on the 
construction of some equivalent schemes which replace the engi­
neering object at each of these levels, these three levels are 
mutually correlated and the theoretical solution of the prob­
lems advanced by engineering practice found. As a result of the 
functioning of engineering theory new structural schemes of 
hypothetical (potentially possible) engineering objects of the 
given type are worked out. They serve as the initial point for 
the design. Herein lies the main contribution of engineering 
theory to the solution of practical engineering problems.
This to a great extent explains the specific feature of 
engineering theory: the class of hypothetical engineering ob­
jects which are not yet designed must correspond to its ab­
stract objects. Therefore, what matters in engineering science 
is not so much the explanation of the existing facts and the 
forecast of the course of natural processes, but the design of 
possible situations (and of the means for their attainment), 
not only the analysis, but also the synthesis of the theoretical 
schemes of engineering objects. For this reason, the empirical 
basis of engineering theory contains necessarily not only some 
constructive-technical and technological knowledge, oriented 
on the generalization of experience in engineer's work, but 
also some practical and methodological knowledge representing 
practical recommendations for application in engineering prac­
tice.
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Ontological (theoretical) schemes of scientific disciplines 
orovide a specific "vision of the world", that is, the universe 
)f the objects studied in the given theory and of the methods 
)f their theoretical representation. In natural sciences this 
specific vision of the world is expressed in "special scientific 
world pictures" (the physical, biological, mechanical, elektro- 
iynamic and other pictures). In engineering sciences there are 
ilso analogues of this vision of the world, but somewhat dif­
ferent principles of ontologization are developed in them. They 
are associated with the rigorous orientation on engineering ac­
tivity. Let us call it a "universal" ontological scheme with 
respect to a "family" of scientific-engineering disciplines. 
Within the framework of every individual discipline in such a 
"family" this scheme is concretized in the form of the gener­
alized ontological one which, in its turn, generalizes a number 
of specific ontological schemes developed in various fields of 
studies or lines of research of the given discipline.
The genesis of the "universal" ontological scheme in scien­
tific-engineering disciplines is determined, on the one hand, 
by the basic natural-scientific discipline, and, on the other, 
by engineering ideas and tasks. This is why its formation takes 
•place along two opposite lines: firstly, due to ever greater 
concretization and utilisation of the "universal" ontological 
scheme borrowed from the appropriate natural science, and, se­
condly, by generalizing specific theoretical models developed 
in the given engineering science. In the first case emphasis 
is placed on the flow scheme, in the second case on the struc­
tural scheme. Thus, the "universal" ontological scheme of a 
scientific-engineering discipline is obtained as a result of 
the intersection and superposition of two layers of ontological 
schemes.
Unlike the case in natural-scientific disciplines, in scien­
tific-engineering disciplines the layer of structural schemes 
determines their becoming and development. (Flow and functional 
schemes perform auxiliary functions within the framework of 
theory.) They constantly develop and improve through direct 
contact with practical engineering activity. The scientific-en-
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gineering discipline can be considered as formed when a mathe- 
matized engineering theory is constructed in it. It should also 
clearly give the procedures of the transition from structural 
schemes to flow and functional schemes (schemes of analysis) 
and vice versa (schemes of synthesis). Only when an engineering 
science has worked out the means of the theoretical synthesis 
of engineering systems which make it possible to extrapolate 
the theoretical results obtained for the class of hypothetical 
engineering objects (with the orientation on practical and 
methodological knowledge) can its generalized ontological scheme 
be considered universal in relation to the given class of ob­
jects.
In developed engineering science new scientific-engineering 
disciplines can be constructed after the pattern of a basic 
engineering (and not natural-scientific) theory (for instance, 
radiolocation after the pattern of theoretical radio engineer­
ing) within the framework of the "universal" ontological scheme 
common for the given "family" of disciplines. In this case their 
formation follows the "research line - research field - sci­
entific discipline" scheme.
So, one can speak about two basic methods of forming clas­
sical engineering science: in the first place, out of new
applied lines of a natural-scientific theory, and, secondly, as 
branches of the corresponding basic engineering theory within 
the framework of the "family" of homogeneous scientific-engi­
neering disciplines grouped around it.
Engineering sciences have traditionally been regarded only 
as spheres of the application of natural-scientific knowledge. 
However, recently we have seen the emergence of a number of 
scientific-engineering disciplines oriented on using not only 
natural-scientific knowledge but also socio-humanistic knowl­
edge in engineering practice and design. The range of design 
problems has been expanded and includes now socio-economic 
and engineering-psychological systems and other problems.
Two main types of scientific-engineering disciplines can be 
discerned - classical and nonclassical. The former are orien­
ted on a certain type of engineering object (a mechanism, a
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machine, a radio or radar device, an electric circuit, etc.) 
which is under study or design. The latter are oriented on dif­
ferent classes of comprehensive scientific-engineering problems, 
although their subject of study and design can coincide, for 
instance, the man-machine system in ergonomics and systems engi­
neering. Such scientific-engineering disciplines can be called 
modern comprehensive (nonclassical ) scientific-engineering dis­
ciplines. Theoretical studies for these two types of disciplines 
essentially differ, but are comparable to an extent.
In classical scientific-engineering disciplines of the the­
ory of mechanism and machinery, theoretical radio engineering, 
circuit analysis, etc. type, the engineering theory was shaped 
to a large extent in conformity with the norms and ideals of 
organising scientific knowledge, which were borrowed from a bas­
ic natural-scientific theory (theoretical mechanics, theory of 
electricity, electrodynamics, etc.). However, having branched 
out of basic natural science or mathematics, engineering theory 
gradually shaped its own specific ideals and norms of organizing 
scientific theoretical knowledge. These ideals and norms are 
determined by the necessity of strict orientation on the corre­
sponding field of engineering practice.
Present-day comprehensive (nonclassical) scientific-engi­
neering disciplines are already oriented not on a single basic 
(natural-scientific, socio-humanitarian or engineering) theory, 
but on the whole complex of scientific knowledge and disciplines. 
This is why they shape another epistemological ideal of theoret­
ical research - comprehensive theoretical research. Systems en­
gineering is the most typical in this respect.
Systems engineering develops the nonclassical way. As a 
rule, at first there evolve some rather general concrete-method­
ological approach enjoying "universal" application. Then this 
is gradually adjusted to a definite problem area (complex sci­
entific and engineering problems). Behind the phenomenon is a 
broad scientific movement which may result in a new scientific 
discipline.
The uniqueness of the nonclassical way is that a solution 
of integrated scientific and engineering problems may, in prin-
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ciple, be found on the basis of any scientific disciplines, 
theories, knowledge, and methods (and not only on the basic 
theory) which in the future are synthesized on a general method­
ological foundation into an integral theoretical system of a 
scientific and engineering discipline. Of course, they are ad­
equately processed and revised. Finally, new specific methods 
and theoretical tools of research are developed, making it pos­
sible to accomplish most effectively the tasks faced by the 
given scientific-engineering disciplines. Though at first glance 
the main task here is a synthesis of heterogeneous knowledge, 
theoretical notions and methods, it implies coordination, align­
ment, management, and organisation of different activities aimed 
at the solution of a certain integrated scientific-engineering 
problem. Hence, the objects of the disciplines of this type 
carry out studies into specific "activities". Systems engineer­
ing belongs precisely to such disciplines.
There are two basic ways of theoretical research organisa­
tion in modern science: monodisciplinary and interdisciplinary. 
Monodisciplinary research realised within classical engineering 
sciences has already been considered. Interdisciplinary theoret­
ical research may be integrated and complex. The former results 
from generalization and subsequent integration of particular 
theoretical schemes of different scientific-engineering dis­
ciplines, i.e. different lines of research into a certain type 
of engineering object conducted on a general mathematical basis 
and from a certain standpoint (e.g. stability and quality of 
automatic control systems). The latter are both multiple aspect 
and multifaceted. They remain complex at all stages of research 
into the complicated engineering objects, whereas their unity 
and integrity are provided for methodologically. The automatic 
control theory is a clear illustration of integrated inter­
disciplinary research. Let us now consider the organization of 
comprehensive theoretical research with systems engineering as 
an example.
The nonclassical, specific evolution of systems engineering 
is stipulated by the necessity of solving complex engineering 
problems. Though integrating a complex collection of different
118
types of knowledge and methods, and encountering a variety of 
disciplines, it uses them for handling specific problems that 
cannot be solved by any of these disciplines separately. Hence, 
the formulation of systems engineering theory starts directly 
with the development of a generalized ontological scheme. It is 
worth noting that such a scheme cannot be borrowed from any of 
the existing scientific disciplines. This requires a certain 
methodology. The most adequate concrete methodological basis 
for the comprehensive theoretical research in systems engineer­
ing is provided by systems approach. The use and development 
of the latter determine its status as a comprehensive scienti­
fic-engineering discipline. It is worth nothing that method­
ological knowledge constitutes an integral part of the systems 
engineering theory.
A specific feature of modern scientific-engineering dis­
ciplines, in particular systems engineering, is that they are 
systems oriented. In other words, all of them (systems engineer­
ing, ergonomics, engineering cybernetics, systems analysis, 
etc. ) operate according to a certain "universal" ontological 
scheme represented by different versions of the general systems 
theory, and methods and means of systems approach. This "uni- 
• versai" ontological scheme provides a basis for an ideal model, 
for specific viewing of the object under study and design, the 
reality which the systems engineer faces and in which it oper­
ates, the only reality permitting a synthesis of "particular" 
theoretical concepts.
The research methods and means are selected from different 
scientific disciplines or developed specially as applied to 
each concrete problem. A comprehensive piece of theoretical 
research should take account of all the particular concepts 
(representations) and specific ontological schemes. These must 
be generalized and reformulated into a sort of partial systems 
theories while their abstract objects, ontological schemes, 
are represented as special systems. These special systems may 
be further synthesized into different (depending on the problem 
being solved) complex models of a complicated engineering ob­
ject. It is a collection of all possible (including hypotheti­
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cal) comprehensive systems models that makes up a generalized 
ontological scheme of systems engineering which, on the one 
hand, is generalization of specific particular ontological 
schemes, of the theories used therein and, on the other, speci­
fication of the "universal" ontological scheme.
In systems engineering the "universal" ontological scheme 
(or systems ontology) serves as a methodological guide in 
choosing the theoretical methods and means for solving complex 
scientific and engineering problems, and makes it possible to 
adopt them from the related disciplines or methodological field. 
It also determines the methodological principle of "designing" 
complex abstract objects of systems engineering - complex sys­
tems models, their subsequent simulation and interpretation,
i.e. makes it possible to extrapolate the experience accumulated 
in systems engineering to future design situations. Complex sys­
tems models of a complicated engineering object, developed at a 
theoretical level, may be used as a basis for designing new 
systems.
In practical systems engineering activity, the task of 
creating a new system consists in a combination of different 
scientific and engineering concepts without reducing them to a 
unified theoretical representation. This enables a researcher 
or developer, while solving a special systems engineering prob­
lem, to build the dissimilar schemes of complex engineering ob­
jects. And it is impossible to reproduce the procedure of their 
construction (it is within the sphere of the designer's intui­
tion). Such schemes actually constitute a "syncretic" combina­
tion of different theory representations (elements of electric 
circuits and mechanical diagrams, algorithmic, skeleton, and 
block diagrams of automatic control theory and other disci­
plines) and the representations of the object in engineering 
activities: elements of different schemes of production, devel­
opment, functioning, etc. Thus, a common structural ontological 
scheme contains the components of gearing diagrams, electronic 
circuits, and block and wiring diagrams that underlie the de­
sign and assembly of mechanical, electric and other blocks.
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An essential shortcoming of the representation of a compli- 
:ated engineering object this way is the qualitative inhomo- 
jeneity of the obtained ontological scheme which makes it pos­
sible to simulate the functioning of a system as a whole, and 
implicates the design and development of technology, adjustment 
îtc. The "syncretic" schemes actually do not solve the problem 
jf an integral theoretical description of a complicated engineer 
Lng object.
To solve this problem, it is necessary to represent the giv- 
эп "syncretic" scheme as a system of honogeneous descriptions. 
Automatic control theory arises as a result of the integration 
Df different engineering sciences (theory of mechanisms and 
machinery, theoretical electrical engineering and radio engi­
neering, engineering hydraulics and pneumatics) which deal with 
specific engineering problems (servomechanism). The theoretical 
synthesis of scientific-engineering knowledge is based here on 
a single mathematical scheme. The comprehensive theoretical 
research is also oriented towards a synthesis of the theories 
employed, though from somewhat different positions as compared 
to integrated interdisciplinary research.
Thus, the main problem facing theoretical systems engineer­
ing is the transition from the syncretic description of a com­
plex engineering problem by theoretical means and notions of 
different scientific disciplines to the homogeneous abstract 
ontological scheme. It is necessary, first of all, to be able 
to use the appropriate mathematical apparatus in systems engi­
neering. For this purpose the method of a uniform description 
of qualitatively heterogeneous elements must be chosen. That is 
why in theoretical systems engineering the structural and flow 
ontological schemes are formed in principle as maximaly ab­
stract. (In classical engineering science they are much more 
specialized and particular).
Functional schemes in systems engineering can be of two 
types (Fig. 2). The schemes of the first type are developed 
in so-called structural analysis and are aimed at investigating 
the structure of large-scale systems. They correspond to ab­
stract structural schemes of systems engineering and generalize
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various structural schemes - automatic control theories, net­
work theories, switching circuit network theories and computer 
logics, etc. The second type is represented by functional 
schemes elaborated in theoretical programming which are adequate 
to generalized flow (algorithmic) schemes. They have been gen­
eralized in cybernetics and are considered on the plane of the 
transformation of substance, energy and information. They ac­
tually are idealized representations of the functioning of any 
system and the initial point of computer programming. In sys­
tems engineering these two types of ontological schemes are 




sentations and notions 
(systems, cybernetic, 
etc.)
"Universal" means of 
computer simulation
Synthesis - systems design
I ~1 - "configuroid"
Fig. 2. Structureland functioning of theoretical research in modem 
scientific-engineering disciplines
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Algorithmic schemes in systems engineering are used for 
lescribing and organizing activity aimed at creating a large- 
scale system. The ensuring of the functioning of the designed 
jystem also belongs to it. The algorithm of the functioning of 
:he system merges with the algorithm of this activity, especial­
ly during the creation of automated management systems. The 
ilgorithms of their functioning describe automated managerial 
ictivity. It is not fortuitous that most works on systems engi- 
íeering contain two basic parts: the description of the struc­
ture of the system and the description of the process of its 
creation. It is essential, therefore, to combine both descrip­
tions in a single theoretical model. This, for instance, takes 
place in algorithmic languages of computer simulation in which 
the flow (algorithmic) scheme is superimposed on the structural 
(static) scheme of the system which is being simulated. The 
rules of transforming structural and flow schemes into func­
tional schemes are formalized, and this transformation is car­
ried out automatically on a computer.
Systems engineering solves comprehensive engineering prob­
lems of a qualitatively new class. These problems are associat­
ed with the mutual co-ordination of particular, local solutions, 
•with their systems representation in the form of a single whole. 
Here arises the problem of "configuring", reducing the multi­
aspect description recorded in different flow and structural 
ontological schemes into a single systems model - a "config- 
uroid" - obtained as a result of simulation. So, the config­
urator is a device for synthesizing theoretical schemes, a 
generator of the simulation models of the system while the con- 
figuroid is a comprehensive (structural-flow) model of the 
system.
In modern engineering theory the place of the analysis of 
schemes is taken by a comprehensive study, while the place of 
the synthesis is taken by systems design. Not only the theoret­
ical schemes of different engineering, natural, mathematical 
and social scientific disciplines are made comprehensive, but 
also the engineering requirements and limitations represented 
in a theoretical form (special structural schemes). Modern
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engineering theory, unlike classical theory, is oriented on gen­
eral scientific (methodological) notions (systems, cybernetics, 
etc.) and on universal means of computer simulation. Therefore, 
the process of its construction is inevitably accelerated. It 
is associated with the adaptation of these already developed 
universal notions and schemes.
Let us sum up the basic features of the structure and func­
tioning of theoretical studies in modern scientific engineering 
disciplines,
1. The structural and flow schemes of modern engineering 
theory are more general and are shaped, on the one hand, as the 
concretization of a universal ontological scheme, for instance, 
systems ontology whose principles of construction are developed 
in a wide methodological sphere, and, on the other, as a gen­
eralization of appropriate ontological schemes of classical 
engineering theories.
2. The generalized structural scheme of modern engineering 
theory represents a maximally abstract image of the static 
structure of a complex engineering object abstracted from the 
qualitative definiteness of structural elements. It is used to 
analyze the configuration of the system and the degree of the 
interrelationship and reliability of its elements, irrespective • 
of their specific content.
3. The generalized flow scheme of modern engineering theory 
is a generalized algorithmic description of the functioning of 
the system, i.e., of the sequence of transforming the flow of 
substance, energy or information, irrespective of its realiza­
tion. It is the result of abstracting from the qualitative de­
finiteness of the natural (in particular, physical) process 
which is passing through the system and which is being trans­
formed by it.
4. Each of these generalized ontological schemes (struc­
tural and flow schemes) has its specific methods of mathematical 
descriptions. In other words, in modern engineering theory 
(where the mathematical description depends primarily on the 
flow scheme) functional schemes develop. They are oriented, in 
the first place, on structural schemes and, secondly, on flow
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ontological schemes. Besides, modern engineering theory uses, 
as a rule, several standard (functional) schemes adapted for 
solving different classes of engineering problems.
5. This gives rise to differences in functioning. In clas­
sical engineering theory (for instance, in theory of electrical 
circuits) at first a structural scheme of a device is built 
which then, according to certain rules of correspondence, is 
transformed into a flow scheme and then into a functional scheme 
equivalent to it, for instance, an operator scheme. On the basis 
of the latter, sets of equations are formed into which specific 
values of parameters under study can be substituted. The solu­
tion of these sets of equations makes it possible to determine 
either unknown parameters of some structural elements (of the 
electrical circuit) with known characteristics of the natural 
process passing through them (e.g., the electrical current 
passing through the circuit), or unknown characteristics of the 
electric current with known parameters of elements.
In modern engineering theory the complexity of engineering 
objects conditions the necessity of the theoretical study and 
the mathematical description of not only the process of their 
functioning but also of their structural schemes. Therefore, 
mathematical problems of two types are solved in it: firstly, 
the determination of the rank, connectedness, reliability, etc. 
of the elements and the structure of the system, and, secondly, 
the calculation of the parameters of its functioning.
6. Since modern engineering theory deals with the qualita­
tively new object of research and design, the problem of its 
systems representation, of creating special systems ontology, 
emerges. Within the framework of each theory this finds its 
expression in the necessity of comparing the generalized struc­
tural and flow schemes of the same object, of its syncretic 
structural-flow description. For example, in many algorithmic 
languages of computer simulation the static structure of the 
system is combined with the algorithm of its functioning (on a 
single block diagram). This algorithm is regarded as a con­
sequence of operations carried out by the elements of the 
static structure.
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7. Finally, owing to the comprehensive character of theoret­
ical study in modern scientific disciplines, their functioning 
consists not only in revealing different aspects and modes of 
the operation of the system under study (design), which are sub­
ject to the generalized description and calculation, but also 
in collecting all the results obtained in a single multi-aspect 
simulation model. This task has not been set within the frame­
work of classical engineering theory.
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KNOWLEDGE AND VALUE ORIENTATION IN SYSTEM DESIGNING
Ladislaw Tondl
Abstract
The term "knowledge and value orientation" in technology 
presupposes that any technological system is a materialization 
of a certain amount of knowledge and a certain set of values. 
Discussions concerned with the explanation of technological 
changes have pointed at the role of value orientation and at 
the importance of decision-making processes influenced by ac­
cepted value structures. Changes in knowledge orientation have 
accentuated primarily an interdisciplinary approach; analyses 
of dynamic behaviour; the sphere of impacts in time and space; 
and considerations of prognostic dimensions in the preparation 
planning and designing of technological changes. New accents 
in value orientation presuppose a synthesis of technical and 
humanitarian rationalities, respecting those aspects which are 
expressed in terms of "human dimensions", "controllability", 
"manageability", "acceptability", "solving ecological and er­
gonomical problems".
*
1. The terms "knowledge orientation" and
"value orientation" in technological systems
Recent Soviet discussions concerned with outlooks of tech­
nical disciplines - with system designing and designing cul­
ture, which have also reflected certain generalized experience 
with recent technological accidents and the increase of po­
tential hazards or the danger of negative impacts of some tech 
nological solutions - have focused attention on two important
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areas which tend to be expressed in terms of "knowledge orien­
tation" and "value orientation" in technology and technologico- 
engineering thinking. These terms represent a certain general­
ization or modification of those concepts which were stimulated 
by the pioneering work of Thomas Kuhn, which deals with the 
role of paradigms in the development of science and technology. 
According to these concepts, any scientific/technological arti- I 
fact, i.e. any new work resulting from rational cognitive or 
creative activities, is characterized by certain knowledge and 
certain value structures being projected into its creation. In 
this respect, any new step in science and technology is char­
acterized by what is expressed in terms of "knowledge-laden- 
ness", or "theory-ladenness" and "value-ladenness".
Naturally, the increasing complexity of envisaged, planned 
or designed technological systems also results in an increased 
amount of knowledge being applied in the course of the design 
process, and in the realization or implementation of complex 
technological systems. The very synthesis, aggregation or in­
tegration of these knowledge prerequisites (which are, as a 
rule, of a different nature and origin, resulting from many 
scientific and technical disciplines, and which include not 
only the knowledge of what can be realized but also the knowl­
edge of how it can be realized, the knowledge of realization 
conditions and limits) requires a certain systems approach, a 
systems analysis. Consequently, one cannot wonder that the 
designing of large technical systems involves well-managed and 
organized work of teams composed of specialists in different 
professions, not only in technical and natural scientific dis­
ciplines, but frequently in economics, some biological and 
medical disciplines and, principally, ecology.
While the knowledge orientation and knowledge prereouisites 
of the conceptual and design preparation of a piece of tech­
nical work may seem obvious - this is also corroborated by the 
fact that the conceptual and design preparation is always 
carried out by specialists and specialized teams - the situa-
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ion is different as far as value orientation is concerned. And 
et the origin of any technical work inevitably results also 
rom certain decisions and evaluations, starting with the as­
sessment of existing, justified and accepted needs, require- 
lents or obligations, and ending with the selection of a tech- 
tical solution for a given problem situation. These decision- 
laking and evaluating processes always employ certain value 
.structures, certain criteria, certain priorities etc. This es­
sential characteristic of the genesis of technical works holds 
;rue, even when these value structures may be concealed, and 
íeed not be explicitly expressed or formulated; this is also 
because decision-making and evaluating processes reflect certain 
Interests or requirements on the part of those who are engaged 
in the realization of a required technical work.
The value orientation of envisaged, planned or designed 
pieces of technical work may sometimes be prone to a certain 
contradiction, as shown in recent works by Soviet authors deal­
ing with the system designing of new technology. On the one 
hand, a team of specialists is correctly required to submit an 
optimized solution which would satisfy all-society demands and 
comply with up-to date trends in scientific and technical de­
velopment, using the highest level of knowledge. On the other 
hand, the technical solution submitted is required to comply 
with interests and needs of the customer, which may be biased 
■by narrow or limited knowledge or value horizons, resulting 
from outdated ideas and concepts, or from a unilateral approach 
to a potential technical solution, which is biased by partial 
interests. It can be assumed that the contradiction is partly 
responsible for some still-existing deficiencies in the invest­
ment process, for the continuing accentuation of technical de­
velopment within existing or rather outdated technical para­
digms, i.e. for the mere dissemination and distribution of so 
far accepted models, standards, designs, methods and technol­
ogies, for the increasing technical delay in many technical 
areas, or, in other words, for giving inadequate attention to 
the importance and role of some new technical directions.
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2. Problem of the explanation of technical changes
In the past, analyses of technical trends and technological 
developments operated mainly with the term "innovation", intro­
duced by Schumpeter. Their attention was focused principally on 
the analysis of the influence and role of technical innovations 
in the economic development, on the typology of technical in­
novations, analyses of so-called innovation cycles or innovation 
rhythms etc. Concurrently with analyses of this type, analyses 
of so-called technical delay, technological transfer, and im­
portance of so-called innovation clusters, i.e. centres of 
scientific and technical creativity, were carried out in Western 
Europe and in the OECD member countries. These works resulted 
in many valuable incentives, mainly for the orientation of sci­
entific and technical policies and the programming and planning 
of promising technical trends. (This holds true despite the 
fact that analyses of this kind were considerably underestimatec 
or, in other words, following certain promising initial works, 
discontinued completely in our country.)
Recently, analyses of additional problem spheres - apart 
from those mentioned above - have been initiated, which rep­
resent a certain expansion of the original ones. While the ear-' 
lier efforts focused mainly on scientific and technical innova­
tions, their genesis, informational, technical and social pre­
requisites of their fruitful development, problems related to 
a more general term, namely to that of "technical change", have 
recently been analyzed and discussed more frequently. An es­
sential difference from concepts and analyses which use the 
term "innovation" can be briefly characterized as follows: 
while the term "technical innovation" includes desirable, re­
quired and currently prepared technical changes which are as­
sumed in advance to be generally beneficial or, to be exact, to 
be leading to a reduction of entropy in processes of man-con­
trolled, -managed and -utilized material, energy or information 
changes, the term "technical change" also denotes undesirable 
changes, changes related to negative (mainly environmental) im-
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>acts, changes involving increased risks, increased possibili­
ties of accidents etc. Obviously, this is not to say that the 
ratio between positive and negative impacts of technological 
changes is stable, or that it cannot be modified to follow a 
lesired direction using a series of appropriate measures, i.e. 
additional technological changes.
The issue of technological changes can be examined from 
yarious viewpoints and in different consequences. These include 
Drincipal directions and trends of technical changes, their po­
tential or assumed trajectories (which are usually tree struc­
tures), directions of these changes projected into chronological 
and spatial dimensions (i.e. a certain expansion and generaliza­
tion of the earlier analyses of the so-called "transfer of tech­
nology"). In this respect, it is necessary to mention an im­
portant problem sphere which has recently been in the focus of 
keen attention and which tends to be denoted as the "explana­
tion of technological change".
The explanation of technological change includes mainly 
analyses of the origin and course of technical change, i.e. 
usually the reconstruction of causal concatenations leading to 
a technological change of a certain type; in these analyses, 
attention is paid chiefly to general relationships and depend­
encies, i.e. dependencies which have a repeatable character and 
which can lead - assuming identical or analogous conditions - 
■to a repeated occurrence of an identical or analogous tech­
nological change. Consequently, the problem sphere is sometimes 
characterized as "technological diagnostics". (Formally, ex­
planation or diagnostic models have a suitable or analogous 
structure, being represented by sets of procedures operating 
with general data, i.e. scientific laws, hypotheses or other 
generalizations, singular factographic data and certain infer­
ence rules. For these reasons, the term "technological diag­
nostics" has the same or analogous meaning as the "explanation 
of technological change".)
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The explanation of technological changes, or the use of 
the term in the sense corresponding to the technological diag­
nostics, is important for analyzing changes which have already 
taken place, especially those changes which can be charac­
terized as undesirable, unwanted or unexpected and which have 
resulted in negative impacts, deteriorations of the overall 
situation, or increased risks or dangers characterized in any 
other way. The fact that we are capable of explaining such 
changes, that we know the sequence of processes leading to a 
technological change of a certain type (the sequence is, as a 
rule, a tree structure where analyses proceed from its branches 
and ramifications downward to the root) is very important for 
selecting measures which can prevent an undesirable change oc­
curring, or at least reduce the probability of its taking place, 
as well as for selecting measures which could reduce negative 
impacts of some situations. Essentially, the function of expia-, 
nation procedures in this case is the same as that of diag­
nostic procedures: a diagnosis is reliable and efficient enough 
if it is capable of initiating an efficient therapy.
However, the explanation of technological change is by no 
means limited to changes which have already taken place, or 
even to their negative impacts. It is also concerned with en­
visaged, prepared, planned or designed changes. As every tech­
nical work is a result of human technical activities which usu­
ally constitute a complex, sequentially and hierarchically or- 1 
ganized structure of different activities, mainly cognitive, 
evaluating, decisionmaking, proposing and materializing (manu­
facturing) ones, which are interrelated and interlinked, the 
explanation of technological changes includes findings which 
render our knowledge concerning the structure of these activ­
ities more detailed. Unlike the explanation of phenomena, oc­
currences or situations which originate or which are manifested 
without any interference on the part of man and which are, to 
a substantial degree, represented by general relationships and 
causal concatenations, the explanation of technological changes 
must also take into account the fact that these changes are 
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always a result of a purpose-oriented, organized and man-con­
trolled set of activities into which elements of a very broad 
sphere of subjective phenomena enter. Apart from other consti­
tuents, the sphere includes elements which tend to be expressed 
as needs, requirements, demands, motivations etc. At the same 
time, elements of what are usually termed "knowledge orienta­
tion" and "value orientation" are always projected into and ref­
lected in this sphere. To summarize the role of these subjective 
elements in the explanation of technological changes, it is pos­
sible to conclude that:
- every technological change can be regarded and analysed as a 
result of a conscientious, organized and target-oriented set 
of activities which are capable of desirable transformations 
of some material, energy and information processes,
- every technological change represents a "second nature" ele­
ment, i.e. conditions, processes or occurrences produced by 
practical human activities,
- every planned, required or designed technological change must 
be - before it takes place - prepared in the form of an "ideal 
model", an "informational model", i.e. in the form of a pro­
ject of what is to be changed, how the change is to take place 
and what its future use will be. (This is to stress the in­
dispensability of a design preparation stage in every planned 
and required technological change. )
3. Changes in knowledge orientation of designing
Changes in the conceptual knowledge orientation, i.e. main­
ly in the research, development and design preparation of tech­
nical works, are stimulated chiefly by the necessity of a sys­
tem-conceived approach to the preparation, realization and use 
of these works. For this reason, the term "system designing" is 
often used. (Although the interpretation of this term need not 
necessarily be unambiguous, it may either denote the use of sys­
tem principles and system-engineering methods in designing tech­
nical works, or denote the designing of works explicitly char­
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acterized as systems - there is no clearly delineated boundary 
between the two interpretations. In the following parts of the 
present article, the first interpretation will be adhered to.) 
Principal changes in the knowledge orientation of engineering 
designing, which are being enforced step by step and which have 
to be taken into account in all spheres of engineering-technical 
activities, can be summarized as follows:
- provisions for an interdisciplinary snythesis and inter­
disciplinary cooperation,
- an accentuated system approach to the preparation, realiza­
tion and operation of technical works,
- thorough application of prognostic criteria.
The interdisciplinary synthesis has already built up a rel­
atively good and developed tradition in some technical fields. 
Practically all important works in the field of engineering, 
power generation, construction industries and other technical 
branches cannot dispense with purposefully controlled and orga 
ized cooperation of specialists in a number of different tech­
nical disciplines, especially engineering disciplines, dis­
ciplines related to materials and control processes, electro­
technical disciplines related to microelectronics, and many 
others. Lately, these problem spheres have been supplemented by 
information sciences and a number of disciplines of theoretical 
and technical cybernetics, including the use of automated algo- 
rithmizable activities, databases and, possibly, knowledge 
bases and other elements of artificial intelligence.
Many technical jobs and technical solutions of acknowledged 
problem situations require the interdisciplinary synthesis to 
include ergonomic information, i.e. information concerned with 
man-technical system relationships, ecological and medicinal 
knowledge etc. The solution of many technical tasks cannot be 
comprehensive and versatile, if it does not take into account 
knowledge of some non-technical disciplines which include not 
only engineering psychology, but many others. It may be of some 
interest to mention certain new tasks in linguistics, theory of 
language and graphic communication and other humanities, which
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have emerged in relation to the programming of more advanced 
generations of computers.
The accentuated system attitude and system approach are man­
ifest mainly in that every important technological work (such 
as large manufacturing systems, new power sources, transporta­
tion systems, urban schemes etc. ) must be conceived as a sub­
system of a broader system (technico-economic, socio-economic, 
or characterized in another way), which presupposes complex in-
t
terrelationships and interactions of individual subsystems, 
usually in time and space, as early as the conceptual and pre­
designing preparatory stages. A system concept must include 
analyses of the dynamic behaviour of a subsystem under consid­
eration, and potential or assumed changes in the interactions 
of the individual subsystems. The analyses of dynamic behaviour 
usually include the behaviour in extreme situations as well, 
i.e. in conflict situations, situations characterized by an in­
creased measure of risk etc. These analyses must pay utmost at­
tention to problems of a whole broad range of potential or ex­
pected impacts, including impacts in extreme situations. Con­
sidering the range of potential impacts, our attention will 
naturally be focused on ecological/environmental impacts, po­
tential microclimatic changes and potential dangers to living 
environment and biosphere. For these reasons, the most advanced 
designing establishments include in their interdisciplinary 
teams specialists or groups of specialists in engineering ecol­
ogy, that is why models or simulations of potential or expected 
environmental impacts are, in their view, an indispensable part 
of any project.
The application of prognostic criteria must be an indispen­
sable part of the system designing orientation as far as pro­
jects of larger technological systems are concerned. The opinion 
that project/designing documentation should contain only a model 
of a future technical work at the time of its being put into 
operation must be regarded as outdated and quite unsatisfactory. 
The system designing must include assumed impacts of a project's
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operation, of its assumed dynamic behaviour in time and space, 
cycles and rhythms of accomplished functions etc.
The incorporation of chronological parameters must not be 
limited only to the traditional concept of a sequence of chron­
ological instants, but must also include such concepts asi 
tend to be characterized by the term "time direction". The term 
denotes the direction and speed of the increasing of the entropy 
level of a given system. Consequently, such chronological para- < 
meters include those related to moral ageing, a decrease of the 
measure of reliability of a given system, useful life intervals 1 
etc.
As complex technological systems are usually composed of a 
number of subsystems or elements the typical feature of which 
are differential characteristics of the time direction and dif­
ferential chronological parameters determining typical intervals 
and cycles in general, an important part of the system designing 
is what may be conclusively termed as the "flow chart coordina­
tion". The flow chart coordination is very important for asses­
sing linkages and relations of a technical system being designed 
to its surroundings, as well as for assessing interrelationships 
of individual subsystems of a broader system into which the 
technical system being designed is to be incorporated.
System designing which incorporates chronological para­
meters and time direction measures and variables into an image 
of a technical work being prepared, cannot dispense (mainly as 
far as building investment projects are concerned) with an ex­
tensive problem sphere of potential modernizations, updating or 
other modifications of the created technical system, with prob­
lems of so-called secondary and tertiary uses, and - last but 
not least - with problems of its future liquidation. One should 
never succumb to a carefree and naive faith that all these prob­
lems will fall on future generations and need not concern us at 
all. Even now, it is well known that problems of this kind con­
cern some power-generating facilities, e.g. nuclear power-gen­
erating plants, and - albeit in a somewhat different way - some
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construction projects, such as large housing schemes built of 
jrecast elements etc.
Problems related to chronological parameters cannot always 
oe exactly determined and exactly quantified using current 
knowledge. Nowadays, the technological prediction also accounts 
for such situations as require the use of prognostic methods 
based on viewpoints, opinions and recommendations of teams of 
.experts or ad hoc task groups.
4. Changes in value orientation
The value orientation of the conceptual, research, develop­
ment and design preparation of large technical works can also 
draw on certain positive traditions, and on many developed 
methods and procedures employed in technological decisionmaking 
processes. In this respect, one should never forget methods, 
criteria and criterional systems developed for analyses of eco­
nomic efficiency of investment projects and cost-benefit ana­
lyses, for concepts of so-called "utility functions", multi- 
criterional decision-making processes etc. Starting with the 
‘classic works of Pareto from the beginning of this century, a 
relatively rich pool of methods and methodologies is available, 
which has also found a good application in the sphere of tech­
nical and technico-economic decision-making processes.
■ Hence, the methods listed above have in no way lost their 
importance for solutions concerned with those problem spheres 
which are related to the value orientation of system designing. 
They have been rather expanded or generalized in some ways. The 
expansion of the problem sphere can also be attributed to one 
of the trends of the present technical thinking, usually denoted 
by the term "technology assessment", for which the author re­
commends the term "system conceived assessment of technological 
innovations and investment projects". On this occasion, I shall 
attempt to show in brief how the system-conceived assessment 
expands the existing methods and means in the value orienta­
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tion, i.e. which trends it promotes and what it accentuates. 
Certain changes or some new accents in the value orientation of 
system designing can be summarized as follows:
- generalization of the traditional concept of efficiency or 
the concept of utility functions,
- synthesis of technical and non-technical rationalities,
- accentuated "controllability", "manageability" and "human 
dimensions" of new technology.
The generalization of the traditional concept of efficiency 
consists mainly in that the technical work to be assessed is 
purposefully conceived as a subsystem of a broader system, that 
its dynamic behaviour, expected or extreme situations impacts 
in time and space are taken into account. As efficiency methods 
presuppose analyses of inputs, and outputs of a given tech­
nological system, and of functions the system is capable of 
performing, to be undertaken, the generalization of the tradi- < 
tional efficiency concept requires a synthesis of analogous 
viewpoints of the whole broader system. At the same time, the 
concept of "functions" must not be limited only to immediate 
users of a given system, but must include universal criteria in 
a long-term view.
The synthesis of the technical and the non-technical ration­
alities denotes mainly the expansion of the so far applied sets 
of technico-economic criteria by those criteria which are con­
cerned with the preservation and protection of a healthy living 
environment, with medical, biological, psychological and social 
viewpoints, with cultural and aesthetic values, with universal 
and moral responsibility problems which cannot be limited only 
to the responsibility for existing state-of-the-art of tech­
nology, but must also include potential future situations and 
impacts of technological systems. These problems are highly 
complicated and, at the same time, very sensitive, as exempli­
fied by discussions on the moral and human responsibility for 
proposals, recommendations and decisions carried through by 
computer systems, automated systems containing artificial in-
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!;elliqence elements, expert systems etc. As far as system de­
signing is concerned, the synthesis of the technical and the 
ion-technical rationalities assumes that the designing process 
*nd its results should also include solutions to all ergonomical:
Problems related to the use of a technological system, to re­
lationships between its human user and technology. These re­
lationships also comprise a broad group of problems concerned 
.«rith communication processes, control, management and monitoring 
Df a technological system, possibilities of dialogue, cross­
checking or other forms of interaction. It may seem that these 
aroblems have become especially topical and sensitive in the 
sphere of modern computer technology or in that of the use of 
automated systems provided with elements of artificial intel­
ligence. In fact, experience with solving ergonomical problems 
in the spheres mentioned above can have a more general meaning 
and may come in handy in other spheres of manipulations with 
and sophisticated uses of modern technology. This applies espe­
cially to solving problems of the so-called technical aliena­
tion, to humanitarian solutions of problems arising in such 
situations when man becomes in a certain way dependent on or 
•even subordinate to a technological system.
The synthesis of the technical and the non-technical ratio­
nalities is closely related to those systems of assessment cri­
teria which are expressed in terms of "controllability", "man- 
,ageability" of technological systems, or "human dimensions" of 
new technology. These expressions truthfully denote certain 
changes which have taken place in value structures employed in 
technical thinking and decision-making processes. On the basis 
of these changes, system designing should not leave aside prob­
lems of certain guarantees in situations when a technological 
system becomes uncontrollable and unmanageable. The recent tech­
nological development has proven beyond doubt that these prob­
lems, for years and years known only from works of science fic­
tion writers, need not necessarily be just a fiction.
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5. Decieion-making bases and theoretical 
support of technical solutions
The scheme of the explanation of required, planned or de­
signed technical chanqes presented above presupposes that such 
a technical change always results from a decision-making proc­
ess. These processes always employ what has been defined as 
knowledge orientation and value orientation. In relation to the 
role of knowledge orientation and value orientation in proposing 
a final technical solution, terms which are to a certain extent 
analogous to those used in determinations and assessments of 
informational prerequisites and initial solutions in systema- 
tization-tvpe procedures (such as explanation, diagnosis, pre­
diction and other procedures operating with knowledge and fac­
tual data), i.e. the "decision-making base" and "theoretical 
support" can be employed for determining and assessing informa­
tional prerequisites and initial solutions. (As far as the 
term "theoretical support" is concerned, it corresponds to that 
of "conditional credibility" introduced by the author for as­
sessing scientific results. )
The term "decision-making base" denotes a set of informa­
tional prerequisites necessary for solving a given task, the 
solution of which makes use of certain knowledge. In scientific 
procedures, the decision-making base consists of an arranged 
pair of a general data set (scientific laws, hypotheses, em­
pirical generalizations) and a factual data set. The resulting 
solution can be derived from the decision-making base. The de­
cision-making base of designing processes is usually far more 
extensive and includes:
- characteristics of a given problem situation, including 
specifications of needs, requirements, demands and objectives 
of an assumed technical solution,
— a sufficiently detailed description of the initial state of 
the art including a description of the initial situation, 
surroundings of the system (such as the geosphere and an- 
throposphere around the proposed technical system), i.e. sets
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of factual empirical data,
• sets of knowledge necessary for potential solutions of a 
given problem situation, i.e. generally scientific and tech­
nical knowledge,
- a set of all additional conditions necessary for potential 
solutions, which include feasibility conditions regarding 
employable resources, capacities and other technical prere­
quisites, and standardized conditions for all potential solu­
tions ,
- a set of all criteria, values and priorities (i.e. a set 
characterizing the value orientation) usable in selecting 
the optimum alternative.
The term "support" (or the analogous term "conditional cre­
dibility" ) denotes how and to what extent the resulting solu­
tion corresponds to all informational prerequisites available 
for a given solution. For these reasons, the term has become 
very important for evaluating results obtained in all systems 
which allow for their derivation using a decision-making base 
and appropriate inference procedures, i.e. in cognitive sys­
tems, expert systems, consulting systems and systems charac­
terized in any other way and containing elements of artificial 
intelligence. Similarly, it is very important, when assessing 
results of a designing process, to know how the designer or the 
designers’ team made use of the informational background which 
was available, mainly of the information fallinq within the 
"knowledge orientation" and "value orientation" categories.
Hence, the assessment of the theoretical support of diffe­
rent project alternatives is a very important part of tasks 
concerned with the system evaluation of designing activities or 
project alternatives. Obviously, the interdisciplinary team of 
specialists appointed to solve the evaluation/assessment task 
must have all informational prerequisites of the technical 
solution, including the set of usable knowledge, at its dis­
posal. Here, too, the importance of what has been characterized
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as the "knowledge orientation" and "value orientation" of all 
technical solutions under consideration is clearly seen.
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References
Boese P., Gutsch R.W. et. al., Planungsfaktor Umweltschutz. 
Lexika Verlag, Grafenau 1976
Gorokhov V.G., Metodologicheskij analiz sistemotekhniki. Izd. 
Radio i svjaz, Moscow 1982
Gasparski W., Projektowanie, koncepcy jne przygotowanie dzialan. 
PWN, Warsaw 1978
Huning A., "Zentrale Werte im technischen Handeln." In: Marhen- 
kel H., König W., Hrsg., Technikbewertung, Wärmepumpe. Düssel­
dorf 1985, pp. 7-15.
Pejsa J., "Explanation of Technological Changes and the Ques­
tion of Efficiency of Technological Changes." Design Methods 
and Theories, vol. 20, N.4, pp. 519-531.
Rozin V.M., "Projektovanie как Objekt metodologicheskogo issle- 
dovanija." Voprosy filosofii, N.10, 1984, pp. 100-111
Sidorenko V.F., "Genezis projektnoj kultury". Voprosy filosofii
N.10, 1984, pp. 87-99
Tondi L., Scientific Procedures. D. Reidel Publ. Comp. Dord­
recht, Boston, 1974
Tondi L., "Some Methods of Information Evaluation of Scientific 
Results". Computers and Artificial Intelligence, N.5, 1986, 
pp. 385-394.
Tondi L., "Classical Explanation Models and the Explanation of 
Technological Changes". Design Methods and Theories, vol.20, 
N.4, pp. 506-518.
Tondi L., Pejsa J., "Metodologicheskie aspekty sistemnogo 
projektirovanija". Voprosy filosofii, N.2, 1987, pp. 87-96
Tondi L., "Nová paradigmata projektováni a funkce CAD". Pro­
ceedings of ICCADI 87 conference, Karlovy Vary 1987 (cf. in 
the present volume)
Tondi L., "Explaining Technological Changes and the Paradigms 
in Technology Design". Proceedings of the VIII International 
Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, 
Moscow 1987.
Entwurf für eine Richtlinie "Empfehlungen zur Technikbewertung" 
VDI, Ausschuss "Grundlagen der Technikbewertung".
"Inzhenernaya deyatelnost i nauka". Materialy kruglogo stola.
Voprosy filo s of ii, N.5, 1986, pp. 71-87
142
NEW PARADIGMS OF DESIGNING AND THE FUNCTION OF CAD
Ladislaw Tondl
•1. Introduction
The present paper does not aim at submitting a survey of 
various design automation systems. Fairly good surveys of design 
automation systems, basic principles of their construction, and 
their architecture are provided, for example, in monographs [1] 
and [2], various other conceptual studies and publications, the 
journal CAD etc. The paper is rather meant to outline some con­
sequences and new functions of CAD, as well as CAD relations to 
what is going to be characterized as "new paradigms of design­
ing" .
I
2. CAD and Traditional Engineering Design
Computer-aided design (CAD) is conceived as the use of cy­
bernetic means in a set of activities and information bonds 
among these activities, the ultimate result of which is an in­
formation model of what is to be realized and how to realize it 
on the basis of available means, sources, capacities, knowledge 
' or prerequisites characterized in some other way. At the same 
time, designing in a general sense is conceived as a (conceptu­
al) preparation of a change required by man and achievable by 
human working activity [3]. The use of cybernetic means may 
assume various forms, starting with scientific-technical cal­
culations, mass data processing, automated drawing or other 
kinds of graphic presentation of intermediate or ultimate re­
sults of design activities, and ending with retrievals from 
databases, dialogue or interactive forms, simulations of poten­
tial behaviour or impacts of a designed technical work. The 
Introduction of these or additional analogous automated proce­
dures into the process of designing is usually stimulated by
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the necessity of improving the designing process quality, in 
particular through expanding the resources and capacities 
needed to solve a given design problem, reducing human labour, 
substituting routine, repeated and algorithm!zable human ac­
tivities (especially those bottlenecking the process of design­
ing) , activities with high time and capacity requirements 
(such as searching through and processing extensive data files, 
preparation of design documentation drawings etc.) by automated 
procedures implementable on computer technology. Consequently, 
the introduction of automation into designing concerns both the 
automation of certain activities constituting an indispensable 
component of the entire designing process, and the automation 
of information prerequisites, information inputs and outputs.
The characteristics presented above show that automation 
can concern different components of the designing process. To 
be able to specify automation requirements and needs in a de­
tailed manner, it is advisable to perform a system analysis of 
a given designing process, or, in other words, to construct a 
system model of this process, to specify its constituents, 
their information prerequisites, functions, inputs and outputs, 
organizational forms of these elements, their information bonds 
etc., thus rendering it possible to determine what should be 
automated and what not (creative, management, decision-making, 
assessing activities) in the sphere of designing. Obviously, 
this presupposes a certain coordination of, and a conceptual 
approach towards, automated and non-automated components of the 
designing process, which are an indispensable prerequisite for 
the introduction of higher, i.e. system-conceived forms of au­
tomation.
The emphasized fact, namely that design automation can in­
clude various elements and linkages of the designing process, 
should also be understood in the following manner: Design au­
tomation can be introduced gradually and in a modular way, ac­
complished on various levels and in different stages. From a 
system point of view, the following design automation stages 
can be distinguished [ 4 ], [5]:
a) fragmentary automation of individual partial components 
of the designing process,
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b) system-conceived automation of the designing process, 
*»hich makes use of a system approach and system models of the 
designing process, in particular purposeful organization of 
different algorithmized components and related programs, e.g. 
•rganizing differents programs into automated lines,
c) system-conceived automation which, in addition, makes 
use of various purpose-oriented information systems and which 
«Hows for a multi-purpose utilization of databases in various 
>:asks and in different stages of the designing process.
Higher, i.e. system-conceived stages of design automation 
mainly allow for a multi-purpose utilization of automated compo­
nents in various tasks, such as a multi-purpose use of program 
elements in various automated lines (the term "automated line" 
denoting a target-oriented sequence of programs with all nec­
essary instructions needed to run it specified in its beginning 
by the user), multi-purpose utilization of data files and data­
bases. As designing can also be analyzed as an information proc­
ess the inputs (including the determination of objectives, 
specifications, requirements, criteria, standards and other 
information prerequisites) and outputs of which have an infor­
mational character, suitable cooperation and coordination of 
■different information sources and informational prerequisites 
is essential for higher levels of design automation. In terms 
of a traditional classification of information systems, design­
ing cannot dispense with the use of diverse and multiple in­
formation sources, such as systems of socio-economic, scienti­
fic-technical and technico-economic information, various fac­
tual systems, e.g. land information systems, catalog systems, 
different systems of standards, value or criterional systems 
etc. For these reasons, the integration of various information 
sources and prerequisites for designing belongs to comparatively 
demanding tasks of design automation.
The CAD concepts listed above, or, in other words, the con­
cept of design automation stages, does not essentially have to 
change what cap be characterized as paradigms of designing. The 
term "paradigm" was first introduced into the analysis of sci­
entific and technological development by T.S. Kuhn [6] who used
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the Greek word for denoting a basic initial model, a pattern, 
or a scheme determining the explanation and interpretation of 
the entire area of interest. In this sense, Ptolemy's (geo­
centric) concept is a paradigm, while the heliocentric concept 
of Copernicus represents its revolutionary change and, hence, 
a new paradigm. Analogously, as shown in a number of other 
works, technical paradigms can be considered. E.W. Constant [7], 
for example, characterizes a technical paradigm as an'accepted 
manner of a technical activity, as an accepted set of means to 
accomplish a certain technical task. In this respect, paradigms 
of designing could also be considered. The concept of paradigms 
then makes it possible to distinguish two basic types of sci­
entific and technological changes; either those in the frame­
work of existing paradigms, characterized as "normal develop­
ment" by T.S. Kuhn, or changes of scientific and technical par­
adigms characterized as "scientific" or "technical revolutions". 
The basic paradigms of a traditional engineering designing 
process are then as follows:
- Designing is a component of an organized system of ac­
tivities which, as a whole, constitute the investment process. 
The system comprises a sequence of linked-up blocks, starting 
with the formulation of a design problem, i.e. with the appear- ■ 
ance, recognition, justification and acceptance of certain 
needs which can be satisfied only through carrying out a certain 
technical change, followed by the acceptance of a concept of 
approach toward the problem, resulting in the formulation of an 
investment project or the specification proper of the project 
task, preparation of related documentation, and ending with
the realization proper and use of the required technical change. 
The system includes extensive sets of diverse and interdepend­
ent activities, such as decision-making, evaluating, cognitive 
and proposal-formulating ones.
- Designing, which results in the preparation of project 
documentation, is fully subject to the accepted solution con­
cept, to the accepted task specifications. Consequently, the 
designer's initiative is limited by the scope of the accepted 
task specification.
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- Results of the designing process contained in project 
ocumentation are evaluated mainly with regard to how they sat- 
8fy the task specification, or objectives and requirements 
ormulated in the task specification.
- The traditional engineering designing is focused on what 
an be characterized by a question "how to realize" rather than 
what to realize", with the latter (except for technical de- 
ails) formulated outside the design process proper.
- In the process of designing, efforts aimed at the optimi­
sation of the solution of a given problem, manifested mainly in
■ittempts to minimize costs and to maximize efficiency of the 
>roposed solution to the given problem, are very important.
Naturally, these and some other paradigms of the traditional 
îngineering designing are only partly set forth in appropriate 
standards, regulations or other forms of organizational, nor- 
native and value frameworks of designing. Undoubtedly, these 
.paradigms have proved useful in practice as an efficient nor­
mative and value scheme which incorporates designing into the 
entire cycle of the investment activity. However, this is not 
to say that the existing set of paradigms should not be, re­
garding present needs and problems, modified, expanded or sup­
plemented in some ways.
3. Motives for Some Changes of Traditional Designing Paradigms
Recently, significantly increased importance has been at­
tributed to certain situations which require changes of tradi­
tional schemes of the investment process and, consequently, 
also of what has been characterized as paradigms of designing. 
Such situations may include the following facts, or, in other 
words, awareness of the following facts:
a) There has been significantly increasing criticism of 
the lack of coordination of some investment projects, not only 
in terms of their chronological scheduling, but also from the 
viewpoints of their spatial arrangement, provision of materials 
and energy, relations between suppliers and customers, building 
up of research, development and organizational prerequisites 
and tools etc. (Undoubteldy, examples of such a lack of co-
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Ordination are plentiful, no matter which viewpoint is chosen, 
as well as those of its negative technico-economic, social, 
esthetic, ecological and other impacts which continue to persist 
and which are overcome at a cost of considerable efforts.)
b) Some investment projects may result in unexpected nega­
tive impaote after a certain period of operation or use, par­
ticularly in increased hazards, danger of accidents, uncontrol­
lable situations or situations which can be coped with bnly at
a cost of immense efforts, needs of additional investment funds, 
initially not accounted for, etc. At the same time, these im­
pacts do not include only apparent, unique power-generating 
plants, accidents of some means of transport, leakages of nox­
ious chemical substances into the atmosphere or streams, but 
also long-term changes of the entire environment, sometimes ut­
terly irreversible.
c) The importance of so-called limit probléma has also in­
creased. This applies in particular to limits of materials, 
power resources and human capabilities, to so-called "limits 
to growth", which have been pointed to in works of the Club of 
Rome etc. Their scope is fairly broad and diverse, while aware­
ness of them has increased gradually. Some problems, such as 
those brought by the energy crisis of the seventies, have shift­
ed the awareness of these problems from narrow groups of spe­
cialists to minds and opinions of the broad public. The same applies 
to problems related to the controllability of certain technical 
systems, or, in other words, to hazards associated with these 
systems. These facts also explain the popularity of some slogans, 
such as "human dimensions of new technology", "small is beauti­
ful" [8] etc.
d) Lately, increased attention has been paid to what can be 
generally characterized as probléma of ecological impacts of 
all technical changes, innovations or investments. The problems 
of’environmental protection and formation have justly become 
primary factors influencing planning and investment policies
[9]. This is an indisputable contribution of different ecologic­
al movements (the so-called "green" movements) and similar 
citizens' initiatives, despite the fact that some of these move-
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ments use rather simple slogans and emotionally laden proclama­
tions, while investment policy needs can never dispense with 
multifaceted analyses carried out on an expert level.
These and some additional circumstances stimulate the 
introduction of some new accents into existing designing para­
digms, or of new paradigms; this phenomenon by no means con­
cerns only the sphere of designing, but is extended to the whole 
investment process, including its conceptual, research and 
development preparation. Generally, the new accentuation (or 
new paradigms) can hardly be achieved without automating some 
of the related activities, without using extensive, interdis­
ciplinary knowledge, without processing large data files and 
databases, without having at one's disposal the possibility of 
presenting or simulating the assumed behaviour of technological 
systems and their potential impacts in time and space, that is, 
without making use of the capabilities offered by the existing 
and developed state-of-the-art of CAD.
The following can be assumed to represent new designing 
paradigms which partly change the content of the existing ones:
1. Every engineering technical work, no matter whether in 
the stage of preparation, planned, or being designed, should be 
considered to represent a aubayatem of a broader technological, 
teohnioo-eoonomio or eooio-eoonomio eyetem which is always 
characterized by a certain dynamic behaviour, probabilities of 
risks, conflicting situations etc. Consequently, the designing 
process should always take into account linkages to broader 
systems, its functioning and maintenance within a higher-level 
system, or the liquidation of a technical work in the stage of 
preparation in the framework of a broader system.
2. Present-day engineering designing should always produce 
alternative eolutione. One of them may even be the preservation 
of the existing state, i.e. dropping or shelving a given prob­
lem to be solved. The alternatives, which should be described 
in sufficient detail, should undergo a system-conceived, i.e. 
comprehensive and multicriterional evaluation [technology as­
sessment tasks). The system evaluation of alternative solutions 
should by no means be limited solely to the quality of the
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technical solution of a given task, but also include the sphere 
of broader linkages to its neighbourhood, a comparative analysis 
regarding the current state-of-the-art in the world, the sphere 
of potential impacts in time and space, problems of “direction 
of time" (the term denoting the direction of the maximum in­
crease of the entropy of an evaluated technological system), of 
so-called "time horizons" etc.
3. The current designing represents an important Intermedi­
ate link in the cycle of
Research - development - deeigning - realization - иве. 
As important links in this cycle have an informational charac­
ter, it is necessary to solve a number of problems related to 
informational links, such as those of noise minimization in 
these links, of a sufficient absorption capacity of some blocks 
in these cycles (i.e. the ability of such blocks to recognize 
in time and to interpret competently enough what is taken over 
from other blocks), of potential delays in the cycle etc. The 
same ring also includes what can be characterized as respecting 
problems of feasibility, i.e. the feasibility of a given tech­
nical solution regarding given conditions, available resources 
and capacities, and disposable assets of the realization sphere.
4. The current designing must also include solutions of 
problems related to man (user)- technical work bonds and lin­
kages. It is a fairly broad and diverse group of problems 
(which are generally characterized as ergonomical problems) 
which, for different technical jobs, are connected with many 
diverse and varying aspects. The group includes particularly 
the following ones:
- problems of manageability and controllability of a de­
signed solution (including manageability and controllability 
in limit emergency situations),
- potential for secondary uses of an accepted technical 
solution, including possibility for its external use in dif­
ferent conditions (the so-called spin-off), or, in other words, 
in situations not yet defined.
5. The modern concept of designing technical work must 
also take into account tendencies in the present technological
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and investment policies which may be characterized as efforts 
for •participation democracy" in investment policy, "public 
participation" in urban development and land-use planning, and 
elements of "direct democracy" in construction planning and 
management. Essentially, these efforts are focused upon in­
creasing the direct participation of citizens in management 
and decision-making in the spheres of land-use planning, in­
vestment policy and urban development, i.e. upon combining di- 
‘rect and representative democracies in all areas directly or 
indirectly concerned with the life, work and leasure of citi­
zens. As far as the designer's work and the basic alternatives 
of the solution of a given design problem of greater importance 
are concerned with an entire region and its population, they 
should be, if possible in a sufficiently illustrative and under­
standable form, submitted for public discussion. (Switzerland 
has already gained considerable experience with combining di­
rect and representative democracies in investment policy. In 
some countries, such as in Denmark [10] or in Great Britain [11], 
direct democracy is law-enforced. The applicable Danish law, 
passed in the seventies, charges all regional administration 
bodies with the duty of providing land-use plans and important 
.investment projects in several alternatives, of organizing pub­
lic discussion on the given topic for a period not shorter than 
6 months; only then is it possible to decide which alternative 
will be selected. The selected alternative must next be sub­
mitted to the Ministry of Environmental Affairs for a final ap­
proval and authorization.) The provision of participation de­
mocracy in investment policy, or, in other words, the coordina­
tion of concepts, proposal and evaluating judgments of competent 
experts and the public, is obviously a very complex and not 
always feasible affair, not only because public opinions can be 
easily manipulated and unilaterally influenced, but also because 
these opinions are not homogeneous; conflicts of different con­
cepts have to be solved, as well as those of different interests 
or analogous conflict situations.
Although the problems related to this area predominantly 
lie outside the spheres proper of designing or designing auto­
Il
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mation, it is necessary to take account of some of the impor­
tant aspects even in the designing process proper. These gen­
erally include aspects of technical solutions considered and 
evaluated which are usually expressed in terms of "acceptabil­
ity", "desirability" etc., or in their quantitative measures.
4. CAD Taake in Relation to the Paradigme Given Above
Undoubtedly, the introduction of the paradigms mentioned 
above into the process of designing, or the modification of 
traditional paradigms in accordance with the trends mentioned 
earlier, result in a considerable increase in the demand for 
knowledge, information and capacity prerequisites of the 
designing process proper, and also in its importance as an in­
dispensable link of the research - development - design - re­
alization - use cycle. The very increase in the number of al­
ternatives in designing, the increased importance of manage­
ment, decision-making and evaluating activities, the need to 
simulate broader links with the surrounding environment, the 
expected dynamic behaviour and potential impacts of proposed 
solutions, the need to process extensive data files of variable 
nature and origin - these all necessarily promote requirements 
for automating all such activities and information processes 
as are algorithmizable and, hence, implementable through using 
appropriate tools, as well as requirements for expanding the 
scope and room for proposal, management, decision-making and 
evaluating activities and, in fact, for everything which tends 
to be characterized as creative technical activities.
Understandably, the fragmentary concept of the automation 
of individual tasks, characterized earlier, does not and cannot 
satisfy these requirements, no matter what their linkages to 
other tasks may be. If it is declared that the system concept 
of automation is indispensable, then the "system" attribute 
represents no a priori guarantee of overcoming the fragmentary 
concept limitations. Consequently, it is necessary and ad­
visable to formulate principles of the system concept of de­
sign automation, which can be, of course, implemented gradually 
and to a varying extent.
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Leaving aside hardware prerequisites (which include, in 
articular, a hierarchically organized computer network with a 
ystem of distributed intelligence, a system of intelligent 
erminals and means allowing for dialogue and interactive modes 
f work, a system providing for a purpose-oriented parallelism 
f digital and graphic outputs, and other facilities of com- 
unicating with hardware means at all levels and in every stage 
f the designing process), the main principles of the system- 
onceived automation of the process of designing can be char- 
cterized as follows:
1. Automated components of the designing process must be 
•urposefully incorporated into the entire process of designing 
ind providing for guaranteeing necessary linkages and bonds.
'or these reasons, the introduction of automation satisfying 
>;hese requirements presupposes a system analysts and system 
decomposition of the entire process, including the determina­
tion of its sequential and hierarchical structure. (In the 
Literature on CAD, the results of such analyses are generally 
characterized as a "network model of the designing process"
[l].)The system analysis and decomposition of the designing 
process is also important regarding that CAD should satisfy 
.general and specific objectives of designing, and at that, more 
efficiently, in higher quality, faster, with reduced human 
labour requirements and, in comparison with traditional de­
signing, a lower demand for other indispensable capacities.
(The note conerning general and specific objectives is also 
important because the system of objectives, too, is hierarchi­
cally structured, with the aims of specific (lower level) ac­
tivities being subordinated to more general (higher level) ob­
jectives. An example of general objectives, which are usually 
yet far from the designing proper, is the well-known statement 
by J.F. Kennedy, made on May 25th, 1961, that it is necessary 
to provide for a safe landing of man on the Moon and for his 
safe return to the Earth by 1970, or a proclamation that the 
housing shortage in City Y should be solved by the year X, 
while specific objectives are represented, for exemple, by a 
static calculation for a given type of a block of apartments 
etc. )
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2. The system-conceived automation of designing presupposes 
a multi-purpoae utilization of all developed methods, means, 
algorithms and programs in different tasks, a multi-purpose use 
of data files and databases on different levels and in various 
stages of the designing process (as well as, naturally, the use 
of the data - and of data produced during the designing, imple­
mentation and post-implementation stages - for operation, main­
tenance and, perhaps liquidation purposes). The multi-purpose 
utilization of individual programs also implies that they can 
be arranged into various automated lines directed by a single 
instruction (command) or query, the use of organized sequences 
of subroutines and programs arranged into so-called menus etc. 
The multi-purpose use of all means developed is important re­
garding the increase of the number of alternative solutions 
offered by the designing process, for modelling the dynamic 
character of the items of technical work considered and their 
assumed impacts.
3. The system-conceived automation of designing must pro­
vide for guaranteeing not only reliable linkages and forma of 
communication among automated constituents, but also among 
automated and non-automated components of the designing process
i.e. individual activities and their informational linkages. 
Requirements of this type are by no means limited to ensuring 
compatibility and transferability of data among various levels 
and components of computer networks, but are also concerned 
with various forms of communication between the user-designer 
and automated components of the process of designing. The re­
quirement for these forms of communication to be sufficiently 
reliable and efficient emphasizes the role of graphic forms as 
highly illustrative and fairly comprehensive ways to present 
extensive data files, the role of interactive graphic systems 
and dialogue systems using linkages and mutual transformations 
of digital and graphic forms of presentation.
4. The system-conceived automation of designing cannot 
leave unheeded new trends and new tendencies related to higher- 
generation computers. In particular, the new trends include es­
pecially what may be generally characterized as the introduc-
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ion of artificial intelligence elements into systems of tasks 
eing solved and, most of all, into information systems being 
ade use of in such tasks. The elements of artificial intelli- 
ence, which seem promising for the automated designing develop- 
ent, include, in particular, knowledge systems or knowledge 
ases. These are automated systems which operate with precisely 
etermined inference mechanisms and certain knowledge, i.e. 
ertain proven or valid generalizations applicable to an entire 
irea of interest. When building up informational prerequisites 
or designing (in the form of managed databases), it will un- 
oubtedly be useful to design some of such databases as know- 
edge bases. This especially concerns normative systems, axio- 
ogical systems (i.e. systems of criteria and criterional func- 
ions assuming a certain synthesis of a large number of cri- 
.eria having a varying degree of relevancy) allowing for eval- 
mating alternative solutions under consideration, or, in other 
tords, their arrangement into a suitable system of priorities.
5. A very important principle of the system-conceived auto­
mation of designing is what may generally be characterized as a 
irinoiple of modularity. The principle of modularity presupposes 
t possibility of expanding the designing process in a modular, 
wtep-by-step way, through adding new automated components, of a 
broader use of automated components already developed in new 
tasks and in new circumstances, or of a suitable adaptation, 
modification or updating of these components in new contexts. 
Naturally, the principle of modularity should not be interpret­
ed in an oversimplified way, claiming that all CAD systems 
oeing developed or developed so far can simply be expanded by 
the addition of new elements without having to reconstruct them 
dramatically or to abandon them altogether. Its aim is rather 
to point out the necessity of taking into account the gradual 
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HUMANISTISCHE ASPEKTE DER WISSENSCHAFTLICH-TECHNOLOGISCHEN
ENTWICKLUNG
G. BELKINA
Was ist im 20. Jahrhundert geschehen, welchen Stellenwert 
haben in ihm Wissenschaft, Technik und Technologie, was ver­
heißen sie den Völkern für die Zukunft und womit bedrohen sie 
sie? Diese konkreten und praktischen Fragen, die unvermeidlich 
einen politischen und ideologischen Klang bekommen, werden heute 
von den Exponenten verschiedener sozialer Kräfte und Bewegungen 
gestellt.
Noch zu Beginn unseres Jahrhunderts hatte die Menschheit 
derartige Probleme und Dilemmas nicht gekannt. Und dies nicht 
nur deshalb, weil die sozialen Voraussetzungen für ihr Dasein 
andere gewesen sind. Die Wissenschaft selbst und die auf ihr 
basierenden technischen und technologischen Neuentwicklungen 
hatten dazu keinen zwingenden Anlaß gegeben. Es hatte den An­
schein, als gebe es nur in utopischen Romanen Platz für die 
künftige Erhabenheit und die "Dämonie" der Wissenschaft und 
Technik. Gegen Mitte des 20. Jahrhunderts geschah jedoch etwas, 
was ihren Platz und Rolle bei der Entwicklung der Gesellschaft 
. von Grund auf veränderte. Die Wissenschaft begann zu einer un­
mittelbaren produktiven und sozialen Kraft zu werden, wobei sie 
zugleich auch zu einem gewichtigen Faktor in der internationa­
len Politik wurde.
In der neuen Etappe des wissenschaftlich-technischen Fort­
schritts, der die Zukunft der Menschheit in einem sehr starken 
Maße bestimmt, fanden vor allem Veränderungen bei der Entwick­
lung und Verwendung der Mikroelektronik, der Informatik und der 
Biotechnologie, hinsichtlich der Beherrschung der A- 
. tomenergie sowie bei der Erschließung des Weltraums statt.
Diese Richtungen in der Forschung bildeten von Anfang an den 
Inhalt der modernen wissenschaftlich-technischen Revolution.
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Heute aber sind sie durch solche revolutionäre Umgestaltungen 
gekennzeichnet, die die Produktionstechnologie und viele Seiten 
im Leben des Menschen von Grund auf verändern. Die Sphäre der 
Technologie wird zu einem entscheidenden Faktor.
Welche Folgen wird dies für den einzelnen Menschen und für 
die Gesellschaft, in der er lebt, haben, und welche reale sozia­
le und menschliche Probleme, die einer dringenden Lösung be­
dürfen, treten in diesem Zusammenhang bereits heute auf? Diese 
Fragen sind neben den Problemen der Effektivität, der Produkti­
vität der neuen Technologie, der neuen Prinzipien der Organi­
sation und Leitung der Produktion im Zusammenhang damit, daß 
diese immer mehr von Mikroelektronik, Informatik und Biotechno­
logie durchdrungen wird, von überaus großer Bedeutung. Denn 
neue Technik und neue Technologie existieren ja nicht in einem 
sozialen und menschlichen "Vakuum" und sie bestimmen auch nicht 
an und für sich das gesamte Spektrum des menschlichen Daseins, 
das seinen Ausdruck in dem einen oder dem anderen Typ der Zivi­
lisation, der Menschheitskultur findet. Mehr noch, sie hängen 
in ihrer Entwicklung wesentlich von den sozialen und mensch­
lichen Faktoren ab, obgleich sie relative Selbständigkeit be­
sitzen, die, wie wir sehen, zuweilen in technokratischen Konzep­
tionen verschiedener Art absolutisiert werden. Aus diesem Grunde 
ist denn auch die Untersuchung der sozialen Probleme von so 
großer Bedeutung, die in der neuen Phase der wissenschaftlich- 
technischen Revolution auftreten und unter anderen mit der Ent­
wicklung der neuen Technologie Zusammenhängen.
Wollten wir den Versuch unternehmen, auf die gestellten 
Fragen eine kurze Antwort zu finden und damit das wichtigste 
soziale Problem dieser Phase zu bestimmen, die mit den Erforder­
nissen der neuen, der, wie sie bezeichnet wird, "hohen" Tech­
nologie unmittelbar zusammenhängt, so würde die Antwort etwa 
wie folgt lauten: "hohe Kontaktebene". Diese, dem Sprachgabrauch 
der Computertechnologie entliehene Terminologie gewinnt somit 
einen umfassenderen Sinn: je höher das technologische Niveau 
der Produktion und der gesamten menschlichen Aktivitäten sind, desto . 
höher müssen auch die Entwicklungsstufe der Gesellschaft und 
des Menschen selbst in ihrer Wechselbeziehung mit der Natur,
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Jie neue Zivilisation und die neue humanistische Kultur sein, 
lie davon ausgeht, daß der Mensch der "eigentliche Zweck" der 
gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung ist.
Die marxistische Theorie, die die starke Wechselbeziehung 
ind gegenseitige Beeinflußung der Entwicklung von Wissenschaft 
and Technik einerseits und der sozialen Umgestaltungen sowie 
1er Entwicklung des Menschen und seiner Kultur, einschließlich 
seiner Einstellung zur Natur, andererseits, ermittelte, hat 
‘liesen Schluß bereits v^n langem gezogen. Was ist eigentlich 
las Neue, was die neue Etappe der wissenschaftlich-technischen 
Revolution hierbei mit sich bringt? Sie spitzt die hier auf­
getretenen Probleme äußerst zu, wobei sie nämlich "eine hohe 
Rontaktebene" von neuer Technologie, Gesellschaft, Mensch 
and Natur verlangt, wobei zu bemerken ist, daß dies nicht mehr 
einfach lebensnotwending, sondern auch zur unerläßlichen Voraus 
Setzung sowohl für eine Effektive Anwendung dieser Technologie 
als auch für die Existenz der Gesellschaft, des Menschen und 
der Natur selbst wird. Heute wird die Gefahr immer realer, daß 
der Mensch jeden Sinn für sein Dasein in der Welt von Robotern
verliert, die ihn aus der Produktion immer mehr verdrängen, ihn 
nich nur von den routinemäßigen und ermüdenden Operationen, 
sondern auch von solche., befreien, die die Maschine einfach 
besser als der Mensch erledigt.
Im Westen wird dieser Umstand nicht selten zum Gegenstand 
von sozial-philosophischen Experimenten verschiedener Art, von 
■denen sogar die Phantasie des Schöpfers des Begriffes "Roboter"
V*Karel Capek, verblaßt, die in einer so prägnanten und glänzenden 
Form im seinem Drama "Rossum's Universal Robots" zum Ausdruck 
kommt. Zu einer der Formen der Erkenntnis, daß sich der tech­
nische Fortschritt von seiner menschlichen, personenbezogenen 
Dominante losgelöst hat, wurde die in der 60er Jahren dieses 
Jahrhunderts im Westen aufgetretene Theorie vom "menschlichen 
Kapital". Nach Auffassung ihrer Adepten ist diese Theorie mit­
unter geeignet, unter anderem das wirtschaftliche Denken umzu­
orientieren. "Das menschliche Kapital", so der US-amerikanische 
Wirtschaftswissenschaftler L. Thurow, "sind die schöpferischen 
Fähigkeiten, die Begabung und das Wissen des Individuums." Das
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Investieren in den Menschen gilt deshalb als eines der wichtigen 
Probleme der Entwicklung neuer Technologie. Diese Einstellung, 
durch die die politisch-ökonomischen Probleme durch ideologischen 
ersetzt werden, darf wohl kaum als konstruktiv betrachtet wer­
den. Sie macht jedoch auf einige nichtökonomische Faktoren auf­
merksam, deren Bedeutung im "Zeitalter der Roboter" zunimmt. 
Heute gelangen Wissenschaftler immer mehr zu der Ansicht, daß 
die Verbreitung der Roboter für die Werktätigen ein weiteres 
fundamentales humanitäres Problem, das Problem der Reproduktion 
menschlicher Funktionen außerhalb des Produktionsprozesses, 
entstehen läßt'*'
Das ist aber kein technologisches Problem mehr, sondern ein 
soziales, das Lösungen erfordert, die sich aus einer neuen hu­
manistischen Sicht ergeben.
Die neuen Technologien, etwa die auf Mikroprozessoren beT 
ruhenden, enthalten umfassende Möglichkeiten für ihre verschie­
dene Anwendung. Ob sie zur Entwicklung humanistischer Werte 
oder zur geistigen und häufig auch zum physischen Unterdrückung 
und sogar zur Vernichtung des Menschen genutzt werden, hängt 
vom Charakter der sozialen Ordnung ab.
Unter den Verhältnissen des Kapitalismus "findet eine Aus­
beutung der Wissenschaft, des theoretischen Fortschritts der 2Menschheit statt" . Eine äußere Form hat diese Ausbeutung der
Wissenschaft in unseren Tagen vor allem in ihrer Militarisierung
gefunden^. Bekanntlich ist heute ein beträchtlicher Teil von
Forschungskräften im Rüstungsbereich beschäftigt, der
bis zu 40 Prozent aller Ausgaben für Forschung und Entwicklung
verschlingt.
Außerordentlich gefährlich für die Menschheit und kostspie­
lig sind die Arbeiten im Zusammenhang mit der Vorbereitung der 
"Sternenkriege".
^Habary Ch. L'homme et les robots. - Monde diplomatique (P.), 
1982, №  334.
2K. Marx, F. Engels. Werke, Bd. 47, S.554 (russ.)
3G.S. Kosin. Mach und Ohnmacht. Wissenschaftlich-technische Re­
volution und Politik des Imperialismus (russ.) Moskau, 1986.
Die Pläne für das Übertragen des Rüstungswettlaufs in den 
eltraum sind ein schreiendes Beispiel für die Entstellung von 
inn und Inhalt der wissenschaftlich-technischen Entwicklung, 
hre Unterordnung unter die Ziele und Motive des Militarismus, 
ie in der Ausbeutungsordnung selbst wurzeln.
Militarismus, Militarisierung der Wissenschaft und Technik 
erfälschen nicht nur deren humanistisches Wesen und Sinn. Sie 
ompromittieren sie auch in den Augen der breiten Volksmassen, 
ie dann nicht selten die Tatsache der militaristischen An­
endung der Ergebnisse des wissenschaftlich-technischen Fort- 
chritts auf die Charakteristik ihrer Bedeutung als Sozialer 
:raft übertragen, die die Menschheit und ihre Zukunft bedroht.
Ob die neue Technik "humane Züge" gewinnt, ob sie neue gei- 
;tige und materielle Reichtümer mit sich bringt, oder ob sie 
гиг Ursache und zum Quell von unsagbarer Not wird, wird in 
ïinem immer stärkeren Maße von konkreten Menschen und von den­
jenigen abhängen, die diese neue Technik und Hochtechnologie 
•entwickeln, in die Praxis überleiten und benutzen. Damit stellt 
sich das Problem der Wahl und Ausbildung von Fachleuten, der 
Gewährleistung ihres garantiert hohen professionellen und kul­
turellen Niveaus. Garantierten deshalb, weil die Menschheit 
nicht das Recht hat, Fehler unter Verhältnissen zuzulassen, da 
die neue Technik den "Preis" eines jeden solchen Fehlers auf 
das Millionenfache steigert. Ein prägnantes Beispiel dafür war 
die Havarie im Kernkraftwerk Tschernobyl, wo mangelndes Verant- 
■wortungsbewußtsein und Fahrlässigkeit von nur wenigen Menschen 
zur größten Tragödie für tausende und zehntausende Menschen ge­
worden sind. Gerade deshalb besteht denn auch eine der wichtigs­
ten Besonderheiten bei der Entwicklung der modernen Wissen­
schaft und bei ihrer Realisierung in der modernen Technologie 
in der außerordentlich gewachsenen Rolle der moralischen und 
ethischen Aspekten der Anwendung des einen oder des anderen 
technologischen Ergebnisses sowie der Forschung selbst.
Daß sich die ethischen, die humanistischen Probleme der 
•Wissenschaft und Technik in einer so zugespitzten Form darbieten, 
ist wohl auf die eventuelle praktische Anwendung der Erkennt­
nisse der Genetik, vor allem der Genetik des Menschen, zurück­
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▼Die Entstehung und Entwicklung der Kibernetik hatte seiner­
zeit die Aufmerksamkeit auf das Problem der Steuerung, unter 
anderem auf den Umstand gelenkt, daß sich in den Prozessen der 
Steuerung mit Hilfe von, ihrer Leistung nach schwachen, Sig­
nalen energetische Veränderungen von ungeheurer Stärke regeln 
und kontrollieren lassen. Mit etwa dergleichen Problematik hat 
auch die Genetik zu tun, die Strukturen und Mechanismen unter­
sucht, mit denen Prozesse der Steuerung des Wachstums und der 
Entwicklung biologischer Organismen verwirklicht werden. Der 
Mensch gewinnt somit eine Macht, mit der er mit äußerster Vor­
sicht umgehen sollte. Gerade damit wird denn auch letzten Endes 
der sozial-ethische und humanistische Inhalt der Forschungen 
in der Gentechnologie, geschweige denn ihrer Anwendung, bestimmt
Mehrere angesehene Wissenschaftler im Westen, die sich 
früher zu den ethischen Aspekten der Gentechnologie leiden­
schaftlich äußerten, sprechen heute davon, daß solche Erörte­
rungen überflüssig und sogar schädlich sind, und behaupten, 
daß die Gefahr dieser Forschungen von den Massenmedien über­
trieben worden war, und daß Verbote und Einschränkungen den 
wissenschaftlichen Fortschritt auf diesem wichtigen Wissensge­
biet nur hemmen könnten. Diese Haltung dürfte weder vom wis­
senschaftlichen noch vom ethischen Standpunkt aus gerechtfer­
tigt sein. Die Gentechnologie lenkte vielleicht nachdrücklicher 
und anschaulicher als irgendwann und irgend was in der Ver­
gangenheit [einschließlich der Diskussion über die Gefahr der 
Forschungen in der Kernphysik) die Aufmerksamkeit der Mensch­
heit auf die Notwendingkeit einer öffentlichen Kontrolle (so­
zialer und ethischer) darüber, was in der Wissenschaft und 
Technologie geschieht und was für den Menschen unmittelbar ge­
fährlich werden könnte. Bisher beschränkte sich alles ledig­
lich auf das "Drama der Ideen" und in einem noch höheren Grad 
auf das Wortgeplänkel. Aber es steht noch alles bevor, sowohl 
Gutes, denn die Gentechnologie verspricht uns für die Zukunft 
wahre Wunder in der Landwirtschaft und in der Medizin, wie 
auch, leider wahrscheinlich auch weniger Gutes.
"Die wichtigste Frage, die die Menschen beunruhigt, lautet, 
wer darüber entscheiden soll und wird, welche Gene falsch funk-
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, ionieren", stellt der uS-amerikanische Biochemiker, der Nobel­
reisträger D. Baltimore, fest. Die Angst, daß diese Entschei- 
;ungen von Diktatoren getroffen werden könnten, um ihre Macht 
:u festigen, ließ die Gentechnologie zu einem Symbol von mora­
lischen Problemen, die die moderne Biologie erzeugen könnte, 
fu einem Symbol der Abschreckung der modernen Technik als Gan- 
'es werden.
Die Diskussionen über die Ethik der genetischen Kontrolle 
;ind in folgender Hinsicht bezeichnend. In ihnen werden nicht 
leiten zeitlich recht fernliegende und manchmal auch einfach 
itopische Möglichkeiten erörtert, die mit der Entwicklung der 
jentechnologie eröffnet werden könnten. Und vielleicht lassen 
sich die Aktualität und die Leidenschaft dieser Diskussionen 
licht so sehr damit erklären, wie real diese Möglichkeiten 
»ind, als vielmehr damit, daß sie uns veranlassen, auf solche 
ewige Probleme, wie die des Menschen, seiner Freiheit, seiner 
iöglichkeit und seiner Bestimmung, auf eine neue Weise oder 
empfindlicher zu reagieren. Die fernen Perspektiven, die die 
Gentechnik (sowie die Mikroelektronik und andere fortgeschrit­
tene Zweige der Wissenschaft, die den technologischen Fort­
schritt bestimmen) bieten, haben auf uns bereits heute eine 
‘Wirkung und lassen uns etwa darüber nachdenken, ob wir eine 
klonale Vermehrung des Menschen wünschen und wünschen sollten. 
Und wir sehen uns veranlaßt, uns, wie wir heute sind, etwas 
genauer anzuschauen, um zu verstehen, was wir wollen, was wir 
.anstreben und was wir ablehnen.
Somit geht es hier nicht nur um die Zukunft, eine fernere 
oder auch eine nähere, sondern auch um Dinge, die sehr gegen­
wärtig sind. Und hierbei wird die Anwendung von Mitteln der 
philosophischen Analyse, der im Laufe von Jahrhunderten ge­
sammelten Erfahrungen aus einer philosophischen Untersuchung 
dieser Probleme nicht nur wünschenswert, sondern vom sozialen 
Standpunkt aus betrachtet geradezu unentbehrlich. Die Leistungen 
und Erkentnisse der modernen Wissenschaft stellen die Menschen 
immer wieder vor die Aufgabe einer Selbstbestimmung, einer Neu­
bewertung ihrer Werte. Ohne Benutzung der gesammelten philoso­
phischen Erfahrungen, würde der Mensch dieser Aufgabe gegenüber 
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Die sozialistische Gesellschaft ist sich der revolu­
tionären Möglichkeiten und der sozialen Folgen der Anwendung der 
neuen Technologien, die die Mikroelektronik, die Informatik und 
die Biotechnik bieten, voll und ganz bewußt. Sie schafft für 
diese Anwendung breiten Raum und entspricht schon ihrem Wesen 
nach im höchsten Grade dieser neuen Technologie, die erforder­
lich macht, daß außerordentlich umfangreiche gesellschaftliche 
Fonds (und zwar auf planmäßiger Grundlage) und nicht Privatka— 
pital in Bewegung gesetzt werden, wenngleich dieses Privatkapi- ■ 
tal die materiellen Ressourcen des Sozialismus in einem bestimm­
ten historischen Zeitabschnitt auch übertrifft. Die gesell­
schaftliche Struktur des Sozialismus gestattet es, das Hauptpo­
tential der neuen Technologie, deren arbeitssparenden Charakter 
maximal zu nutzen, wobei dies keine Arbeitslosigkeit zur Folge 
hat, die im Kapitalismus unvermeidlich ist.
Darin bestehen die wichtigsten Vorzüge des Sozialismus und 
die fundamentale Grundlage der "hohen Kontaktebene" von So­
zialismus und neuer Technologie.
Ein Vorzug des Sozialismus besteht auch noch darin, daß er 
eine umfassende Kooperation von vielen Ländern gewährleistet, 
die sich auf verschiedenen Ebenen der wissenschaftlich-tech­
nischen Entwicklung, der Produktion und Einführung neuer Tech­
nologien befinden. Wenn in der kapitalistischen Welt eine immer 
stärker werdende Konkurrenz, etwa zwischen den japanischen Mo­
nopolen einerseits, die sich mit der Produktion neuer Technolo­
gie befassen, und den USA-Monopolen sowie den Monopolen des 
"Vereinten" Westeuropas anderseits zu verzeichnen ist, so 
sind in der sozialistischen Staatengemeinschaft enges Zusammen­
wirken und gegenseitige Unterstützung bei der Verwirklichung 
des wissenschaftlich-technischen Fortschritts und der Einführung 
seiner Ergebnisse in die gesellschaftliche Produktion festzu­
stellen. Davon war auf dem 27. Parteitag der KPdSU die Rede und 
das findet konsequente Verwirklichung im Komplexprogramm des 
wissenschaftlich-technischen Fortschritts der Mitgliedsländer 
des RGW bis zum Jahre 2000.
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Die "hohe Kontaktebene" der neuen Technologie setzt ein ho 
lOhes Niveau von Kultur, Schöpfertum des Menschen in seiner 
Jesamtheit, in seiner harmonischen Entwicklung voraus. Und 
chließlich ist es unerläßlich, daß sie in die neue "Wertskala" 
.ufgenommen wird, die auf einer neuen Auffassung vom Sinn des 
Menschenlebens und der Bewertung all dessen, einschließlich der 
lodernsten Technologie in Übereinstimmung damit basiert, daß 
ier Mensch und seine Entwicklung das "Maß aller Dinge" und der 
‘Selbstzweck" der Geschichte sind.
Die "menschliche Ebene von Berührung" der neuen Technolo­
gie, ihre humanistische Bewertung, ausgehend von den Möglich­
keiten, die sie für eine harmonische Entfaltung des Menschen,
:ür seine Entwicklung als Persönlichkeit und als Schöpfer er- 
iffnet, stimmt maximal mit der wichtigsten Wertorientierung der 
îeuen Gesellschaft, mit der Sorge für den Menschen, mit seinen 
wachsenden geistigen Bedürfnissen überein.
Dem kommt eine ganz besondere Bedeutung zu einer Zeit zu,
,.;а die Zivilisation in das Zeitalter der Mikroelektronik, In- 
ormatik und Biotechnologie tritt.
Heute werden sowohl klassische Antiutopien wie auch mo- 
Mernste Mythen benutzt, die berufen sind, den Menschen, der 
verwirrt ist, sich der Gesellschaft entfremdet hat und unter an­
derem den Sinn und die Bedeutung der neuen Technologie nicht 
jegreift, entweder einzuschüchtern oder maßlose Hoffnungen und 
Illusionen bei ihm zu erwecken, wobei diese lediglich auf die 
Sphäre der Konsumtion beschränkt werden soll. So wird, den 
;>rophezeihungen des kanadischen Soziologen M. McLuhan folgend, 
worn "Untergang des Humanismus" gesprochen, wobei die Massen­
medien ("Media"] als solche betrachtet werden, die tiefgrei­
fende Veränderungen in der menschlichen Natur verursachen. Die 
’Media" und die Technologie werden als physische, vergegenständ­
lichte Realität und die Ideologie lediglich als so etwas wie 
Ausschmückung, als "offizielle Uniform" betrachtet, die sich die 
’Media" anlegen. Es wird die Möglichkeit erörtert, mit Hilfe 
yon "Media" soyar die menschliche Physiologie, ihre organische 
Realität zu verändern. In neuen Formen und unter Ausnutzung 
tier noch nie dagewesenen Möglichkeiten der Mikroelektronik und
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der Biotechnologie, so etwa der Gentechnologie, werden die neuen 
genetischen Ideen von einem "fabrizierten Menschen" (Homo sa- 
pientissimus) und sogar vom "Biokiborg" (Machina Sapiens) wie­
derbelebt.
Zugleich setzt sich immer mehr das Bewußtsein, häufig in 
einer abstrakt-utopischen Form, von der Notwendigkeit einer 
"hohen Ebene der Berührung" der neuen Technologie mit dem Men­
schen und den humanistischen Werten neuen Typs, nämlich solchen 
durch, die der alte Gesellschaftsordnung nicht bietet und auch 
gar nicht bieten kann, die jedoch die Grundlage der neuen Zi­
vilisation ausmachen. So wird etwa die Bedeutung der sozial­
psychologischen sowie der kulturellen und moralisch-sittlichen 
Probleme unterstrichen, die mit dem Prozeß der Robotisierung 
Zusammenhängen. Obgleich hierbei der Begriff "hohe Berührungs- 
ebene" in seiner engeren Auslegung gerade das Zusammenwirken 
von Mensch und Maschine charakterisiert, bei dem der Computer 
als "delikate" Maschine dem Menschen viel, einschließlich des 
Verzichts auf mehrere Gewohnheiten (wie etwa das Rauchen u.dgl. 
m.), abverlangt, geht es häufig auch um solche notwendigen Din-I 
ge wie Hebung(Erhöhung) des professionellen Wissens, der allge­
meinen Kultur des Menschen, seiner moralischen Qualitäten.
Nur tiefgreifende soziale Umgestaltungen der gegenwärtigen! 
Gesellschaft in Richtigung einer, nach Marx, "wahrhaft mensch­
lichen" Gesellschaft können die humanistischen Probleme lösen, 
die sich im Zusammenhang mit der umfassenden Einführung neuer 
Technologie in die Produktion noch weiter zuspitzen.
Der Mensch in neuer Gesellschaft tritt in das "mensch­
liche Zeitalter" ein, und er wird aus der Produktion nicht als 
ein für diese Produktion überflüssiges Element verdrängt, um 
das Heer der Erwerbslosen weiter zu vergrößern, sondern er be­
kommt immer umfassendere Möglichkeiten, schöpferisch in sie ein- 
zusteigen und sie im wahrsten Sinne des Wortes seinen materiel­
len und geistigen Bedürfnissen anzupassen, seine Fähigkeiten, 
auch außerhalb der Produktion zu entfalten, die ja immer mehr 
den Maschinen anvertraut wird. Dieses schöpferische Wirken 
einer ganzen Persönlichkeit, eines harmonisch entwickelnten 








о те Marxian Themes in the Age of Information*
he radical conceptual and social changes related to recent de-
elopments in technology - aptly summed up under the term 'com-
uter revolution' - give new interest to certain basic tenets
•f Marx. But these tenets are at the same time moved into a
erspective hardly envisaged by Marx himself.
There is, to begin with, one fundamental Marxian thesis
■ ’hich can definitely be said to have gained in plausibility.
’his is the thesis of technological determinism  -  relativized
already by Engels* 1, contested by scholars of such different
lersuasions as Max Weber2 or Georg Lukács3, but no doubt very
strongly adhered to by Marx himself. Recall the well-known
massage in The Poverty of Philosophyi
In acquiring new productive forces men change their mode 
of production; and in changing their mode of production.
* I am indebted to the Alexander von Humboldt Stiftung un- 
ier whose auspices, in 1986-87, most of the research embodied 
in the present paper was conducted.
1 Cf. his letter of Aug. 5, 1890, to Conrad Schmidt - 
'"wenn die materielle Daseinsweise das primum ágens ist, 
[schließt] das nicht aus, daß die ideellen Gebiete eine reagie­
rende, aber sekundäre Einwirkung auf sie hinwiederum ausüben" 
- or, e.g., his letter of Sept. 21/22 of the same year to Jo­
seph Bloch: "Wir machen unsere Geschichte selbst, aber ... un­
ter sehr bestimmten Voraussetzungen und Bedingungen. Darunter 
sind die ökonomischen die schließlich entscheidenden. Aber auch 
die politischen usw., ja selbst die in den Köpfen der Menschen 
spukende Tradition, spielen eine Rolle..."
2 The relevant classic essay being, of course, his "Die 
protestantische Ethik und der 'Geist' des Kapitalismus", Archiv 
für Sozialnissenschaft und Sozialpolitik  XX-XXI (1903-1904).
3 I am referring to his fateful early notion of class con­
sciousness,  cf. esp. the essay "Klassenbewußtsein" in his Ge­
schichte und KlassenbewuBtsein  (1923).
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in changing the way of earning their living, they change 
all their social relations. The hand-mill gives you socie-1 
ty with the feudal lord: the steam-mill, society with the 
industrial capitalist.4
And recall also the famous preface to the Critique of Political 
Economy,  where Marx affirms that the way men produce their 
means of subsistence conditions their whole social, political 
and intellectual life.5 That developments in microelectronics 
have deep implications for society and politics in the United 
States, in Western Europe, and in the Far East, is by now of 
course obvious. But it is obvious, too, that these implications 
are not independent of the social and political frameworks 
within which they emerge. There is one part of the world, how-| 
ever, namely Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, with regard 
to which the political and social effects of the new technology 
are absolutely determining in the sense that they led to 
changes to which the dominant political forces have been rigid­
ly opposed; to changes for which the inherited and existing po­
litical cultures in the countries in question - with no democ­
ratic traditions whatsoever in the Soviet Union, and with a 
bare minimum of such traditions in Eastern Europe - did not 
provide a framework, and did not herald any promise.
Has not recent history amply demonstrated that the dream 
of drawing closer to the West - characteristically not indulged 
in by Russians - could at any time be turned into a nightmare 
in Eastern Europe? But then came the chip, and a very different
4 Moscow: n.d., p.122.
5 "Die Produktionsweise des materiellen Lebens bedingt den 
sozialen, politischen und geistigen Lebensprozess überhaupt", 
Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie,  Marx - Engels, Merke, vol. 
13, Berlin: Dietz, 1971, pp.8f.
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icture emerged. The centralized economies of the so-called so- 
ialist countries proved to be unable to keep up with Western 
evelopments in microelectronics. As a consequence, the faith 
n the continuing military supremacy of the Soviet Union over 
he West wavered. Eastern European products became, for reasons 
f quality and price, increasingly difficult to export. At- 
'empts at a decentralization of economy with no democratization 
f the political system failed. Liberalization at home and a 
ew détente in foreign policy were the result. It would require 
great deal of naivety not to see that in this instance, once 
юге, a deeply Marxian idea has been confirmed: namely the idea 
hat instead of the personal traits of political leaders form- 
.ng their policies, it is, much rather, the exigencies of po­
litical realities that become reflected in the personal make- 
ip of politicians.
Seen from a Marxist perspective, however, this state of 
nffairs possesses a truly strange feature. For the economy pro­
viding a suitable framework for technological progress thus 
turns out to be not that of central planning, but that of the 
free market. Indeed the situation, as in particular the Japan­
ese experience shows, is even more peculiar: the presence of 
some old-fashioned traditions in the texture of a liberal soci­
ety does not seem to be an obstacle to the development of suc­
cessful free enterprises, and, by implication, to advances in 
technology. And the joint values of the free market on the one 
hand and of traditionalism on the other add up to just about 
everything Marx detested - and to just about everything Marx's
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arch-liberal adversary F.A. von Hayek stands for.* 6
Some central Marxian themes are, to be sure, only seeming­
ly affected by the emergence of the new technologies. Thus for 
instance the labour theory of value, with all its implications, 
strikes one today, at a time when knowledge has become the su­
preme commodity, as utterly implausible; but this theory had 
never been a logically acceptable one, and was, precisely with 
reference to the effects of science, withdrawn by Marx himself. 1 
The plausibility of the labour theory of value has radically 1 
decreased because the element of labour time has lost its rele- I 
vance as a source of added value.7 The substance of value, Marxi
e Recall the view succintly expressed by Hayek in his 1945 
talk "Individualism: True and False", where he spoke about 
"true individualism" affirming the value of the family, the lo­
cal community, and of "common conventions and traditions" (Ha­
yek, Individual ism and Economic Order [1949], London: Routledge
& Kegan Paul, 1976, p.23). Hayek called into question "whether 
a free or individualistic society can be worked successfully if 
people are too individualistic' in the false sense, if they 
are too unwilling voluntarily to conform to traditions and con­
ventions". (Ibid., p.26) Or, as Eisenstadt has put it: "the im­
plicit assumption in many studies (and the one most closely re­
lated to the dichotomous conception of traditional versus mod­
ern societies) that the less 'traditional' a society is, the 
more capable it is of sustained growth was proven incorrect. It 
became clear that the mere destruction of traditional forms did 
not necessarily assure the development of a new, viable, modern 
society... In addition ... it was realized that in some coun­
tries, such as Japan or England, modernization had been suc­
cessfully undertaken under the aegis of traditional symbols and
even traditional elites......a growing array of evidence has
shown that many forms of extended-family and/or kinship rela­
tions may indeed not only be compatible with industrialization 
but even reinforce it." (S.N. Eisenstadt, Tradition, Change, 
and Modernity, New York: Wiley, 1973, pp.98f. and 108.)
7 The adjective added has to be stressed by anyone who 
does not subscribe to an objective theory of value. The ques­
tion one then addresses is: given the subjective economic value 
preferences of a society, what are the elements or processes 
which satisfy those preferences, i.e. act towards conferring 
value upon this or that commodity?
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síd, is labour; its measure  is time.6 *10As exchange values, all 
ommodities are but certain amounts of congealed labour time.0 
oday however it is obviously kno^iledge^o > not labour time, 
hat is primarily embodied in the added value of any commodi-
y.11 Incidentally, this was already the 
esser degree, in Marx's days - a state 
•ealized12, but to which he gave a str
case, even i 
of affairs he 
angely twisted
f to a 
fully 
inter-
e "Wir kennen jetzt die Substanz  des Werts. Es ist die йг- 
eit. Wir kennen sein Größenmaß.  Es ist die Arbeitszeit." Das
apital, vo1.1, Berlin: Dietz, 1969, p.55.
0 "Als Tauschwert sind alle Waren nur bestimmte Maße fest- 
eronnener Arbeitszeit", Zur Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie,
: . 18.
10 "Knowledge" and "information" are of course not identi- 
al; but they are closely related. As Fred I. Dretske puts it 
n his Knowledge and the Flow of Information,  Oxford: Basil 
lackwell, 1981, p.44: "Roughly speaking, information is that
ommodity capable of yielding knowledge, and what information a 
ignal carries is what we can learn from it." - "By informa- 
.ion", writes Daniel Bell, "I mean data processing in the 
iroadest sense; the storage, retrieval, and processing of data 
íecomes the essential resource for all economic and social ex­
changes. ... By knowledge, I mean an organized set of state­
ments of facts or ideas, presenting a reasoned judgment or an 
Experimental result, which is transmitted to others through 
моте communication medium in some systematic form." ("The So­
cial Framework of the Information Society", in M. L. Dertouzos 
und Joel Moses, eds., The Computer Age: A Tuenty-Year  View,
Jambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1979, p.168.)
11 "[W]ith the shortening of labor time and the diminution 
)f the production worker ... it becomes clear that knowledge 
■and its applications replace labor as the source of 'added val- 
ie' in the national product. In that sense, just as capital and 
labor have been the central variables of industrial society, so 
Information and knowledge are the crucial variables of postin­
dustrial society", Bell, loc. ci t., p.168.
12 In his 1857-58 manuscripts, later published as Grund­
risse der Kritik der Politischen Ökonomie, he wrote: "to the 
degree that large industry develops, the creation of real 
wealth comes to depend less on labour time and on the amount of 
Labour employed than on the power of the agencies set in motion 
during labour time, whose 'powerful effectiveness' is itself in 
turn out of all proportions to the direct labour time spent on 
their production, but depends rather on the general state of
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pretation. As Marx saw it, the labour theory of value would 
cease to be valid once the capitalist mode of production had 
been superseded; and the signs that the theory was in fact be­
coming increasingly implausible he understood as heralding the 
imminent doom of capitalism. In this sense the labour theory of 
value was not susceptible to scientific refutation* 13; only the 
historical deed of establishing communism could prove it false 
- by rendering it obsolete. And it is indeed a piece of irony 
that the attempt at that historical deed led to an entirely 
different result: to the perfect realization of the labour the­
ory of value, in the form of the Soviet labour camp. There, 
certainly, all work was reduced to uniform, simple labour, 
measurable in units of men and time.
Then there are other Marxian convictions, for instance 
some of those having to do with the idea of the concentration 
of capital, which, for a long time, seemed convincing, but ap­
pear antiquated in the light of today's high-tech economy, in 
particular in the light of developments in software engineer-
science and on the progress of technology... As soon as labour 
in the direct form has ceased to be the great well-spring of 
wealth, labour time ceases and must cease to be its measure", 
Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy,  transi, by 
Martin Nicolaus, Penguin Books, 1973, pp.704f.
13 Cf. David McLellan, Karl Marx: His Life and Thought, 
London: Macmillan, 1973, p.299. - In another sense this theory 
is irrefutable since it is from the start circular. Consider 
Marx's central introductory argument: "Um die Tauschwerte der 
Waren an der in ihnen enthaltenen Arbeitszeit zu messen, müssen 
die verschiedenen Arbeiten selbst reduziert sein auf unter­
schiedslose, gleichförmige, einfache Arbeit, kurz auf Arbeit, 
die qualitativ dieselbe ist und sich daher nur quantitativ un­
terscheidet. - Diese Reduktion erscheint als eine Abstraktion, 
aber es ist eine Abstraktion, die in dem gesellschaftlichen 
Produktionsprozeß täglich vollzogen wird", Zur Kritik der Poli­
tischen Ökonomie,  p.18.
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ng. Although huge enterprises obviously do play an important, 
ometimes dominant, role in the electronics industry, and al- 
hough with the increasing tendency of programs to be written 
,y large teams the costs of software production are, on the 
■ 'hole, rising, it is still the case that small firms in these 
ireas continue to have relatively good chances of success, and 
i.hat the software industry still offers entrepreneurial possi- 
>ilities for programmers with practically no capital to invest, 
’he success stories of bright teenager "hackers" - virtuoso 
programmers - in the United States and in Western Europe are a 
Yamiliar theme. And it is significant that software development 
is practically the only economic domain where a backward coun­
try like Hungary, with no funds to mobilize, seems to be able 
to co-operate effectively, and in places to compete, with West­
ern firms.
On the other hand the romantic-eschatological aspect in 
.Marx - notoriously a cause of embarrassment to bureaucratic 
Marxism - is today acquiring an air of reasonableness. Certain­
ly the overthrow of liberal institutions and the elimination of 
free competition by a revolutionary proletariat no longer has, 
for those who tried the Marxist experiment, the ring of promise 
it apparently possessed earlier. Yet the emerging technologies 
for handling information do indeed seem to herald a new age of 
community, of the vergesellschafteter Mensch - of participatory 
democracy, of a new craftsmanship, of non-alienated cultural 
patterns. Discussing the historical role of a mode of produc­
tion based on exchange values, Marx writes:
The universal nature of this production with its generali­
ty creates an estrangement of the individual from himself
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and others, but also for the first time the general and 
universal nature of his relationships and capacities. At 
early stages of development the single individual appears 
to be more complete, since he has not yet elaborated the 
wealth of his relationships, and has not yet established 
them as powers and autonomous social relationships, that 
are opposed to himself. It is as ridiculous to wish to 
return to that primitive abundance as it is to believe ini 
the necessity of its complete depletion.14
Clearly, Marx's vision of a non-alienated past does indeed play| 
a part in his dream of a non-alienated future.15 *And when de-l 
picting that future he strikes a utopian, almost millenial 
note. The historical mission of capitalism is fulfilled and a 
new age begins when the productive forces of labour have reach­
ed a stage at which general affluence is maintained by a mini­
mum of labour essentially scientific, indeed by an activity 
which is really the free development of rich personalities.18
Now the specialist whose work is most deeply embedded in,
14 Cf. Foundations, p.162. I am here quoting after the 
English translation as cited by McLellan, op. cit., p.297.
15 In a telling passage in one of his earliest writings he-
regards it as a "correct idea" that early, primitive conditions
in a way foreshadow the genuine conditions under which man 
ought to live, "daß die rohen Zustände naive niederländische 
Gemälde der wahren Zustände sind" . "Das philosophische Manifest 
der historischen Rechtsschule" (1842), Marx - Engels, Merke, 
vol.l, Berlin: Dietz, 1964, p.78.
18 Cf. Foundations, pp.325 and 611: "the development of
the productive powers of labour" makes it possible that "the 
possession and preservation of general wealth require a lesser 
labour time of society as a whole, and ... the labouring soci­
ety relates scientifically to the process of its progressive 
reproduction, its reproduction in a constantly greater abun­
dance; hence where labour in which a human being does what a 
thing could do has ceased." Here, then, emerge "the material 
elements for the development of the rich individuality which is 
as all-sided in its production as in its consumption, and whose 
labour ... therefore appears no longer as labour, but as the 
full development of activity itself, in which natural necessity 
in its direct form has disappeared...". It is at this stage 
that labour truly becomes travail attractif, "self-realization, 
objectification of the subject, hence real freedom, whose ac­
tion is, precisely, labour...".
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d is perhaps most revealing of, the age of information, is 
e professional programmer. Thus in assessing the claim that 
ie tendencies emerging in this age in a sense vindicate the 
rxian utopia, it seems reasonable to begin by analyzing the 
ну the members of this profession labour and live. First im- 
essions are, certainly, discouraging. As Sherry Turkle
•rites,
In the course of the last decade programmers have watched 
their opportunities to exercise their expertise in a spon­
taneous way being taken away. Those who are old enough re­
member the time when things were different as a kind of 
golden age, an age when a programmer was a skilled artisan 
who was given a problem and asked to conceive of and craft 
a solution. ... Today, programs are written on a kind of 
assembly line. ... Thus programmers are particularly sen­
sitive to the fragmentation of knowledge and the lack of a 
feeling of wholeness in work to which so many of us are 
subject.17
jt this is not the only possible perspective. As David Bolter 
Jts it:
The computer shows that even teamwork need not thoroughly 
subsume and homogenize the special contribution of each 
• member. The best organization for many computer projects 
is modular: each member of the group is given a separate
part of the larger program or machine design. This is not 
the stultifying specialization of the assembly line, where 
one worker performs one operation repeatedly for hours. 
Instead, each module may be a self-contained program or 
portion of hardware, with challenges and difficulties all 
its own.18
Another way to point to the non-alienating aspects of the
17  The Second Self: Computers and the Human Spirit,  Lon- 
on: Granada, 1984, p.173. "Structured programming", the pro- 
ramming mode or style which is sufficiently constrained to 
•ermit smooth team co-operation, is "good for business, death 
or the joy of work", as one programmer interviewed by Turkle 
expressed the matter (ibid.). For a more detailed discussion of 
structured programming, in the spirit of Adam Smith, cf. David 
.evy, "Constraining the Choice Set: Lessons from the Software 
devolution", Reason Papers, Spring 1985, pp.77-88.
10  Turing's Man: Western Culture in the Computer Age,
dhapel Hill: The Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1984, pp.231f.
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Tcomputer is to highlight its tool-like character. "The computer 
is", writes Bolter,
in some ways a grand machine in the Western mechanical- 
dynamic tradition and in other ways a tool-in-hand from 
the ancient craft tradition. The best way to encourage the 
humane use of computers is to emphasize, where possible, 
the second heritage over the first, the tool over the ma­
chine. - A machine is characterized by sustained, autono­
mous action. It is set up by human hands and then is more 
or less set loose from human control. ... A tool, unlike a 
machine, is not self-sufficient or autonomous in action.'1 
It requires the skill of a craftsman...18
Now Turkle, too, exploits - with reference to Marx20 - the 
tool--machine distinction. "Tools are extensions of their us­
ers; machines", she writes, "impose their own rhythm, their 
rules, on the people who work with them, to the point where it 
is no longer clear who or what is being used."21 At work - in 
the office, at the lab - the computer has become a machine; but] 
at home - this is the aspect Turkle stresses - it can play the 
compensatory role of a tool. When people in the electronics in­
dustry, or professional programmers, speak of the way they ap-
•
proach problems on their home computers - in their free time, 
as a hobby - they convey "a sense of power" that comes from 
"having full knowledge of the system", from working in a "safe 
environment" of their "own creation".22 Building up from ma­
ie ibid., pp.232f.
20 The text she directly bases her analyses on seems to be
ch.13 of I>as Kapital: "Maschinerie und große Industrie“. But,
here again, the Foundations  is worth quoting too: "The science
which compels the inanimate limbs of the machinery, by their 
construction, to act purposefully, as an automaton, does not 
exist in the worker's consciousness, but rather acts upon him 
through the machine as an alien power, as the power of the ma­
chine itself" (p.693).









•line code to finished project, becoming directly involved, as 
t; were, with the workings of the CPU - the central processing 
lit - itself, turns the computer virtually into a physical 
ool.
The CPU's primary activity is moving something that is 
conceptually almost a physical object (a byte of informa­
tion) in and out of something (a register) that is concep­
tually almost a physical place. The metaphor is spatial,
■ к concrete. One can imagine finding the bytes, examining 
them, doing something very simple to them, and passing 
them on. ... People are able to identify physically with 
what is happening inside the machine. It makes the machine 
feel like a part of oneself. It encourages appropriation 
of the machine as a tool in Marx's sense - as an extension 
of the user.23
The idea that it is the worker's free time  which consti- 
utes the true domain of non-alienated activity is of course 
gain a very Marxian one, one belonging to the less romantic 
ayers of his thinking.24 But it appears that it is precisely 
he romantic-utopian vision of the Grundrisse  which today is 
ecoming increasingly plausible. The emergence of the homo ati- 
.isus, the human being enjoying the leisure of his free time, 
Hill, so it seems, coincide with developments which lead to a 
ilurring of the boundaries between working hours and the hours
гз Ibid., pp.186f.
24 Freedom within the sphere of material production, Marx 
writes in volume three of Des Kapitel, "kann nur darin bestehn, 
daß der vergesellschaftete Mensch, die assoziierten Produzenten 
... ihren Stoffwechsel mit der Natur rationell regeln, unter
ihre gemeinschaftliche Kontrolle bringen.......Aber es bleibt
dies", viz. the sphere of production, "immer ein Reich der Not- 
endigkeit. Jenseits derselben beginnt die menschliche Kraft- 
ntwicklung, die sich als Selbstzweck gilt, das wahre Reich der 
reiheit, das aber nur auf jenem Reich der Notwendigkeit als 
einer Basis aufblühen kann. Die Verkürzung des Arbeitstags ist 
ie Grundbedingung", Berlin: Dietz, 1969, p.828.
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spent off work.2 6 The main new element here is the possibility 
of working  at home, the "return to cottage industry on a new, 
higher, electronic basis, and with it a new emphasis on the 
home as the center of society"28. Economically this might im­
ply, as Toffler puts it, that
if individuals came to own their own electronic terminals 
and equipment, ... they would become, in effect, independ­
ent entrepreneurs rather than classical employees - mean­
ing, as it were, increased ownership of the "means of pro-| 
duction" by the worker27.
The possible sociological implications are no less significant:,
If employees can perform some or all of their work tasks 
at home, they do not have to move every time they change 
jobs, as many are compelled to do today. They can simplyj 
plug into a different computer. - This implies less forced 
mobility, less stress on the individual, fewer transient
2S Cf. Klaus Haefner, Die neue Bildungskrise: Lernen im
Computerzeitalter,  Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1985, pp.197
and 245f. - Haefner registers a certain similarity between what 
he calls the "humanely computerized society" of the future on 
the one hand, and ancient Greece on the other. "Bei den Grie­
chen", he writes, "gelang es, Demokratie, Künste und Kultur auf 
der Basis intensiver Nutzung der Sklaven zu entwickeln; manuel­
le und kognitive Routinearbeit konnten vergeben werden, dem. 
freien Griechen blieb das 'reine Denken' (und das Kriegshand­
werk). Die human computerisierte Gesellschaft nutzt die 'intel­
ligente' Informationstechnik in der Kombination mit dem hohen 
Stand von Agrar-, Konsumgüter- und Energietechnik zur Lösung 
vieler 'Sklavenprobleme' im täglichen Leben...", ibid., p.240. 
Comparing computers to slaves is, incidentally, not lacking a 
certain epistemological and ethical interest. I have touched on 
this issue in my paper "Wittgenstein and the Problem of Machine 
Consciousness", Grazer Philosophische Studien  1989, forthcoming.
28 Alwin Toffler, The Third Uave, New York: Bantam Books, 
1980, p.194.
27 ibid., p.205. Indeed Toffler speaks of "a new civiliza­
tion" which "begins to heal the historical breach between pro­
ducer and consumer, giving rise to the prosumer' economics of 
tomorrow. For this reason, among many, it could ... turn out to 
be the first truly humane civilization in recorded history",
ibid., p.ll. - Another aspect of "prosumer" economy is what Mi­
chael L. Dertouzos calls "individualized automation", the tech­
nological possibility of producing, at home, with the help of 
intelligent tools, commodities for one's own use, cf. Dertouzos 
- Moses, eds., The Computer Age, pp.38ff.
180
human relationships, and greater participation in communi­
ty life. ... The electronic cottage could mean more of 
what sociologists, with their love of German jargon, call 
gerneinschaft. 2 8
It is not by their indirect effects on the local level
owever, but by their direct impact on a nationwide or even a
Ilobal one, that computer networks contribute most significant-
y to the forming and maintaining of new communities. Discus-
, »
ting the introduction of personal computers in the late 1970s, 
herry Turkle points out that
they came on the scene at 
ing politics open and 
were small, individually 
networks over telephone 
people together. ... The 
over the country were 
about the computers thems 
cial relationships peopl 
wake. ... Personal comput 
new populism in which ci 
information resources and
a time of dashed hopes for mak- 
participatory. Personal computers 
owned, and when linked through 
lines they could be used to bring 
computer clubs that sprang up all 
imbued with excitement not only 
elves, but about new kinds of so- 
e believed would follow in their 
ers became symbols of hope for a 
tizens would band together to run 
local government.20







delusive in principle. For computer networks can 
instrumental in overcoming the information gap 
knowledge any individual has from the knowledge
society at large possesses.30 This informât ion gap is, indeed,
28 Ibid., p.204.
20 Turkle, op. cit., pp,174f.
30 Applied to the field of politics this is tantamount to 
saying that participatory democracy can be deepened by making 
use of computer networks - not so much in order to count votes, 
as rather to disseminate relevant knowledge. "The genius of de­
mocratic government is not arithmetic", writes Herbert A. Si­
mon, "it is informed consensus. ... The computer enters as a 
tool that permits policy alternatives to be examined with a so­
phistication and explicitness that would otherwise be impossi­
ble" (Simon, "The Consequences of Computers for Centralization 




a real source of alienation in the modern world. In closed,! 
pre-literate societies the knowledge conveyed by oral tradi­
tions was partly knowledge in the common realm; partly knowl­
edge available to the initiated only, but to them in fact di­
rectly accessible. With the rise of literacy - a fundamental 
change in the technology of communication, information storage 
and retrieval31 - knowledge became embodied in written texts. 
And the first early libraries contained in principle -all there 
was to read: the information they provided was a global one. 
Even a hundred years ago it was still possible for someone to 
assume that he was acquainted with all the essential documents 
that were of importance for his private and professional life. 
Modern man however has lost control over his informational en­
vironment32. Computer networks - representing a second funda­
mental change in the technology of communication - are a pos­
sible means to regain that control.
.
31 Cf. the pioneering early essay of the Hungarian histor­
ian István Hajnal, "Le rôle social de l'écriture et l'évolution 
européenne", Revue de l'Institut de Sociologie  (Bruxelles), 
1934 .
32 Man is today, as Haefner puts it, "hineingestellt in 
eine mit seinem Gehirn allein nicht mehr überschaubare informa— 
tionelle Umwelt...  Die Informationsexplosion ... hat den ein­
zelnen Menschen in eine relativ willkürliche Ecke seiner infor­
mationeilen Umwelt geschleudert...", °p. cit., pp.31f.
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INDETERMINISM IN QUANTUM MECHANICS*
Péter Szegedi
There has been much illuminating discussion over the last 
5 years concerning the motives and conditions of the appear- 
nce of quantum mechanical indeterminism. It was initiated by 
aul Forman, who earlier took part in the project "Sources for 
istory of Quantum Physics", organized by Thomas Kuhn. Forman 
ublished a long paper^ on the relations between the Weimar 
ultural milieu, causality and quantum theory. His thoughts and 
he publications disputing his theses will be the starting 
oint of this paper.
Forman's first thesis is that Weimar culture constituted a 
ostile intellectual environment for causality, physics, and 
'lathematics. After Germany's defeat in 1918, ideas such as ir- 
ationalism, mysticism, Lebenaphiloeophie, wholism (neovitalism 
n biology, Gestalt Ism in psychology) began to spread. For the 
termán middle classes the Weimar period was a period of perma­
nent political, economical, moral, intellectual, cultural, and 
scientific crisis and was also perceived as such. According to 
1?orman, the characteristic representative of this climate was 
"The Decline of the West" by Oswald Spengler. In this work 
causality is presented as a Western, Baroque phenomenon.
Secondly, Forman states that the German physicists and 
mathematicians accomodated themselves to the Weimar intellectual 
environment. Mainly through Wien's popular lectures he tries to 
prove that these physicists within a short space of time turned 
from (Machist) positivism to Lebenaphiloeophie. Forman has de-
■*Paper presented at the 8th International Congress of Logic, 
Methodology, and Philosophy of Science, Moscow, August 17-22 
1987.
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tected explicit references to Spengler in the works of Bom, 
Einstein, Exner, Frank, Jordan, von Mises, Weyl, and Wien. In 
the papers of some physicists and mathematicians he met with a 
decided capitulation to Spenglerism. For instance, R. von Mises 
in a lecture at the Technische Hochschule Dresden - delivered 
^  February 1920 — told the students that the age of technology 
was on its way out and that it was being replaced by "culture 
consciousness". Progress "is not a question of new facts of any 
sort, nor of new theoretical propositions, nor even of new meth­
ods of research, but if I may say it - thinking of this word in 
its philosophical sense - of new intuitions (Anschauungen) of 
the world". In this "numerical harmonies, even numerical mys­
teries play a role, reminding one no less of the ideas of the 
Pythagoreans than of some of the cabbalists". At the saune time, 
concerning the development of spectral analysis (Balmer, Ryd­
berg, and Rit*) A. Sommerfeld saw the orientation of new physics 
in Pythagorean number mysticism. "If only Kepler could have ex­
perienced today's quantum theory! He would have seen the most 
daring dreams of his youth realized..." Besides the acceptance 
of Spengler amd mysticism, a large number of physicists' papers 
and lectures, which refer to the crisis in their science, also 
comes into this category.
Forman's third thesis is that, as a result of the outlined 
external forces, there was am acausal tendency established in 
physics. The first to convert to acausality were Exner and Weyl. 
(The latter had fallen under the influence of Husserlian phi­
losophy as well, amd he was not the only one to do so.) Exner 
and Weyl were followed by von Mises, Schottky, Nemst, amd 
others. Later Schrödinger amd Reichenbach joined them. Natural­
ly, some theoretical physicists continued to adhere to causal­
ity (e.g. Plamck amd Einstein).
As the third thesis is the consequence of the first two, 
the last proposition cam also be deduced from the previous 
ones: the negation of quamtum mechamical causality is due to 
the abovementioned external influences. Speaking of this For-
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*an refers to the Bohr-Kraraers-Slater paper, and tries to es- 
ablish a connection between Lebenephiloeophie and Heisenberg 
tn the basis on his earlier membership of the German Jugend­
bewegung.
Our aim is to establish the truth concerning all this. As 
'for his first thesis, Forman's valuation of the Weimar cultural 
;limate rings true when compared to the picture drawn by his­
torians. From the point of view of the general intellectual 
nilieu he rightly puts Spengler's work in the centre (of course 
mithin philosophy, Husserl's influence was more important).
On the other hand some problems occur with Tormán's second 
thesis. In connection with the dimensions of the social-intel­
lectual pressure on scientists and, accordingly, with the manner 
of their accomodation to it historians have taken a different 
point of view. According to J. Hendry "while there were indeed 
many attacks upon mathematics and physics from outside these 
disciplines, there were in all cases attacks upon their value 
rather than upon their content. ... physicists and mathemati­
cians were to some extent ieolated from , rather than attaoked
2by the forces of the milieu". The historian Walter Laqueur - 
without naming Forman - writes that "There was a German liter­
ature, a German theatre, German schools in the visual arts, 
even in history and philosophy. But only a fool or a fanatic 
would talk about German mathematics or German physics".^
One also can draw the lesson from Laqueur's book that we 
have to form a much more refined notion of the mutual inter­
action of religious, political, and philosophical groupings in4the physics community than Forman did. However, in my opinion 
there can be no denying that there existed certain external 
forces. I shall try to analyse these forces in our particular 
case, but here I might also mention Heisenberg's opinion, ac­
cording to which science is entirely inseparable from more 
general problems.^
As concerns Forman's third thesis, it is hardly disputable 
that there existed an acausal tendency in physics at this time.
185
But this was by no means a clear-cut consequence of Weimar's 
irrational istic intellectual climate or Spenqier's philosophy. I 
For instance S. Brush emphasizes "the continuity of the stream 
of thought running from Fourier to Kelvin to Maxwell to Boltz­
mann to Planck to Einstein to Born and Heisenberq".  ^From the 
point of view of physics he traces acausalitv through statis­
tical method back to the problem of irreversibility. As regards 
its philosophical foundations, he differs from Forman, too. He 
clearly links the transition from determinism to indeterminism 
with the positivistic-pragmatic-operationalist-instrumentalist- 
phenomenalist attitude that many physicists adopted in the 
early twentieth century, partly under the influence of Ernst 
Mach and other critics of nineteenth-century mechanicism, part­
ly as a result of the difficulty of fitting the new phenomena 
of atomic physics into any consistent theoretical scheme.
P. Hanle makes a similar statement. Investigating inde­
terminacy in the case of Exner and Schrödinger Hanle finds an 
early account of Exner's positivistic attitude in the latter's 
first book on electricity published in 1888, which recalls 
Mach's positivist conception.^ On Exner's anti-causal attitude 
Hanle writes that "it would be incorrect to ascribe Weimar cul-g
tural influences to ideas that originated before 1908". The 
roots of these ideas, in Hanle's opinion, also lay in statis­
tical mechanics. Schrödinger accepted the likelihood of an 
acausal physics towards the end of World War I, adopted Exner's 
ideas almost verbatim in 1922, supported them in a research 
paper in 1924, but after 1922 explicitly rejected (Machist) 
positivism as inadequate and insufficient for motivating 
physics research.
According to M. Jammer "certain philosophical ideas of the 
late nineteenth century (namely the questioning of the strict 
validity of the causality principle - P. Sz.) not only prepared 
the intellectual climate for, but contributed decisively to, 
the formation of the new conceptions of the modem quantum the­
ory".9 He then writes about Poincaré's book published in 1904,
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It is clear that Poincaré's question whether differential e- 
îations are still the appropriate instrument for the mathemat- 
oal formulation of physical laws was but a mathematician's way 
f expressing his doubts in the validity of the causality prin- 
iple. For, obviously, the positing of a differential equation 
resupposes a continuous change or a continuous chain of events 
s implied in the conception of causality." Moreover, in 1910 
.H. Jeans proved that continuous motion - i.e. a differential 
’quation - could not lead to the Planck law.'1'0 C.G. Darwin, 
ollowing Poincaré in 1919, already writes, in an unpublished 
aper, about electrons exhibiting free will.
We can add, with Hendry, to the abovementioned facts that 
»'eyl's conception, for instance, was not related explicitly to 
hese problems and that the primary external influence upon 
.he latter's ideas on physics appears to have been an intui- 
:ionist philosphy. Furthermore, although von Mises expressed 
iis conclusions in a Spenglerian framework, and Schottky's 
presentation also had a strongly existentialist tone, there 
were important internal factors as well - for instance the re­
opening of the wave-particle issue (by M. de Broglie^).
Concerning the origin of quantum mechanical acausality -
Forman's fourth thesis - we shall take a look at the famous
12paper by Bohr, Kramers, and Slater, because among the direct 
preliminaries to Heisenberg's matrix mechanics it contains the 
first explicit possibility of indeterminism. In the section 
entitled "Principles of the quantum theory" they write that 
"great difficulties have been involved in the problem of the 
time-interval in which emission of radiation connected with the 
transition takes place. In fact, together with other well-known 
paradoxes of the quantum theory, the latter difficulty has 
strengthened the doubt, expressed from various sides* whether 
the detailed interpretation of the interaction between matter 
and radiation can be given at all in terms of a causal descrip­
tion in space and time of the kind hitherto used for the inter­
pretation of natural phenomena". Here they refer (at +) to
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O.W. Richardson'e Thв Eleotron Theory of Hatter (2nd ed. 
Cambridge, 1916) and to Bohr's paper in Ze. f. Phye. 13 (1923), 
although they could have referred to Darwin mentioned above, 
too, because he and Bohr were in correspondence and A.H. Comp­
ton informs us that in 1923 "The conviction of the truth of the 
spherical wave hypothesis produced by ... interference experi­
ments led Darwin and Bohr in conversation with me to choose ... 
the abandonment of the conservation principles.
After this introduction they abandon "any attempt at a 
causal connexion between the transitions in distant atoms, and 
expecially a direct application of the principles of conserva­
tion of energy and momentum". The authors assume "an independ­
ence of the individual transition processes, which stands in 
striking contrast to the classical claim of conservation of 
energy and momentum. Thus we assume that an induced trim sit ion 
in an atom is not directly caused by a transition in a distant 
atom for which the energy difference between the initial and 
the final stationary state is the same. ... This independence 
reduces not only conservation of energy to a statistical law, 
but also conservation of momentum." The basic technical idea 
originated with Slater, but the idea of the independence of 
emission and absorption came from Kramers, and the statistical 
character of conservation laws got into the paper against 
Slater's better judgement, too. Therefore we should give further 
attention to Kramers and Bohr.
It is highly improbable that the Danish Bohr's opinion was 
determined by the Weimar milieu. His acausal views were founded 
on a deep adherence to the principle of correspondence intro­
duced by himself, and because he had been reluctant to accept 
14light quanta . In the formation of his Weltanschauung not the 
Spenglerian Lebenephiloeophie, but - as is demonstrable in his 
later conceptions - in different indirect and direct ways, cer­
tain elements of Kierkegaard's philosophy15 and (probably through 
Hevesy) Machist positivism played an important role.
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The Dutchman Kramers had been living in Copenhagen for a long 
;ime, and although he was acquainted with Spengler, his "roman­
tic" ideas had established themselves before the Weimar period 
•started,^ under the influences of the existentialist theologi­
an Karl Barth. In his mind, elements of Machist-like positivism 
were present too.
The acausality of their paper was interpreted in a spirit of 
pure positivism by the authors, and by those who were concerned 
with the matter (like Heisenberg, the most important person for 
us from the point of view of further development). Kramers's 
next paper on dispersion theory used only Slater's idea, not 
the statistical assumptions. But this work suited an important 
requirement of positivism, namely that only the observables of 
atomic transitions (frequencies and intensities of spectrum 
lines) appeared in it. Then Kramers collaborated with Heisen­
berg, and so this tradition found its way into Heisenberg's 
paper founding the matrix mechanics.
Another strong positivistic influence reached Heisenberg_through W. Pauli. Probably a major factor in Pauli s intellec­
tual development was the philosophy of his godfather, E. Mach. 
•Pauli's opinion as early as 1919 was already that "in physics 
only quantities which are observable in principle should be 
introduced"; later he very much objected to the concept of 
electron orbits. His judgement had am effect on Heisenberg's 
.views, who was a fellow student and const amt correspondent.
They believed that the principle of observables was the basis 
of Einstein's eucceeful relativity theory. So this principle 
of positivism got into the first paper on matrix mechanics.
"It is well known that the formal rules which are used in quan­
tum theory for calculating observable quantities (such as the 
energy of the hydrogen atom) may be seriously criticized on the 
grounds that they contain, as am essential element, relation­
ships between quamtities that are apparently unobservable in 
principle (such as position, period of revolution of the elec­
tron, etc.); that these rules lack am evident physical founda­
189
tion, unless one still retains the hope that the hitherto un­
observable quantities may perhaps later become accessible to
18experimental determination." So Heisenberg intended to treat 
only observable quantities, and according to Bom's recollec­
tions just this philosophical principle solved the problems. 1 9  
Otherwise here the indeterminism - so characteristic of Machism 
- had not been emphasized so far. Its turn came only later in 
the treatment of interprétâtional problems and in the discovery 
of uncertainty relations.
In 1926 Schrödinger published his papers introducing a 
totally different mathematical apparatus for the quantum theo­
retical problems with an interpretation and philosophical pre­
suppositions different from the Bohr-Heisenberg conception.
The Schrödinger picture caught Max Bom's attention, and he 
tried to use it in his work. Concerning the interpretation he 
also wanted to adopt a middle stand. The motion of particles
follows probability laws, but the probability itself propagates
20in harmony with the causality principle. In Bom's view, 
causality can be found in quantum mechanics, but not in all of 
its fields: individual events are not causally determined. How­
ever, in Bom's theory of collision processes the individual 
particles have position and velocity, and their motions are 
determined. In contrast to Bom, positivism is most obvious in 
Heisenberg's article in which the latter describes the uncer­
tainty relation: "When one wants to be clear about what is to 
be understood by the words 'position of the object', ... then 
one must specify definite experiments with whose help one plans 
to measure the 'position of the electron'; otherwise this term 
has no meaning." The author describes such a possible measure 
ment with an otherwise rather classical character in which "At 
the instant when position is determined ... the electron under­
goes a discontinuous change in momentum. ... At the instant at 
which the position of the electron is known, its momentum there 
fore can be known up to magnitudes which correspond to that 
discontinuous change. Thus the more precisely the position is
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letermined, the less precisely the momentum is known, and con­
versely. ... Let be the precision with which the value q is 
known ... be the precision with which the value p is deter­
minable ... Then ... p^ and q^ stand in the relation
Pl^l* h • Ш "
This is the first form of the uncertainty relation. The prin­
cipal conclusion of its interpretation is that "what is wrong 
in the sharp formulation of the law of causality" is that 
"'When we know the present precisely, we can predict the fu­
ture' is not the conclusion but the assumption. Even in prin­
ciple we cannot know the present in all its details. ... one 
might be led to the presumption that behind the perceived sta­
tistical world there still hides a 'real' world in which cau­
sality holds. But such speculations seem to us, to put it ex­
plicitly, fruitless and senseless. Physics ought to describe 
only the correlation of observations. One can express the true 
state of affairs better in this way: because all experiments 
are subject to the laws of quantum mechanics, and therefore to 
equation (1 ), it follows that quantum mechanics establishes 
the final failure of causality."
The rejection of causality later became closely connected 
with the principle of complementarity which in some respects 
could be interpreted as the generalization of uncertainty 
relations. Concerning the emergence of Bohr's notion of com­
plementarity one cannot neglect certain of the young Bohr's 
abovementioned philosophical sympathies. At the university he 
studied Kierkegaard, and while preparing his dissertation for
a Ph.D. degree he also found time to read and annotate a copy
22of Kierkegaard's "Stages of Life*в Journey" . Bohr recommended
this in a letter to his borther, Harald, as one of the most
23delightful things he had ever read. Perhaps he did not iden­
tify totally himself with Kierkegaard's philosophy, but in 
Bohr's writings the philosopher's ideas are to be found.
The title - "Either-or" - of Kierkegaard's first mature 
work can already be associated with the problem of complemen­
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tarity. The essence of the matter is that while in Hegel's con­
ception the poles form a unity, and they are transmittable, on 
Kierkegaard's view there is no interposition in the contradic­
tion. In my opinion Bohr's complementarity is the scientific 
equivalent of Kierkegaard's moral-social "either-or".
But from the young Bohr let us turn our attention to Bohr
the Nobel— prize winner, who in his lecture delivered on the
occasion of the Volta celebration (Como, 1927) explained that
the quantum postulate - by which there are discontinuities in
the atomic processes - "implies a renunciation as regards the
causal space-time co-ordination of atomic processes. ... any
observation of atomic phenomena will involve an interaction
with the agency of observation not to be neglected. ... The
very nature of the quantum theory thus forces us to regard the
space-time co-ordination and the claim of causality, the union
of which characterizes the classical theories, as complementary
but exclusive features of the description, symbolizing the
24idealization of observation and definition respectively." Ac­
cording to Bohr these exclusive features are also complementary 
to each other, that is the reality may be approached through 
these counterpolee - similarly to Kierkegaard's "either-or".
Heisenberg's initial idea was crystallized into a theory 
by Bohr. In the centre of Machist positivism there was the 
sensation, while the main concept of Bohr's Copenhagen School 
is measurement. "... just the impossibility of neglecting the 
interaction with the agency of measurement means that every 
observation introduces a new uncontrollable element. ... the 
measurement of the positional co-ordinates of a particle is 
accompanied not only by a finite change in dynamical variables, 
but also the fixation of its position means a complete rupture 
in the causal description of its dynamical behaviour, while 
the determination of its momentum always implies a gap in the 
knowledge of its spatial propagation."
Of course in the beginning there were objections to Bohr's 
complementarity principle. One of the most long-lived analo-
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es was described in a 1927 lecture by H.S. Allen. Allen 
ted that the wave and particle theories constitute two sep- 
ate edifices, and "Up to the present no one has bridged the
silf between these two buildings. Many attempts have been made
1> build a bridge, but the keystone of the arch has not been 
i.tted. Physicists are obliged to live sometimes In one bulid­
ig, sometimes In the other. ... Bohr's latest work may be 
ugarded as an attempt to dig an underground passage between 
fie two (buildings), but the tunnel is dark and gloomy, and the 
•imosphere scarcely fit for human respiration." Or, "We may 
Lken the 'complementary' theory of Bohr to a see-saw on which 
эт Particle and Mary Wave are so evenly balanced that a touch 
ill send one end of the plank up or down. If we attempt to 
lx one end to mother earth, the other is suspended in mid- 
lr. " 2 5
In the course of the further development of quantum mechanics 
ew mathematical methods were introduced the success of which 
nvolved principally unobservable elements. But in this way 
eisenberg's original lequirenents could not be realized. In 
rder to overcome this and some other shortcomings Neumann
/anted to put quantum mechanics on an exact mathematical bar
2 6is. He demonstrated that quantum mechanics reveals processes 
'hich correspond to strict causality just as much as processes 
■»hich are incompatible with it.
Thus positivism and indeterminism infiltrating into physics 
ieemed to strengthen and continued to spread. A number of per­
sons wished to extend them to fields outside physics, too. The 
indeterministic conclusions have also found their way into 
popular scientific literature.
Finally, what kind of conclusions can be drawn with respect 
to the particular case (and therefore to some extent to the 
general development of science) from Forman's theses and from 
discussions formed around them? First of all the roots of quan­
tum mechanical indeterminism must be searched for within 
physics also and such roots can be found. Thus we must mention
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Statistical physics, which introduced the averages of mass 
phenomena, and the theory of probability, which ignores the 
causal description of individual processes (by necessity or 
spontaneously). In this way possibilities were created for the 
acausal theories. To explain the realization of these possi­
bilities we must draw other factors into the analysis - for 
Instance, the inner factors of physics, such as the contra­
dictions between stationary states and classical electrodynamr. 
ics, or between waves and particles. To some extent we must 
agree with Forman (and Kuhn) that mainly (but not exclusively) 
the feeling of crisis arising from these contradictions forces 
scientists to choose among the different apparent, but as yet 
unknown, ways and possibilities. And although the physicist 
(and the scientist generally at least from the time of Aris­
totle) considers it his duty to explore the relations, deter­
minations, and causes in his particular research area, it seems 
that he is also ready to give up the causality principle, if 
its use is hopelessly difficult, in the expectation of any 
other (functional or structural) relation.
Of course the answers to the questions of what is hopeless 
and what are the possibilities of solving the problems are 
partly subjective ones. We cannot discuss here the psychology 
of research workers, but this evidently plays role in their 
decisions. Psychological factors have a very close relation to 
the so-called "external" social milieu. But between "external" 
and "internal" there is no sharp borderline, their usage has 
only a relative meaning. For instance, the abovementioned 
physical cores of indeterminism (such as statistical physics) 
also had a social background, and in this case these causes 
are not pure inner causes. And we cannot distinguish between 
the external and internal effects on the knowledge, sympathies, 
and other mental states in the physicists' minds. Naturally 
Formám is right when he says that the social milieu has a con-, 
siderable effect on scientific development. However this ef­
fect may be very complex, and its consequences complex as well.
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our case for Instance physicists as intellectuals do not 
rm a homogeneous group from a political, ideological or even 
om a scientific point of view. Correspondingly we can find 
eat differences in their reactions to the situation in the 
20s. For this reason Forman's statements are sweeping gener- 
izations. I think that it is demonstrable that in the rise 
orthodox interpretation, for example, positivism has played 
greater role than Spenglerian Lebenaphiloeophie, if we speak 
ly about the "external" factors.
In every case it must be said to Forman's credit that be­
ides showing the Weimar cultural climate to be among the pos- 
*.ble factors in the formation of quantum mechanical acausality,
■ s has called the attention of historians and others, in a well- 
ritten and well-documented paper, to the importance of external 
nfluences. This is not negligible, since every history of 
hysics is uncritical when it disregards the social basis. Nev- 
irtheless we have to take into consideration that this social 
asis only last of all, through transmissions, and in a com- 
licated manner determines the former, and rather in its main 
utlines than in every particular instance. Forman's work can 
.nspire further research, since the question already seems to 
e raised as to how the world physics community could accept 
causal quantum mechanics, for instance in the opinion of two 
talian physicists "Through a programmatic reduction of the 
riteria of knowledge and control of natural phenomena (impli- 
it in the 'philosophy of observables'), they produced an epis- 
emological shift in the concept of 'scientific explanation', 
imiting it only to a sort of search for statistical correla- 
:ions between subsequent measurements carried out on the physi­
cal system as a whole. The new style of conceiving (and prac­
tising) physics was better suited to the transformations of 
society which took place in both the cultural sphere and the 
Industrial world during the '20s and '30s, first in Weimar Ger­
many and then in the USA. Because of its adaptability, the 
'orthodox'approach did work better than any other in the e­
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merging sectors of scientific and industrial research. ... The 
realistic' approach, since it was the expression of a more 
complete and unitary project regarding the knowledge of natural 
phenomena, appeared to be more rigid, less manageable, and thus 
it was simply rejected by the majority of younger researchers 
engaged in the new scientific sectors. ... With the transforma­
tion of science into a direct productive force the new physics 
played a central role in the production of technological in­
novations in the most diverse sectors, from chemical industries 
to electronics. Thus the 'orthodox' QM 'purged and relieved' of
all epistemological questions became 'the basis of all prac-
27tical applications'..." . And after this we must ask the ques­
tions why the Copenhagen interpretation is the prevailing in­
terpretation even now, and why attempts at reinterpretation 
still continue.
Loránd Eötvös University 
Budapest
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MARX, MARXISTS AND THE PROBLEM OF ECOLOGY 
Imre Hronszky
here are two typical one-sided interpretations of Marx. One 
econstructs Marx as a techniaiatic thinker who made a fetish 
>f the development of the "objective productive forces", mainly 
hat of technology. The other reconstructs Marx as a thinker 
■fho morally committed himself to the realization of the "real 
luman essence". Interpretations usually move between these two 
:>olarities.
Commitment to technological development at any price - this 
is one typical reconstruction. "This" Marx saw history as the 
scene of necessary technological development which should never 
oe interrupted, and defined the development of the "objective 
productive forces", especially technology, as an independent 
variable of history, part of the destiny of mankind. Because he 
interpreted the advancement of technology as the "objective 
revolutionizing force", he even subordinated his moral indigna­
tion over the state of the working-class in the capitalism of 
his time to the constraint of the "objective-course" of history 
as he perceived it. He not only interpreted history as an "ob­
jective course of events" but as moving towards a definite goal, 
and he was convinced that the "objective functioning" of con­
temporary capitalism was nothing but its role as a social ve­
hicle of development of the productive forces into those needed 
for future communism - so the accusation. Hence the working- 
class of his time was simply the victim of the "objective and 
necessary" course of history. This victim role even had a "pos­
itive" effect in revolutionizing the working-class, by provid­
ing the "subjective" element of social action. In this light, 
Marx appears as a rather cynical commentator on the "objective 
course" of history who saw Nature, and natural resources, as
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just another victim of, in capitalistic production, just as 
the working-class was.
It is no small wonder for a novice in the literature on 
Marx that the other typical one-sided view of Marx reconstruct­
ed Marx's thinking as if he had morally committed himself to 
the realization of the "real human essence", discarding all 
ideas of an "objective history" that only concerned man.
These interpretations see Marx as a secular prophet who, 
on the basis of his firm moral conviction, rejected the whole 
of history so far as being nothing but a long period of aliena­
tion, a prehistory of mankind, and called for social resistan- / 
ce. Some scholars working on this type of representation have 
tried to reconcile the idea of alienation with the fatalistic 
interpretation of history. According to them, alienation was 
a necessary phase in human history for Marx; a sort of trans­
cendental punishment, but having reached its full development, j 
it would necessarily lead to its own abolishment. At this point, j 
alienation had to become conscious, and once conscious, it was 
to be superseded through human action. The prophecy about the 
future did not only have the function of justifying a future 
communism, the latter being none other than the full abolition 
of alienation by definition, but assured that a growing con­
sciousness would really lead in this direction.* The abolition 
of alienation by a new, conscious mankind includes a new non- 
exploitive relationship with Nature, too; a friendly harmony 
based on a "non-possessive" orientation towards Nature.
The first type of Marx reconstruction made him into a cold 
"scientist" who revealed the "objective course" of history, a 
course directed by laws like the course of Nature, and present­
ed him as a commentator on history who measured its progress 
by technological development. The second type turned his ideas 
into a secularized eschatology.
*We lack space here to analyze the Hegelian characteristics of 
this sort of argumentation. History has been working behind 
mankind as the "cunning of reason" and the objective course 
of history has the task of realizing the morally justified 
future- expectation.
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Both types of interpretation have had many advocates over 
e last century. The debate between them reached its highest 
int in the sixties.* A kind of "productive-force fetishistic" 
rx interpretation became official throughout the socialist 
untries. In it the emphasis was on a positive promise of the 
alth of goods made available by advancing technology. This 
rt of Marx interpretation got its backing from "bureaucratic 
gmatic" Marxists in the "official" Marxism of socialist coun- 
ies. With the help of the thesis of what was known as the 
rimacy of the development of objective productive forces" Marx 
■s applied to the needs of the ideology of state socialism 
dified in the early thirties, at the beginning of the Stalinist 
riod. The need for a new ideology had became acute by the 
xties. In response to growing dissatisfaction with the socialist 
ates' policies on living standards, a moderate but steady rise 
i the standard of living became a political goal. By this very 
»derate goal, the gap between the Marxian idea of man steadily 
îveloping himself and his needs and capacities, and the misera- 
le reality, was filled by the promise of richer consumption and 
isier work in the near future.** Technology became the panacea 
iát promised to solve all the problems.
The idea of scientific-technological revolution (STR) 
first under the name of the material-technological basis of 
ammunism) came into prominence as the means.*** The outcome of 
his revolution was seen as the automation of the production 
rocess (predicted in the near future), itself liberating the 
orkers from subordination to machines in the ordinary type of 
actory work. Marx and his ideas about the automation of the 
abour process were adjusted to suit ideological needs. But the 
ew interest in Marx's writings brought with it a real theoretic-
*The scope of this paper does not permit us to go into detail 
here.
**Small wonder that communism became the wonderland of richness 
in consumption (!) in the speeches of politicians such as 
Khrushchev, too. Indirect contrast to Marx, communism receiv­
ed a petit-bourgeois definition.
**As one function of the idea of STR, this ideology offered a 
re-evaluation of the role of scientists and engineers in 
socialism. Another function was to assure people of the "ad­
vantages" of socialist state-directed planning in a new type 
of large-scale technological revolution. 201
al profit as well. Scholars began to analyze more deeply than 
before what Marx wrote about the typical historical evolution 
of the working proceee. As Marx reconstructed it, the relation­
ship between the worker and his productive tools developed fror 
the original immediate unity of craftsmen and their tools, 
through the new relationship between workers and machines in 
which the former became subordinated to the latter (to the 
material basis, “stoffliche Grundlage" of capitalistic produc­
tion), into full automation of the labour process, liberating 
the labourer from subordination, and making him a free user of 
his capacities.
The practical background of the theoretical interest di­
rected the focus of attention to the evolution of productive 
tools. To put it the other way round, the relationship of man 
with Nature became only marginally interesting as the possible 
appropriation of natural processes in transforming them into 
technologies, and not as the ecological problem of the relatioi 
ship between mankind (technology) and the reproduction of Nature.
It is enough to point out that even György Márkus, a write 
who surely cannot be accused of vulgarizing Marx, concentrated 
in his very important book on that side of Marx's thinking, 
claiming that for Marx there was a continuous historical proce: 
of ever-more universal appropriation of Nature by mankind, in 
the form of technology, and this process of appropriation was 
seen by Marx as the basis and part of the advancing social de­
velopment of mankind, the basis of the improvement of man's own
social essence. In other, words, even Márkus failed to expli­
citly consider the relationship between man and Nature as a 
social ecological problem.
Scholars in some Western countries began to emphasize in 
the early sixties that the ecological crisis, accompanying the 
accelerating technological growth, had begun to assume global 
and acute features. At that time this crisis had not affected 
the socialist countries to the same extent as e.g. some parts 
of the USA. Certain political and ideological mechanisms were *
*Márkus György: Marxizmus és “antropológia". Bp. Akadémiai Kia 
dó, 1966.
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ill able to prevent the growing ecological problems from 
coming conscious. Nevertheless, by the end of the sixties 
::ological problems had not only become more and more acute in 
îe different socialist countries, but people began to be in- 
reasingly aware of them as well.
It is only a minor simplification to say that the vulgar 
arxist ideological guardsmen of socialism first of all worked 
at ideological buffer mechanisms against the literature of the 
'zological crisis instead of a thorough social-scientific a- 
alysis. Applying the much-used reflex, typical writings inter- 
reted the problem in the following way: the productive forces 
technology - are per ее neutral, but they can be used social- 
y in opposite ways. The ever growing threat of the contami- 
ation of Nature that accompanies industrial growth is due to 
he capitalistic use of technology, and once property relations 
ave changed, this misuse will be abolished. Even the technology 
nherited from capitalism has been continuously modified - so 
he integration. Another standard argument was that the eco- 
ogical risks were simply unavoidable side-effects of the neces- 
;ary growth of industrial production. This argument was based 
>n the idea of the inevitable character of the growth of tech­
nology and on the consensus that accompanied industrial growth 
in the hope of increased individual consumption. To my mind, 
ahis sort of argument did not reach the level of real philo­
sophical articulation, although it presented itself as such.
For instance, it eliminated the basic level of argument of 
Marxian thinking, that of the welfare of mankind, in the in­
terests of the immediate future.
In the seventies a powerful ecological movement and a vast 
literature of philosophical, economic and sociological ecology emerged 
in the Western countries: a literature ranging from the social 
background of alternative energy models through different ideas 
of alternative economy to possible alternatives to our entire 
way of life. Some of these even reached practical reality either 
in groups looking for alternative ways of living or as part of 
state political and economic conceptions. Let me only pick out 
a few characteristic features of the theoretical writings. They
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extended from the most fundamental subsistence ideas to those 
alternative concepts that tried to explore a possible harmony 
between technological advancement (in the form of some "artful* 
continuous growth), the widening of consumer needs and écologie 
al requirements. The truly philosophical literature made prog­
ress in analyzing different sides of the social aspect of the 
ecological problem. Some dug into the categorical foundations 
of the modern age laid down at the turn of the 18th century.*
In my opinion, these writings expressed justified criticism, 
but in questionable ways. Fr. Capra, e.g., demanding the over­
throw of the "Newtonian paradigm", attacked the whole causal 
attitude of thought, M. Bermann argued for a new "enchantment" 
of the world, cybernetic relations were given an easy teleo­
logical interpretation, etc. It seems that in many cases the 
search for an appropriate catégorial foundation for ecological 
thinking advanced in a cheap and easy form of reteleologizatior 
even revitalization, of the world-picture.**
Another important topic of the ecologically oriented phil­
osophical literature was a reappraisal of the problem of human 
needs; the question being whether it was wise to think of humar 
needs without taking into consideration the reproduction of the 
potential of Nature as a basic need of mankind.
Other philosophically oriented social-theoretical writings 
tried to point out that the nature of technology, or at least 
a particular rate of industrial growth, was the ultimate cause 
of the possible global ecological disaster.
Yet another type of literature concentrated on the social 
values internalized and realized by the different technologies: 
they analyzed the value-creating, mediating role of the develoj 
ment and introduction of new technologies, too.
*Due to growing ecological awareness it was realized more 
widely than before that the triumph of mechanical materialisn 
the doctrine itself comprised in the definition of matter as 
deprived of its sensuous qualities, allowed for an attitude 
to Nature in which Nature was reduced to a repository of raw 
materials.
♦♦Compare this evaluation with the suggestions that Nature, th« 
Earth (Gaia), the biological species have their own goals anc 
hence their "right" to have these goals acknowledged by 
mankind.
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Editorial policies in the socialist countries have so far 
*dly neglected these writings or confined themselves (as in the 
)R) to mere "rejection".
No textbook of Marx's writings relevant to the ecological 
roblem has been published in Hungary until now. That is why 
nis edition is of such importance. It should help us see clear- 
V whether Marx had a definite ecological standpoint (as a basic 
nd coherent philosophical, economic and sociological orientá­
lón to this problem), or, what is much more important in pract- 
cal terms, whether Marx actually left something in his theo- 
etical heritage to assist our understanding of the recent e- 
ological crisis.
The textbook collected and edited by H. Parsons tries to 
ulfil the task of giving a good overview of Marx's conception, 
ut the extensive introduction does "much more": it gives a 
ummary of the application of vulgar Marxism to ecology, too.
’his textbook has the merit of surveying Marx's conception 
though Parsons' choice leaves its mark on the texts) and the 
■merit" (?) that the reader can immediately confront Marx's 
i.deas with their misuse. I should like to clarify this point in 
Borne detail.
Marx developed a definite philosophical anthropological 
3tand-point with regard to the ecological question. Parsons for­
mally shares the same opinion. But he thinks, unlike us, that a 
general dialectic character of the thinking of Marx (and Engels) 
should be seen as the philosophical foundation of their ecolog­
ical sensibility. To my mind, it is not a "general dialectic" 
in their thinking but Marx's definite philosophical-antropo- 
logical stnad-point that gives a coherent and vitally important 
starting point. This starting point allows us to discard the 
extremes which are so fashionable nowadays when ecological 
questions come under discussion.
Marx based his anthropology on the analysis of the labour 
process as the basic dialectical relationship of mankind with 
Nature. This dialectical relationship— the continuous process of
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objectification and appropriation mediated by each other - 
necessarily connects the historical development of the human 
essence, the process of self-creation of the historical-social 
essence of mankind, to the ever fuller material and intellec­
tual, sensuous-emotive appropriation of Nature. In Marx's inter 
pretation, mankind develops itself into a set of universal na­
tural beings. It does so in the sense that throughout its whole 
history, moulded by the special structure of the labour process 
mankind learns to behave itself appropriately to Nature, to 
broader and broader fields of Nature, converting then into its 
own inorganic body.* *A continuously growing part of its capaci­
ties, knowledge and needs comes into being through mutual, man- 
directed interaction with this ever growing "inorganic body". I 
is not only a process whose goal is none other than the use of 
Nature for human needs - themselves defined in relation to thei 
use of Nature -, but Marx sees Nature as the source of human 
capacities and hence as a necessary reservoir for mankind. The 
devastation of Nature is at the same time the devastation of 
mankind, too. For it restricts the evolution of the manifold 
nature of human beings, too. (In Marx's interpretation, the 
human being is the only creature that works out its historical 
essence by appropriating the essence of everything that exists. 
Its existence is a truly historical process of partly bringing 
into being its own essence by appropriation.##) Labour is not 
only the development of the freedom of mankind in relation to 
Nature, by its appropriation, but the freedom of man as a socia 
being as well. For the growing "inorganic body" which is the 
basis of his life in its different functions such as technology 
or the setting of aesthetic pleasures, allows mankind to evolve 
its purely social characteristics, too.
It is important to emphasize, as Márkus points out with 
polemic intent, that this historical process of appropriation
*1 repeat here the reconstruction of Marx's thought by Gy. 
Márkus in the above-mentioned book.
**According to Marx every living being measures its environment 
by its partial measure fixed in its essence. Only man elabo­
rates and changes his essence, partly by incorporating in his 
behaviour and intellect the essence of other beings in a 
historical process.
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i; not restricted to a purely instrumentalist relationship with 
iture.
This position is an adequate starting point from which to 
>nceive of the expansion of man's needs and his awareness of 
oology in unity. In this way, it does away with the futile 
itinomy which says that either man must be subordinated to the 
Interests" of Nature, or vice versa.
The advocates of the Romantic stance would like to see»
•thical constraints imposed on man to bridle his crudely selfish, 
ature-devastating behaviour, his "exploitation" of Nature. The 
rounds for doing so usually involve assigning some "eigenvalue" 
о Nature that exists independently of man. The next practical 
tep dictated to the followers of this conception by the "eigen- 
alue" of Nature, in order to preserve the unlimited character 
f Nature, is to proclaim the necessity of the ethical liraita- 
ion of human needs. Thus, the alternatives are: the unrestrain- 
d economic, industrial exploitation of Nature disregarding the 
uture needs of the economic process for reproduction, or the 
omantically naturalistic, contemplative relationship based on 
lan's self-restraint. Which begs the question of how effective 
îthical self-restraint may actually be in a social mechanisml)
Marx seems to offer philosophical bases for a way out of 
joth impasses by his theoretical, philosophical-antropological 
starting point. He helps to distinguish between the needs to be 
restrained and those to be developed in relation to Nature 
with reference to the real human essence, this self-creating 
(historical -social process. In his anthropology a sort of en­
larged. reproduction becomes the natural starting point; man's 
course is represented as gradually passing on from the stage of 
gathering, drawing the natural goods into his sphere of activity, 
to the stage of reproducing the bases of his existence. Man has 
condemned himself either to reproducing, even improving his own 
natural existential foundation, or to limiting his own develop­
ment.
In the course of improving his many-sided being, man has 
become a more and more comprehensively acting agent of Nature; 
Nature, in turn, is increasingly transmitted through human ac­
tivity even when it is a question of the conservation of "in-
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tact" Nature e.g. in late 20th century national parks. Man can­
not free himself from being homo тепвита in relation to Nature, 
either; by coming into existence, man became a normative factor 
in the evolution of Nature. And since Nature is to an ever- 
increasing extent reproduced via man's interference, man delib­
erately puts an end to certain processes harmful to mankind; 
ever since man came into being, he has directed, the evolution 
of Sature in view of hie own evolution, at first unconsciously 
and later more and more consciously (cf. e.g. the development 
of agriculture via improved species). Homo meneura denotes a 
permanent relationship in the case of any ecological behaviour, 
including sheer subsistence.
At the same time, in today's industrialization we neces­
sarily force Nature into a self-destructive reproduction. By 
reducing man to a "short-term consumer" in his basic tendency, 
the different formations in history have turned him into an ac­
tor working contrary to the human essence (in the Marxian sense) 
which should be realized in his work (in this regard the only 
difference between "existing socialism" and capitalism is that 
in the former a productive mechanism consumes at a high rate 
and not the individuals). Therefore, Marx can help us conceive 
of ecological awareness as part of man as a whole whose re­
production also implies the development of his aesthetic di­
mensions and his senses refined by the richness of Nature, as 
against a crudely reductive production-centered thinking which 
ignores both the reproduction of the very conditions of pro­
duction and the reproduction of man as a whole including e.g. 
his aesthetic dimensions.
This ecological thinking is anthropocentric. However, thisIanthropocentrism, which claims that man's essence cannot de­
velop unless an ever-expanding circle of natural relationship 
are incorporated into his activity, depends on Nature's man- 
transmitted evolution, its enlarged reproduction. Besides, man 
in the Marxian sense is a conscious being capable of recogniz­
ing his own world-historical needs and seeking ways to abandon 
activities that counteract the evolution of his human essence 
as a universal being.
208
Obviously, Marx spoke for the idea of homo faber (he always 
rote enthusiastically of the Promethean symbol). Accordingly,
*; also regarded the principle of "production for production's 
ike" first emerging with capitalist industry, as an achievement 
E historic significance. Yet at the same time he criticized 
Dst fiercely the social formation of his time, namely capital- 
sm, which spurred production to "excesses", making it an end
n itself, subjected to profit. He warned that the blind growth»•f production would gradually eat up ite own preconditions, 
hat he proposed in its place was a communism in which the moral 
onsequence of the unity between mature humanism and naturalism 
ould become necessary through human action. This, in today's 
erminology, presupposes a conscious ecology in man's relation- 
hip with Nature.
The next layer of Marx' theory concerns his view on social 
ormatione. His position is lucidly outlined in claiming that 
.he relationship between man and Nature changes with the his- 
.orically changing social formations, and the primary question 
о be looked at when tackling the problem of ecology is what 
':ype of global social reproduction is at work. As the textbook 
clearly reveals, Marx himself exposed the fundamental features 
,jf the relationship of the capitalism of hie time with Nature, 
tn the capitalism of his tim^ economy functioned through con­
stantly depriving work of some of its preconditions and increas­
ing the individual capitalists' profit directly by extensively 
exploiting the labour force and/or exteriorizing the harmful 
side-processes of production, shifting the burden onto others. 
(Exteriorization assumed the spectacular form of smokestacks in 
the case of chemical works.) In this context he stressed that 
for the capitalist the problem of wages and, to use a modern 
term, of ecology both belonged to the costs of production which 
reduced his profit, and for an individual capitalist the work­
ing of the system was a compulsion from which he could not free 
himself.*
*The average reader is well aware that in capitalist England in 
the early 1840's the government was forced to issue bans to 
check the waste of labour and the rapidly growing mortality 
rate. However, he is far less aware that in the form of the 
"alkali act" something similar was ruled concerning damage to 
Nature. -5nQ
There are two essential tasks facing Marxist theory today. 
One is to explore how the capitalist system woke to the recogni 
tion, via a global ecological crisis, that it was crucially 
important to make widespread efforts to stop the devastation of 
Nature, the basis of its own reproduction. The first major 
steps were taken in the early seventies by announcing and grad­
ually effecting the replacement of the "technology of force" by 
the "technology of the intelligence".*
That is the very point at which Parsons' preface can be 
regarded as mistaken both at the time of writing and even more 
10-12 years later. Parsons uses Marx in a peculiar way. For hiir 
the cause of the ecological problem is "parasitic capital" and 
what guarantees the elimination of the ecological problem is 
the abolition of capitalist society. He tries to present the 
necessary insensitivity of the "capitalist" to ecological prob­
lems as a deceptively simple alternative. On the horn of the 
dilemma of profit vs pollution, the capitalist, he says, will 
choose profit.
Thus, in Parsons' view, the way to solve the ecological 
problem is to do away with capitalism. What we have here is the 
ecological application of the hackneyed stereotype: under the 
appropriate social conditions, the working of productive forces 
will not have harmful effects. The latter derive from the capi­
talistic mode of using these forces, whereas the transformatior 
of property relations will result in the right use of the pro­
ductive forces.The critical attitude of the petit-bourgeoisie 
and dreams of paradise replace the Marxian imperative that the 
current reality must be put under scrutiny as a type of overall 
socio-economic reproduction. The way in which Parsons analyses 
contemporary capitalism reminds one strongly of Veblen's turn- 
of-the-century "petit-bourgeois" spectacles even in its termi­
nology. Capital is anything but "parasitic". Parsons confronts
*Lack of space prevents us here from discussing the point 
that the rapid acceleration of the ecological crisis in the 
"Third World" is largely the consequence of their dependence 
on the advanced capitalist world for their development. This 
means that their ecological crisis is generated by globally 
active capital intent on "exteriorization".
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e Marxian analysis of the capitalism of his time, of which 
'day's capitalism is a variant taken to the extreme, he says, 
th the ideal of a communist society. He compares existing 
iupitalism, more precisely, one of its aspects comprising the 
ugative features, to ideal communism, instead of existing 
»cialism, and in the meantime he makes a short detour praising 
;ie ecological attitude of existing socialism. Now, when we 
ive been ta,ught by sad experience that the "elimination of the 
upitalistic form" is not tantamount to the liberation of the 
iroductive forces, Parsons' description is dangereously simplist­
ic and jeopardizes the recovery of the dwingling credit of Marx- 
sm. The problem is that it is not only capital that is slow to 
earn from the rapidly multiplying symptoms of global ecological 
risis; workers' movements in the capitalist countries and the 
täte administration of the countries of "existing socialism" 
ave proved particularly conservative as well. When a strategic 
ecision had to be made between increasing of the volume of 
onsumer goods and preventing of the deterioration of produc- 
ion's natural preconditions, the raising of wages or produc- 
ion was given priority. Therefore, the realistic context for 
n examination of the contemporary ecological problem is not a 
.omparison between Marx's analysis of classical capitalism - 
lthough such a comparison may have significance for the phil­
osophy of history - but a comparison of today's two existing 
iocial systems as overall reproductive mechanisms. In other 
•rords, the problem of ecology must be evaluated with reference 
:o the specific mechanisms of reproduction in the two world 
systems. The Marxian methodology (whose importance can hardly 
oe overemphasized) requires that the reproductive mechanisms of 
joth modern capitalism and existing socialism be examined from 
i Marxist viewpoint devoid of ideological prejudices. These 
inquiries might show, for example, that it is a minimal social 
condition of ecology that forced industrialization with the 
suppression of individual consumption has made us insensitive 
to the introduction of agricultural technologies based on cruel 
soil contamination just to boost the productivity of agriciiture. 
Го mention an even more effective element, we should also ex­
plore the fact that a huge insensitive political apparatus (and
a bureaucracy consisting of selected experts) can put through, 
as political will - highly questionable global investment pro­
jects causing immense ecological damage (suppressing first witl 
brutal and later with increasingly refined means that public I 
opinion which is an integral part of a well-run democratic po­
litical mechanism and ranges from ordinary people in the streei 
to academicians). One of the tasks would be the unbiassed crit­
ical analysis on a Marxian basis of the social reproductive 
mechanism of "existing socialism" in order to clarify the fund) 
mental peculiarities of the socialist version of the ecological 
crisis in the hope of overcoming it.
Therefore, the reader is kindly referred to Marx's original 
texts in search of a better understanding of his ideas about e- 
cology.
*  *  *
This foreword was written to the Hungarian edition of H. 
Parson's Marx, Engels on Ecology (Englewood, 1977), to be 
published in 1989 by Kossuth. The aim of the English version 
of this paper was to give an insight into Marxist positions on 
ecology in Hungary.
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